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The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-68 
Abstract 
The deposition of Imam Muhammad al-Badr in September 1962 was the culmination of 
a Yemeni nationalist movement that began in the 1940s with numerous failed attempts 
to overthrow the traditional religious legal order. Prior to 1962, both the USSR and 
Egypt had been cultivating alliances with al-Badr in an effort to secure their strategic 
interests in South Arabia. In the days following the 1962 coup d'état, Abdullah Sallal 
and his cohort of Yemeni officers established a republic and concealed the fate of al-
Badr who had survived an assault on his Sana’a palace and whose supporters had 
already begun organizing a tribal coalition against the republic.  A desperate appeal by 
Yemeni republicans brought the first Egyptian troops to Yemen.  Saudi Arabia, 
pressured by Egyptian troops, border tribal considerations and earlier treaties with the 
Yemeni Imamate, supported the Imam’s royalist opposition.  The battleground between 
Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser and al-Badr was transformed into an arena for 
international conflict and diplomacy.  The UN mission to Yemen, while portrayed as a 
symbol of failed and underfunded global peacekeeping at the time, was in fact 
instrumental in establishing the basis for a diplomatic resolution to the conflict.   Bruce 
Condé, an American philatelist, brought global attention to the royalist-republican 
struggle to control the Yemeni postal system.  The last remnants of the British Middle 
East Empire fought with Nasser to maintain a mutually declining level of influence in 
the region.  Israeli intelligence and air force aided royalist forces and served witness to 
the Egyptian use of chemical weapons, a factor that would impact decision-making 
prior to the 1967 War.  Despite concurrent Cold War tensions, Americans and Soviets 
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appeared on the same side of the Yemeni conflict and acted mutually to confine Nasser 
to the borders of South Arabia.  This internationalized conflict was a pivotal event in 
Middle East history as it oversaw the formation of a modern Yemeni state, the fall of 
Egyptian and British regional influence, another Arab-Israeli war, Saudi dominance of 
the Arabian Peninsula, and shifting power alliances in the Middle East. 
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Introduction 
“There were three different stages to the Yemeni Civil War.  For the first few months, it 
was genuinely a war between Abdullah al-Sallal and his republican regime and Imam 
al-Badr and his royalist tribal supporters.  Within half a year of Nasser’s arrival, the 
Yemeni republicans faded into the background and the Egyptians continued the war 
against the royalists.  By 1965, however, the Egyptians were left with only themselves 
to fight.” 
- Recounted, while chewing a mouthful of qat, by General Abdullah Al Sana’ani, a 
former Yemeni General and current curator of the Yemen Military Museum in Sana’a, 
May 2013. 
General Abdullah al-Sana’ani’s observations reflect the dominant Yemeni opinion 
of a revolution that began on September 26, 1962.  The 1962 revolution was the last in 
a series of attempts to overthrow the Yemeni Imamate, which had begun with the 
assassination of Muhammad al-Badr’s grandfather, Yahya in 1948.  Historically, when 
a small military contingent or political rival overthrew the Imam, he would escape to 
the northern highlands of Yemen and gather tribal allies.  The tribes were promised a 
free hand in plundering the capital city as payment for their military service in aiding 
the Imam’s return to power.  This somewhat simplified scenario had held true for 
hundreds of years in Yemen and continued during the revolts in 1948 and 1955.  Why, 
then, did the Imam’s counterrevolutionary historical scenario fail in 1962?  How and 
why did this Yemeni revolution differ from prior episodes in Yemen’s history? What 
impact did this have on the future of the Yemeni state and the Middle East in general? 
 In the days following the shelling of Imam al-Badr’s palace and the outbreak of 
hostilities, Abdullah Sallal and his republican followers managed to convince Egyptian 
president Gamal Abdel Nasser to support the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR).  At the 
same time, Yemeni Prince Hassan, al-Badr’s uncle, assumed the role of Imam in al-
Badr’s absence and secured aid commitments to the royalist opposition from Saudi 
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Arabia.  The involvement of Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the Yemeni conflict was both a 
manifestation of earlier strategic agreements with Yemen and a consequence of 
political intrigue surrounding the falsely reported death of al-Badr. Over the course of 
the next six years, Britain, Canada, Israel, the UN, US, and USSR would join Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia to assume varying roles in fighting, mediating, and supplying the 
belligerent forces.  The first few days of the conflict transformed a local regime change 
into a global struggle that would impact both the Yemen civil war and multiple 
international rivalries.   
The Global and Arab Cold Wars – New International History 
A collective analysis of the American, British, Egyptian, Israeli, Saudi, and Soviet 
interventions and how their individual foreign policies interacted and contrasted with 
one another, provides a better understanding of the Yemen civil war and the impact that 
the international arena in Yemen had upon events and relations beyond its borders.  In 
particular, American and Soviet positions in Yemen during the 1960s reveal several 
anomalies to generalized themes of the “Global Cold War”, as defined by Odd Arne 
Westad.
1
 He argues that American and Soviet ideologies were a major components of 
their respective Cold War policies in the Third World.  There are, however, 
considerable difficulties with applying this Cold War paradigm of ideology to the 
Middle East in the manner it has been applied in other parts of Asia and Africa.   
The Middle East was and continues to be dominated by intraregional conflicts and 
circumstances, such as Israel/Palestine and the impact of oil export dependency on 
many Arab countries, making US and USSR ideological foreign policies difficult to 
maintain.   During the 1960s, Soviet and American policy in Yemen was based on 
                                                          
1
Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2007). This reinterpretation of Westad’s argument is based on a personal conversation with the 
author. 
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realpolitik strategic calculations, rather than ideologically-based decisions.  The Soviet 
construction of the western Yemeni port of Hodeidah, was part of a broader Soviet 
effort to secure international shipping, particularly along the Red Sea and the entryway 
to the Suez Canal.  US grand strategy envisioned a closer relationship with the Saudi 
oil monarchy north of the Yemen border, thereby placing a premium on Arabian 
political stability and the containment of regional conflicts.  The converging foreign 
policies of the US and USSR was manifested by mutual support and recognition of the 
YAR.  Furthermore, by 1965, both powers tolerated and even encouraged Nasser’s 
continued occupation of Yemen in an effort to divert maintain their individual strategic 
interests in Yemen and subsequently divert Egyptian attention away from Israel.   After 
1967 and through the 1980s, however, South Arabia became a partial exception to 
ideology-less Cold War interactions in the Middle East with the founding of the first 
and only communist Arab state in South Yemen. 
In coining the term “Arab Cold War”, Malcolm Kerr characterized the 1950s and 
1960s as a conflict between monarchies and nationalists in the Middle East.
2
  There are 
several difficulties in applying Kerr’s theory to Yemen during the 1960s.  The 
boundaries between nationalist and monarchist were not rigid as is evident from 
Nasser’s alliance with Yemeni Imam al-Badr (and his father Ahmad) prior to the war 
and the Jordanian monarchy’s recognition of the YAR in 1964.  In addition, the conflict 
in Yemen did not occur in a regional vacuum.  Egyptian rivalries with Britain, the 
Iranian Shah, Iraq, and Israel along with competing US-USSR visions for the Arabian 
Peninsula overshadowed Nasser’s “cold war” rivalry with Saudi monarchs.  The 
Yemen civil war demonstrates that the 1960s was a period of conflict between nation-
                                                          
2
 Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal ‘Abd Al-Nasir and his Rivals – 1958-1970 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1971).  Contemporary references to the Yemen civil war 
(Ferris, Jesse Nasser’s Gamble for example) continue to cite Kerr’s “Arab Cold War” as the 
definitive characterization of the period. 
4 
 
 
state formation and an abstract idea of Arab unity, rather than a black and white 
ideological conflict between Egypt and Saudi Arabia.
3
 
This study of the Yemen civil war is an example of new international history that 
seeks to combine multinational archival sources in a broader explanation of events on 
the ground and of a local conflict’s far reaching impact.  Matthew Connelly established 
the model for this type of history in his analysis of the Algerian war for independence, 
1954-62. Connelly explains how France won the battle on the ground but lost the war 
internationally.
4
   
This dissertation analyzes the Yemen conflict using a similar framework. The 
Yemen civil war was characterized by two complementary battlefields: the highlands of 
Yemen and the floors of international diplomacy and media.  The mechanized Egyptian 
occupation army faced the challenge of fighting an elusive tribal militia that 
successfully used cave hideouts and civilian cover as part of its battle strategy.  The 
international war fought in the halls of Moscow, Washington, and the UN, differed 
from that fought by the French in Algeria, in that there was no clear consensus that 
Egypt was an imperialist power, particularly in contrast to Britain with its colony in 
Aden.  Furthermore, Egypt lost both the battle on the ground and the war in 
international media and support.  After a series of failed diplomatic efforts, the 
international community resigned itself to tolerate and even encouraged Nasser’s 
continued investment in a war that was limiting Egypt economically and politically 
elsewhere in the region. 
                                                          
3
 Avraham Sela, “Nasser’s Regional Politics,” in Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and 
Historical Memory in Modern Egypt, ed. Elie Podeh and Onn Winkler (Gainesville, FL: 
University Press of Florida, 2004), 200.  Sela made similar observations about the limitations of 
Kerr’s ideological Arab Cold War.  He refers to the 1960s as a transition from political symbols 
to “negotiated order”. 
4
 Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the 
Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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Connelly urged scholars of diplomatic history to “take off the Cold War lens,” of 
East-West rivalry, as this paradigm obfuscates themes of postcolonial development, 
economic integration, and demographics.
5
 Taking off both the “Cold War lens” and the 
“Arab Cold War lens” reveals multiple interactions, conflicts, and themes that would 
have otherwise been obscured by the dominant paradigm.  This narrative of the 
international Yemen civil war focuses on traditional overarching themes of US-USSR 
and Egypt-Saudi Arabia competition, while reinterpreting their applicability to the 
Yemen case and adding layers of narrative and analysis beyond the central conflicts. 
Topics of modernity and nationalism in South Arabia, Canadian policy in the Middle 
East, regional peacekeeping funding crises, the Anglo-Egyptian rivalry, philatelic 
significance, and Israeli-Egyptian confrontations beyond the Sinai border dominate the 
pages of this study.   As Erez Manela explains, rather than removing the Cold War lens 
entirely, perhaps what is needed is a bi-focal lens that allows for a “broader field of 
vision” to incorporate both traditional and innovative perspectives.6  Through this 
broader analysis of the Yemen civil war, it is possible to reconsider the centrality of 
Saudi-Egyptian and US-Soviet Cold Wars.  A narrative of monumental conflict 
between two powers can obscure historical episodes, such as the Yemen civil war, 
where opposing powers arrived at moments of agreement and cooperation. 
International Intervention in Civil Wars 
 The Yemen civil war of 1962-68, was a prototypical example of civil conflicts 
during the post-WWII era.  From 1945-1999, there were 127 civil wars world-wide, 
compared with 25 interstate wars during the same period.  Fearon and Laitin attribute 
                                                          
5
 Matthew Connelly, “Taking Off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during 
the Algerian War for Independence,” The American Historical Review 105 (2000): 739-769. 
6
 Erez Manela, “A Pox on Your Narrative: Writing Disease Control into Cold War History,” 
Diplomatic History 34:2 (2010): 299-323. 
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the prevalence of civil wars during this period to “small, lightly armed bands practicing 
guerilla warfare from rural base areas.” The four most important conditions for such an 
insurgency include weak government, rough terrain, large impoverished population, 
and access to weapons and foreign support.
7
 Prior to 1962, the Yemeni tribal 
population was poor, yet well-armed, and resided in a mountainous terrain that had 
frustrated the efforts of invading armies for centuries.  Multiple attempts to overthrow 
the al-Badr’s Hamid al-Din ruling family were a sign of both the increasing strength of 
the opposition and the weakness of the Imamate. 
Foreign intervention in post-WWII civil wars can be divided into three main 
categories: military, economic, and diplomatic.  The consensus among international 
relations scholars is that foreign military and economic intervention tend to prolong 
both the duration and intensity of the conflict while making a resolution more difficult 
to attain.
8
 The Egyptian military presence and extensive aid to the YAR singlehandedly 
sustained the longevity of the republican regime and perpetuated the conflict against al-
Badr and the northern royalist tribes.  The royalist armies, on the other hand, were 
supplied through an extensive clandestine operation involving British mercenaries, 
Israeli airlifts, CIA infiltrations, Saudi funding and Iranian advisers.   The Yemen civil 
war marked one of the few times that England, Iran, Israel, and Saudi Arabia were on 
                                                          
7
 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American 
Political Science Review 97, 1 (February 2003): 75-90.  Fearon and Laitin were one of the first 
to conduct a rigorous cross-national analysis of why civil wars occur. 
8
 Dylan Balch-Lindsay and Andrew J. Enterline, “Killing time: The world politics of civil war 
duration, 1820-1992,” International Studies Quarterly 44 (2010): 615-42.  Ibrahim Elbadawi 
and Nicholas Sambanis, “External interventions and the duration of civil wars,” (paper 
presented at workshop on Economics of Civil Science, Princeton, NJ, March 18-19, 2000).  
Patrick Regan, “Third Party interventions and the duration of intrastate conflicts,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 46 (2002): 55-73. 
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the same side of a conflict.
9
  To support the republicans, Soviet economic aid from 
1962-1967 and direct military intervention during the siege of Sana’a in 1968 acted 
similarly to maintain a republic that would have otherwise succumbed to financial 
crises and a subsequently military defeat. 
 During this same period from 1945-1999, there were more than 400 diplomatic 
efforts worldwide by third parties to mediate hostilities.  Foreign intermediaries acted 
to bridge the gap between two intransigent parties who could not otherwise reconcile 
differences and approach the negotiating table.
10
 Diplomatic mediation during civil 
conflicts had a relative success rate of 30%, which reflect the fact that foreign nations 
or institutions did not have the ability to provide sanctuary or security if agreements 
broke down leaving one side or the other in a position of increased vulnerability.
11
 
Other studies have shown that mediation shortened the length of a given conflict even 
as the fighting continued during and after the peace conference.
12
 The success of 
diplomatic mediation has been shown to differ depending on the stage in the conflict in 
which it was implemented.  Mediation efforts in the middle of a conflict were more 
effective than those taking place at the onset of a conflict or after an extended period of 
fighting.
13
 
 The timing of diplomatic efforts in Yemen can account for their initial failure.  
Within weeks of the onset of hostilities, UN and US representatives began a period of 
                                                          
9
 Saeed M. Badeeb, Saudi-Iranian Relations, 1932-1982 (London: Centre for Arab and Iranian 
Studies, 1993), 56.  The 1960s was a period of Iranian-Saudi alliance and cooperation. 
10
 Patrick M. Regan and Aysegul Aydin, “Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil 
Wars,” The Journal of Conflicts Resolution 50 (October 2006): 739. 
11
 William J. Dixon, “Third-party techniques for preventing conflict escalation and promoting 
peaceful settlement,” International Organization 50 (1996): 653-681. 
12
 Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Noron, “Greed, grievance, and mobilization in civil wars,” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (2005): 319-336. 
13
 Regan and Aydin, “Diplomacy and Other Forms”. 
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“shuttle diplomacy” between Cairo and Riyadh in an attempt to secure the withdrawal 
of Egyptian and Saudi support for warring Yemeni factions.  These efforts culminated 
with a 14-month UN mission to Yemen led by Canadian peacekeepers from July 1963 
to September 1964.  The inability of these efforts to produce a lasting diplomatic 
solution to the conflict may have been a product of poor timing, rather than misguided 
terms of agreement.  The performance of the UN mission to Yemen, previously 
misinterpreted as a failure, was hampered not only by poor timing but also by pre-1962 
tensions related to the financing of peacekeeping missions.  From 1965-1967, Saudi 
Arabia and Egypt organized their own peace conference overseen by Arab mediators, 
culminating with the Khartoum Conference in August 1967.  At the basis of these 
agreements were the original terms of withdrawal proposed by the UN and US 
mediation efforts, but not enacted during the period of their intervention, evidence that 
their weakness was not in the content of the proposal, but in the timing of the peace 
negotiations. 
Mediation efforts during the Yemen civil war were hindered as well by the multiple 
non-state and clandestine actors involved in the conflict.  British and French 
mercenaries acted to train and coordinate royalist fighting against Egyptian troops, 
while Israeli pilots and intelligence agents supplied royalist soldiers with vital 
weaponry and communications equipment. Bruce Condé, an American philatelist, 
singlehandedly founded the royalist postal system as part of a broader royalist-
republican struggle for national legitimacy and international recognition.  Yemen had 
become the playground of the international diplomatic and intelligence community. 
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The Civil War and the Emergence of a Modern State 
Yemen, located in the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula, did not exist as a 
distinct South Arabian state prior to the 20
th
 Century.
14
  Harold Ingrams, a British 
diplomat who served in the Aden Protectorate argued that “the normal state of al-
Yemen through history has been chaos.  The people and their country have been a 
regional entity in the Arab world, but never a unified nation.”15 
Since Roman times, when Yemen was referred to as Arabia Felix, the region has 
been invaded, occupied, and subjugated by no fewer than a dozen external powers.   
Dating back to 9
th
 Century, the Qasimi succession of Yemeni Imams, or religious 
leaders adherent to the Zaydi branch of Shi’a Islam, was the only constant among the 
changing rulers.  In the 19
th
 Century the Egyptian army, under Muhammad Ali captured 
the northern half of Yemen at the behest of the Ottoman Empire while the British 
Empire captured the southern port of Aden.  Over the following decades the British and 
Ottoman Empire expanded control and influence over the surrounding tribal areas.  To 
avoid territorial conflict, they signed a treaty officially dividing South Arabia into 
North and South Yemen.  The great majority of North Yemen was of the Zaydi 
religious sect, increasing the power and influence of the Yemeni Zaydi Imam.  Rule 
over South Yemen, dominated by the Shafi’i branch of Sunni Islam, was consolidated 
by the British in the 20
th
 Century in the form of the East and West Aden Protectorate 
which eventually became the Federation of South Arabia. 
                                                          
14
 Robert W. Stookey, Yemen: The Politics of the Yemen Arab Republic (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1978), 2. 
Robin Bidwell, The Two Yemens (Boulder: CO: Westview Press, 1983).  Bidwell argues that 
the concept of the unified state of Yemen dates back to 1229 CE, the Yemeni region entered 
two centuries of a golden age under the Rasulid Dynasty which ruled over most of South 
Arabia. 
15
 Harold Ingrams, The Yemen: Imams, Rulers, & Revolutions (London: John Murray, 1963), 4. 
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In 1918, Imam Yahya Muhammad of the Hamid al-Din family, a member of the 
Qasimi religious dynasty, led a war of independence against the Ottomans, founding 
the Mutawakkilite Kingdom in North Yemen.  The traditional view of Yahya and his 
son Ahmad, who succeeded him in 1948, was that of autocratic rulers who forcibly 
isolated their country from foreign influence.
16
 The increased centralization of authority 
under Imam Ahmad pushed certain groups into exile where they developed political 
aspirations that would ultimately lead to the deposition of a theocratic monarchy and its 
replacement by a secular republic.
17
 Historian J.E. Peterson explains that the modern 
Yemeni revolution began during Imam Yahya’s reign (1918-1948), culminating with 
the 1962 civil war, following decades of gradual revolution and pressures for change in 
Yemen.
18
 
An additional framework with which this study engages is the impact that the 
internationalization of the conflict had upon the Yemen sense of national identity and 
state formation.  The presence of the “other” in North Yemen, the extent of the foreign 
presence, and the competing state models forced simultaneously upon North Yemen, 
compelled a collective exercise in defining Yemeni national identity.  September 1962 
was not only the deposition of Imam al-Badr, the last member of the Qasidi dynasty, 
but also the formulation of a modern sense of the Yemeni state. 
The opposition movement that began gradually in 1918 was accelerated as resources 
and a significant foreign presence intervened in Yemeni affairs.  International 
intervention helped further the establishment of a modern political bureaucracy, a 
                                                          
16
 Ingrams, The Yemen, 63.  Ingrams says of Yahya: “No ruler of importance could have so 
personified isolation.” 
17
 Stookey, Yemen, 6.  For example, after Egyptian King Faruq was deposed, Ahmad ordered 
the confiscation of all radio sets in Yemen.   
18
 J. E.,  Peterson, Yemen: The Search for a Modern State, (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 68. 
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national army, and an increase in revenue with the expansion of existing taxation and 
the postal networks.  Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia disbursed large sums of money to 
Yemeni tribes in an effort to win their support during the conflict, giving tribesmen 
access to money for modern imports and luxuries.
19
  Foreign construction projects gave 
the country a road network connecting major urban areas, utilities in Hodeidah, Sana’a 
and Ta’iz, a modern port in Hodeidah, an airport in Sana’a, and an improved 
communications network.  The internationalized civil war brought about the demise of 
the Yemeni Imamate, Nasser’s Arab Nationalism, and British Imperialism in South 
Arabia, three of the competing forces working to undermine modern Yemeni state 
formation.
20
 
Nasser envisioned a Yemeni state that would be controlled from Cairo and would 
mirror the United Arab Republic in many aspects from its constitution to the format of 
its postal stamps.  The founding Yemeni republicans were emulators of Nasserism, 
supporters of Arab nationalist unity, and consciously invited Egyptian intervention to 
secure the republic.  The Egyptian occupation went to great lengths to stifle opposition 
including the Imam’s supporters, dissident tribal alliances, and internal republican 
opposition through warfare, bribery, assassination, and detainment.   
The US, Israeli, British and Iranian foreign policies exhibited a preference for 
continued instability in Yemen, as Nasser’s military entanglement benefited their 
mutual interests away from South Arabia.  The US supported and sanctioned Nasser’s 
continued presence, while Israel, the UK, and Iran collectively undermined the 
                                                          
19
 Mohammed A. Zabarah, “The Yemeni Revolution of 1962 Seen as a Social Revolution,” in 
Contemporary Yemen: Politics and Historical Background, ed. B.R. Pridham (London: Croom 
Helm, 1984), 80. 
20
 Fred Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans (London: Saqi Books, 2002), 27.  Halliday argues that 
Soviet foreign intervention in South Arabia presented a fourth obstacle to the Yemeni state 
following the end of the civil war in 1968. 
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Egyptian position through an extensive clandestine war.  The Saudis preferred a weak 
ruled either by the Imam or another political entity that could be dominated by Saudi 
Arabia.   Instability was tolerated as long as hostilities did not carry over into Saudi 
territory. 
Soviet state visions for Yemen were focused on grooming a pro-Soviet leader who 
would be amendable to accommodating a naval and military base in South Arabia.  
After Moscow’s initial alliance with Imam al-Badr was derailed in September 1962, 
contingent plans were put in place to appeal directly to the Yemeni people and cultivate 
a relationship with five prominent pro-Soviet figures in the Yemen republic.  The 
USSR continued its support even after the Egyptian withdrawal and managed to sustain 
the Yemeni republic and its new president ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani who was one of 
the “Soviet-Five”. 
The civil war cost the lives of over 200,000 Yemenis and caused incalculable 
damage to property.  The collective goal of the war’s international participants was not, 
however, to destroy North Yemen or decimate its population.  Rather, the former 
kingdom was viewed as a potential state, whether unstable, weak, Nasserist, or 
communist.  The investment, capital, and international attention during the 1960s 
brought not only destruction and war but a sense of nationalism and unity for the 
emerging modern state of Yemen.   
13 
 
 
Bibliographical Notes 
The goal of this international history of the Yemen civil war is to draw from the 
multiple historical perspectives in constructing a single comprehensive analysis of this 
landmark conflict.  By drawing on archives from Britain, Canada, Israel, Russian, the 
UN, the US, and Yemen along with the secondary literature from each of these national 
perspectives, this work explains how and why the Yemen civil war became an arena for 
global conflict and what were the implication of international participation in the 
conflict.   
When New York Times correspondent Dana Adams Schmidt published his book on 
the Yemen civil war in 1968, he was justified in referring to the conflict as The 
Unknown War.
21
 Relatively little media attention had been given to this remote region 
of Arabia.  Around the time of Schmidt’s book, three additional media accounts were 
published by British, Israeli, and French journalists, collectively providing a thorough 
chronological description of the war.
22
  Since the publication of these four journalistic 
accounts, many works have focused on various aspects of the conflict such as Saudi-
Egyptian rivalry
23
 or the history of Saudi-Yemeni relations.
24
  
Firsthand accounts and analyses of the last years of British occupation in Aden 
represent the largest single body of literature on Yemen during the 1960s. There are 
                                                          
21
 Dana Adams Schmidt, Yemen: The Unknown War (London: Bodley Head, 1968). 
22
 Edgar O’Ballance, The War in Yemen (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1971); Claude  Deffarge 
and Gordian Troeller, Yemen 62-69, de la révolution sauvage à la trêve des guerriers (Paris, R. 
Laffont, 1969); Yael Vered, Hafikhah u-milḥamah be-Teman (Coup and War in Yemen) (Tel 
Aviv : Am ʻoved, 1967), Vered is the only of the authors that did not travel to Yemen at any 
point, but rather compiled the book from her diligent review of Arab press reports while at her 
diplomatic post in Paris.  
23
 Saeed M. Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian conflict over North Yemen, 1962-1970 (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1986).  
24
 F. Gregory Gause, Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). 
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dozens of memoirs written by former British diplomats, Special Air Services (SAS) 
members, and colonial officials in Aden
25
 and an equal number of historical studies.
26
  
Two recent books by Clive Jones and Duff Hart-Davis have focused on the British 
covert war in Yemen.
27
  The collection of books and articles on the end of the British 
Empire are singularly focused on internal British politics, border wars with Yemeni 
tribes, and nationalist terrorism in Aden and do not, for the most part, contextualize 
British policies within an international framework. 
Significantly less attention has been devoted to original research on American policy 
towards the Yemen war, with only a few articles devoted to Kennedy and Johnson’s 
policy towards the conflict.
28
 The Yemen civil war appears as a footnote or at most a 
small section in studies of Arab-Israel conflict and relations with Nasser.  Multiple 
works in English provide a history of Yemen, covering the civil war from a domestic 
perspective as a chapter within the larger work.
29
 
Literature in Arabic and Russian on the Yemen civil war is extensive, but lacking in 
sources and academic analysis.  Several Russian books focus on the Yemen Arab 
                                                          
25
 These accounts include the memoirs of High Commissioners of Aden (for example Charles 
Johnston,  The View from Steamers Point: Being an Account of Three Years in Aden (London: 
Collins, 1964)) and British politicians (such as  David Smiley, Arabian Assignment (London: 
Cooper, 1975).  See bibliography for a more comprehensive list. 
26
 The best historical account is Spencer Mawby, British policy in Aden and the protectorates, 
1955-67: last outpost of a Middle East empire (London: Routledge, 2005). 
27
 Clive Jones, Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1965: Ministers, Mercenaries, and 
Mandarins: Foreign Policy and the Limits of Covert Action(Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic 
Press, 2004) and Duff Hart-Davis, The War that Never Was: The True Story of the Men Who 
Fought Britain’s Most Secret Battle (London: Arrow, 2012).  Hart-Davis’ war was so “secret” 
that he did not even cite Jones’ work on the same subject written seven years earlier, claiming 
to be telling this story “for the very first time”. 
28
 For example Michael B. Bishku, “The Kennedy Administration, the UN, and the Yemen 
Civil War,” Middle East Policy 1:4 (1992), 116-28. 
29
 Paul Dresch, A History of Modern Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 
and John E. Peterson, Yemen: The Search for a Modern State (London: Croom Helm, 1982) are 
two examples. 
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Republic, the September 1962 Revolution, and Soviet involvement in South Arabia.
30
 
Recently declassified documents compiled on Soviet-Egyptian relations from 1957-
1967, entitled The Near East Conflict, focus mostly on the Arab-Israel conflict, while 
devoting some attention to Yemen.
31
 
The great majority of Arab writing on the civil war was published in Yemen.  
Dozens of eyewitness and historical accounts provide an interesting local perspective, 
albeit with few, if any, verifiable sources. Mohsin al-Ayni and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-
Baydani, two former YAR Prime Ministers, published the most organized and well-
known recollections of the first decades of the YAR.  As is the case with political 
memoirs more generally, the recollections of al-Ayni and al-Baydani are intended to 
unabashedly whitewash their involvement in the civil war and for the most part cannot 
be taken at face value.
32
  Yemeni historical accounts of September 1962 portray the 
years of the civil war as an idealistic struggle for Yemeni nationalism.  For example, 
from 2003-2010, the Yemeni Department of Moral Guidance based in Sana’a released 
a seven-volume series following a national conference to commemorate the 40 year 
anniversary of the revolution.  The volumes included selected essays, speeches, and 
original documents.  The historic analysis amounts to little more than propaganda for 
Yemeni nationalism and the idealized life of Yemeni revolutionaries, and the most 
                                                          
30
 Lev Nikolaevich Kotlov, Ĭemens ai a  Arabs ai a  Respublika  (Moscow: Nauka, 1971) and O. 
G. Gerasimov, Ĭemens ai a  revoli u t s ii a , 1962-1975 (Moscow: Nauka, 1979) are two examples. 
31
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(Moscow: Mezhdunarodny  fond  Demokratii a ", 2003). 
32
 Mohsin A. Alaini, 50 Years in Shifting Sands: Personal Experience in the Building of a 
Modern State in Yemen (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar An-Nahar, 2004) and Baydani, ‘Abd al-Rahman, 
Azmat al-ummah al-ʻArabīyah wa-thawrat al-Yaman (Cairo:  Jumhūrīyat Miṣr al-ʻArabīyah, 
1984). 
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substantial archival sources are translations of documents from the British National 
Archives.
33
 
A significant number of Egyptian war veterans have written historic recollections 
and assessment of the Egyptian occupation of Yemen.  The most well-known among 
these books, written by Egypt’s former chief of intelligence Salah al-Din al-Hadidi and 
Mahmud ‘Adil Ahmad,34 is used extensively in this work to elucidate elements of 
Egyptian politics and decision-making.  The two best overviews and incorporations of 
these Egyptian memoirs was compiled by Jesse Ferris, in his work on Nasser’s 
intervention in Yemen and its impact upon the Egyptian political class
35
 and by Laura 
James in her book on Nasser’s foreign policy.36  While extensive, Egyptian literature 
does not venture beyond the immediate confines of military barracks and the political 
world of Cairo. 
This dissertation goes beyond the current accounts of the Yemen civil war, often still 
referred to as the “Unknown War,” in the both scope of its historical time period and 
the extent of its archival resources.  Through an extensive narrative of international 
participation in this conflict, it is the intention that Yemen during the 1960s will no 
longer remain an obscure and “Unknown” conflict.  Rather, it will be seen as a 
significant moment in history with ramification for the Middle East and the broader 
international community. 
                                                          
33
 Thawrat 26 Sebtember 1962 (Sana’a: Department of Moral Guidance, 2004). This series was 
so popular that it was already released in a second and third printing. 
34
 Sallah al-Din Al-Hadidi, Shāhid ʻalá ḥarb al-Yaman (Cairo:  Maktabat Madbūlī, 1984) and 
Mahmud ‘Adil Ahmad, Dhikrayat Harb al-Yaman, 1962-1967(Cairo: Maṭba’at al-Ukhuwwah, 
1992). 
35
 Jesse Ferris, Nasser’s Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the 
Decline of Egyptian Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013). 
36
 Laura M. James, Nasser at War: Arab Images of the Enemy (New York: Palgrave, 
Macmillan, 2006). 
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Chapter Outline 
 The subsequent seven chapters will follow a chronological narrative starting in 1839 
and end in the aftermath of the Yemeni Civil War in 1968.  The purpose of this 
dissertation is not to reiterate a journalistic account of every battle in the Yemen civil 
war, nor is it an attempt to summarize events in Aden that led to the withdrawal of 
British forces in 1967.  Rather, the chapters will focus on the myriad countries 
involved, the significance of the war for their own foreign policies, and the impact of 
the internationalized conflict on Yemen and the Middle East. 
Chapter 1, “The First Anglo-Egyptian Confrontations,” begins with the capture of 
Aden in 1839 as part of Lord Palmerston’s campaign against Muhammad Ali, and 
continues through the 20
th
 Century, culminating with the 1956 Suez War.  This chapter 
explains the historic Anglo-Egyptian rivalry that came to dominate events in Yemen 
during the 1960s. 
Chapter 2, “International Intrigue and the Origins of September 1962,” argues that 
the coup in September 1962 was a culmination of more than two decades of 
revolutionary sentiments among Yemeni émigrés and local opposition movements, 
rather than a revolution emanating primarily from the Egyptian foreign office.  The 
chapter then focuses on Imam Muhammad al-Badr and his relationship with Nasser and 
the USSR prior to September 1962 and concludes with a contrast to the US and the 
relatively minimal importance granted to Yemen prior to the coup. 
Chapter 3, “Recognizing the New Republic,” focuses on the first days of the new 
Yemeni republic, the secrecy surrounding Imam al-Badr’s fate, and the hostile stance 
taken by the YAR towards Saudi Arabia.  Egypt and Saudi Arabia were reluctantly 
drawn into the conflict, a policy decision that both countries attributed to legal and 
historical reasons.  The chapter then focuses on the formation of al-Badr’s tribal 
18 
 
 
opposition and the emerging relations between YAR and the Cold War superpowers 
and their respective decisions to recognize the republic. 
   Chapter 4, “Local Hostilities and International Diplomacy,” delves into details of the 
first two years of fighting between Egyptian and royalist forces which included the 
Egyptian Ramadan and Haradh Offensives and multiple royalist counteroffensives.  
The chapter then looks at the role of republican and royalist postal policies during the 
war and the impact of American philatelist Bruce Condé on the royalist postal efforts. 
Chapter 5, “The UN Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM),” explores the 
international diplomatic efforts with a focus on the UN mission to Yemen.  The chapter 
incorporates newly available UN and Canadian archival material in an attempt to 
further understand the function of the mission in Yemen and its impact on the broader 
conflict.  A focus on the living conditions and operations of the mission’s personnel 
helps clarify previous misrepresentations of the mission as an underfunded diplomatic 
failure. 
Chapter 6, “Nasser’s Cage”, looks at the diplomatic conferences between 1964 and 
1966 and Nasser’s decision to pursue a “long-breath” defensive strategy.  The chapter 
presents an analysis of US and Soviet perceptions of Nasser’s foreign policy and 
Moscow’s plans for a postwar alliance with the YAR.  The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of Nasser’s use of chemical weapons in Yemen and international reluctance 
to intervene. 
Chapter 7, “The British and Israeli Clandestine War Against Egypt” tells the story of 
the Aden Group, a collection of Conservative British politics who clandestinely 
intervened to help train and supply royalist tribesmen.  The group’s activities attracted 
the attention and participation of the Israeli intelligence agency and air force in aiding 
19 
 
 
anti-Nasser forces.  This participation had a profound impact on the Israeli decision to 
attack Egypt in June 1967. 
20 
 
Chapter 1: The Anglo-Egyptian Rivalry 
British Capture of Aden 
Between 1835 and 1837, British Captain Stafford Bettesworth Haines made two 
expeditionary trips to Aden, assessing it to be a suitable port for trade on the Red Sea.  
Captain James MacKenzie of the Bengal Light Cavalry, conducted similar surveys in 
1837, noting that Muhammad Ali’s army, which had been consolidating its position in 
Yemen since 1832, was poised to move southwards and capture the port of Aden.
1
 
Ali’s army was sent to Yemen at the behest of the Ottoman Empire to crush the 
Wahhabi tribal revolt in the Hijaz, an area encompassing the holy cities of Mecca and 
Medinah.  When hundreds of Egyptians were reported to have garrisoned the Yemeni 
port city of Mocha on June 22, 1837, the British Foreign Office estimated that it was 
only a matter of time until Muhammad Ali’s forces secured the entire Arabian 
Peninsula.
2
  Beyond the Red Sea trade, Yemen itself was estimated to be a valuable 
asset to Ali as it was, and continues to be, the most populous country on the Arabian 
Peninsula.
3
 The impending Egyptian conquest of Aden would have serious 
ramifications for British commerce in the Red Sea and the security of India and its 
trade routes. Moreover, the expansion of Egyptian control on the Arabian Peninsula 
                                                          
1
 Eric Marco,  Yemen and the Western World. London: Hurst, 1968, 27. From the 17
th
 Century, 
coffee was the principle and most valuable export from Yemen.  Traders from Western Europe 
and the Americas competed for rights to Yemeni ports and access to the coffee agricultural 
markets.  Prior to the War of 1812, British traders had been a fixture in the western Yemeni 
port of Mocha.  During the 1820s and 1830s, however, American shipping, taking advantage of 
post-Napoleonic wars trade disruption, assumed the dominant trading position in Mocha, 
forcing the British to look elsewhere for a South Arabian shipping hub. 
2
 British Library, R/20/E/1, June 22, 1837 
3
 R.J. Gavin, Aden Under British Rule: 1839-1967.  London: C. Hurst & Company, 1975, 25.  
The British began warning Muhammad Ali about his expeditions in Arabia as early as 1825 for 
fear that he would endanger the route to India.  Ibrahim’s troops entered Yemen in 1831 with 
the intention of conquering South Arabia. 
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would continue to threaten the relative stability of the Ottoman Empire and the balance 
of power in the region. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Muhammad Ali’s Red Sea conquests through 1837. 4 
 
In January 1837 the merchant ship, Deria Dawlat, owned by the Nawab (ruler) of the 
Carnatic and sailing under the British flag left from India carrying dozens of Muslim 
passengers on their way to Mecca for the annual Hajj pilgrimage.  After it unexpectedly 
crashed into the rocky shores of Aden, tribal members under the leadership of the 
Sheikh of Aden plundered the British ship and apprehended many of the surviving 
                                                          
4
 British Library, IOR: R/20/E/5. 
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passengers.  In subsequent events, later clarified by detailed testimonies offered to a 
tribunal in Bombay, the passengers were stripped naked and brought to shore.  The men 
were jailed while the women were harassed by the local inhabitants of Aden.  The 
Sheikh forced them, under threat of death, to sign an affidavit declaring that they had 
not been mistreated.  After receiving a coarse waist covering and some food, several 
passengers found passage to Mocha where they were forced to beg for food in the 
streets.  The surviving passengers eventually made their way to Jedda under the 
protection of a British captain who was passing through the area.
5
 
According to the testimonies of two survivors, Syed Nooradeen and Peer 
Muhammad Mistree, the boat’s crew behaved suspiciously before capsizing the boat off 
the shores of Aden.  Syed was a resident of Bombay on his way to the Hajj in Mecca 
with the female members of his family and a number of servants.  Syed had noticed that 
no one had been steering the ship as it careened towards the shore.   He repeatedly 
asked the crew to take the helm but to no avail.
6
  Syed was sequestered in Aden while 
his wife was taken captive by a local ruler and was raped.  She returned to her husband 
crying relating that she had been told: “your husband is now poor, he has nothing for 
you to eat, you had better come and live in my house with me.”  
Peer Muhammad, the ship’s carpenter, and one of what he counted as 25 survivors, 
testified that the crew made no effort to clear the ship from the rocky Aden coast.  If 
anything, it seemed that they had intentionally directed the ship towards the shore to 
precipitate the subsequent international crisis.
7
  Other survivors corroborated these two 
lengthy testimonies leading many to suspect that the sinking of the Deria Dawlat 
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6
 British Library, R/20/E/1, August 2-3, 1837 
7
 Ibid. 
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seemed intentional.  Having originally scouted Aden as a potential coaling port for the 
Indian Navy, Captain Haines, under the aegis of the British East Indies Company, took 
advantage of this incident off the coast of Aden, to occupy Aden, posing a major 
impediment to Egyptian imperial goals. According to his correspondence with the India 
office and his recollection of the events, one can surmise that he may have been 
involved in orchestrating this event in order to manufacture a crisis in Aden.  To further 
corroborate this tale of intrigue, it was later uncovered that the Nawab of the Carnatic 
had purchased additional insurance on the Deria Dawlat, prior to its date of 
embarkation, in an amount that exceeded the value of the ship.  The Sultan of Aden, 
had long developed a reputation as a brigand and pirate, and was sure to take advantage 
of a defenseless merchant ship wrecked on his shores.
8
 
While this incident was occurring in Aden, Captain Haines was in the Yemeni port 
of Mocha, ostensibly surveying trade opportunities on the Red Sea.  When he received 
word of the crash, he immediately traveled to Aden to document the investigation and 
begin preliminary negotiations with the Sheikh of Aden.  After receiving approval from 
the Bombay Government, who was eager to use the incident as an excuse to acquire the 
port, Haines returned to Aden to negotiate the purchase of the port from the Sheikh in 
November 1837.   The Sheikh initially demanded an outrageous price $50,000 annual 
payment for the lease of the port.  When Haines returned to negotiate a more reasonable 
price, he discovered that the Sheikh had been plotting to kidnap and murder him and 
was forced to return to Bombay with little prospects of purchasing the port.  It became 
increasing evident that Aden might only be acquired through use of force.
9
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 Gavin, Aden, 28.  Gavin suggests that the Nawab of the Carnatic colluded with the Sultan of 
Aden who was known to have been a brigand and a pirate.  There were rumors that the Nawab 
may had offered him a portion of the insurance collection. 
9
 Zaka Hanna Kour,  The History of Aden, 1839-1872 (London: Frank Cass & Co., 1981), 8-11.  
Haines returned to Aden in November 1838 for additional negotiations from the safety of a 
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On March 26, 1838 the British Colonial Secret Council met in Bombay to discuss 
Muhammad Ali’s expanding Egyptian empire and its repercussions for the British 
Empire.  They discussed Captain Haines’ “free purchase of Aden” proposal.  Although 
members of the Government of Bombay deemed the military procurement of the Aden 
to be a dangerous and unnecessary provocation of Egypt, they perceived the situation 
as an epic confrontation with Egyptian imperialism: 
“there is but one power in that [Arabia] region, whose views or feelings 
on that subject are worth a moment’s regard; and to that Power it will be 
a matter of profound indifference whether we gain the port in question 
by force, fraud, or favor, so as we gain it at all.  Probably no sight more 
hateful could visit the eyes of Muhammad Ali, than that of the British 
Design flying over the promontory of Aden.”10 
 
 The Secret Council viewed Muhammad Ali as an ambitious ruler equaling, if not 
surpassing, the global threat of the French and Russian Empires. 
“Since first obtaining possession of Egypt by an act of shocking perfidy 
and cruelty, his career has been uniform.  By treason to his 
acknowledged sovereign, he has extended his sway over the heart of 
Africa…His next adventure will be on Baghdad, and on the western 
shores of the Persian Gulf; and, if once permitted to the Straits of Bab 
al-Mandib, he never rest till he has stretched his power along the whole 
cost of Arabia.  The object of Muhammad Ali is evident the plans to 
erect Egypt, Syria, and Arabia, into an independent Kingdom; and, 
whenever it suits the views of France or of Russia to abet him in 
accomplishing that purpose, he will gladly league with wither of those 
powers against England.”11 
 
 The council concluded that the British occupation of Aden was indeed a retribution 
for the embarrassment of the Deria Dawlat and could potentially curtail the threat of 
Egyptian Imperialism, by blocking Muhammad Ali’s plans for Arabian and Red Sea 
dominance. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
British ship in the harbor.  The Sheikh of Aden answered his proposals with gun shots, forcing 
Haines to appeal to Bombay for reinforcement, having concluded that the city would be taken 
by force. 
10
 British Library, R/20/E/1, March 26, 1838 
11
 Ibid. 
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“It is distinctively known that as one object amidst his ambitious 
schemes, Muhammad Ali has for some time contemplated the 
subjugation of Aden.  He cannot therefore but view with great 
displeasure the anticipation of his design by the British government…If 
we withdraw from Aden, and Muhammad Ali plants his foot there, the 
plea of priority becomes his, and our hopes of superseding him are 
extinguished forever.  We are then at his mercy, and can establish no 
coal depot for our Red Sea steamers, at a station worth having, which 
will not be under his control.”12 
 
 In an effort to further justify the planned British acquisition of Aden, Captain Haines 
reported to the Colonial Office that with good management, the Aden harbor had the 
potential to be a hub for Yemeni coffee trade and a transshipment station for English 
and Indian goods and trade with the African coastline.  The “barbarian tribes around the 
port would gladly place themselves under the [British] to secure them from the 
dominion of the Pasha of Egypt”.  Haines warned that “if we allow the Egyptian flag to 
be hoisted at Aden we are at the mercy of Mehmed Ali Pasha”.13 Providing further 
encouragement, Patrick Campbell, British Agent and Consul-General in Egypt reported 
to Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston that the French Consul in Egypt had been 
encouraging Muhammad Ali to take possession of Aden.  The French convinced Ali 
that British occupation of Aden would threaten Egyptian trade and sovereignty.  Ali’s 
relationship with Britain’s rival, France, was cause for additional disdain towards the 
Egyptian ruler.
14
  
Throughout the 1830s, Henry John Temple, Third Viscount, Lord Palmerston, 
developed a personal contempt for Muhammad Ali, whom he accused of establishing 
state monopolies only to secure a huge profit for himself.  In 1839, Palmerston wrote: 
“The fact is, that Mehmet Ali has divided the population of Egypt into two classes the 
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14
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Rich and the Poor.  The rich class consists of Mehmet Ali himself singly and alone; the 
poor class of all the other inhabitants of Egypt.”15 As the conflict with Egypt continued, 
Palmerston took an increasing vitriolic stance towards the Egyptian wali, writing:  
“I hate Mehmet Ali, whom I consider as nothing but an ignorant 
barbarian, who by cunning and boldness and mother-wit, has been 
successful in rebellion;…I look upon his boasted civilization of Egypt as 
the arrantest humbug; and I believe that he is as great a tyrant and 
oppressor as ever made a people wretched.”16 
 
Having been persuaded by Haines’ arguments and by the Committee’s fear of 
Egyptian Imperialism, Sir Robert Grant, the Governor of Bombay, issued orders to 
negotiate with the Shiekh of Aden to take possession of the port in compensation for 
grievances related to the Deria Dawlat:
17
 “The insult which has been offered to the 
British flag by the Sultan of Aden has led me to enquiries which leave no doubt on my 
mind that we should take possession of the port of Aden.”18 
Captain Henry Smith
19
 and the HMS Volage led a small reinforcement flotilla of 
three other ships to address the situation in Aden.  Acting as political agent in Aden, 
Captain Haines confirmed in a letter to Captain Smith on January 16, 1839, that despite 
“all the reasoning and every strenuous endeavor,” negotiations with the locals had 
failed.  According to his assessment, a forceful occupation of Aden was “the only 
resource left to obtain satisfaction for the repeated insult offered to the British.” He 
justified the impending invasion as a way to secure the safety and well-being of the 
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 Sir Charles Webster,  The Foreign Policy of Palmerston, 1830-1841: Britain, the Liberal 
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23, 1838. 
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“poor inhabitants of Aden who have been compelled by the chieftains to remain there, 
consisting principally of Jews, Banians, and Zoories.” In this same letter, Haines made 
the case for his candidacy for a governing position in Aden, as he claimed to have “a 
perfect knowledge of the localities of the place.” 20 
In a letter from Captain Haines to Campbell, after capturing the port of Aden on the 
morning of January 19, 1839, he reiterated that Muhammad Ali had wanted all of 
Yemen, the Red Sea, and a monopoly of Arabian imports.  Haines claimed to have 
received word, only days before the British invasion, of an Egyptian attack on Shiekh 
Sherzebee of Hauzherea, a major coffee producer just north of Aden: 
“A report has reached me that the Egyptian force under Ibrahim Pashah 
has conquered nearly the whole of the Sherzeebee Chieftan’s territory 
and that a division of the army under Muhammad Bey are besieging a 
fort so close to Lahej that the report of the guns were heard there.  
Should this prove true, I cannot but inquire the Egyptian General has 
been playing a secret game to our detriment.”21 
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Fig. 1.2 Muhammad Ali’s expeditions in Yemen through 1839. 22 
 
Without a British presence in Aden, it would be only matter of time before Ali 
conquered Sana’a, the capital of South Arabia, thereby giving him regional political 
control.  Haines believed that the interior tribes looked to the British for support to stop 
the Egyptian advance and reopen Yemeni roads to commerce.
23
  Sheikh Sherzebee, for 
example, informed Haines that he was relying on the British to keep the trade route 
open through Aden, as the Sheikh had declined to submit his territory to Egyptian rule.  
This statement was detrimental for the Egyptians as the Sheikh was a large coffee 
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producer and his absence would detract from the importance of the Mocha port 
currently under Ali’s control.24 
Concurrent French commercial expeditions to Mocha created further alarm in 
London about European competition in Arabia, which was passed on to Haines.  Haines 
sent Captain Robert Moresby to negotiate with local chiefs in order to create a loyal 
hinterland around Aden through the direct purchase of adjacent land and distribution of 
subsidies to outlying tribes.
25
  For example, Sultan Ali Muhsin of Lahej chose to 
collude with Haines and the British as the Egyptian army was stationed north of his 
border in Ta’iz. From his perspective, the British were seen as a guarantor of his 
independence.
26
  Many of these same tribes would become part of the Federation of 
South Arabian States during the 1950s and 60s, a product of British hegemony in 20
th
 
Century South Arabia. 
Captain Smith sent a full report of the capture of Aden to Rear Admiral Sir 
Frederick L. Maitland, the East India station commander-in-chief.
27
 The Aden fortress 
was captured with ease as the British ships had docked close to shore before first light 
to avoid the towers’ cannons aimed further out into sea.  The British flag was planted 
on the walls of Aden by the quartermaster of the ship, Captain Rundle, who was the 
first one ashore and who would later depict the capture of Aden in a number of 
paintings.  Despite the estimated 1,000 defenders of the fortress, the British suffered 
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only two casualties
28
 and captured the port in less than three hours through a 
combination of overwhelming firepower from their four ships and the decrepit state of 
the opponents’ weapons.  Due credit was given to Captain Haines for leading the 
expedition and full confidence was given to him in maintaining the British position in 
Aden while Captain Smith made plans for his return trip.
29
 
30
Fig. 1.3 
On March 27, 1839, Patrick Campbell, reported to Lord Palmerston that the port of 
Aden had been secured and that he no longer thought that Muhammad Ali would 
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threaten the British port or British trade routes along the Red Sea as a result.
31
  
Palmerston’s response to Campbell claimed that Muhammad Ali had marched an 
expedition force to Mocha with the intention of attacking Sana’a in October 1838 and 
continuing further south to the tip of the Arabian Peninsula.  The British possession of 
Aden, however, succeeded in halting Ali’s advance.  Palmerston instructed Campbell to 
inform Ali that the British did not support continued Egyptian occupation of Yemen 
and request a withdrawal.  Campbell was to encourage Ali to “engage in improving the 
administration of the Provinces confided to His Government instead of employing the 
energies of his mind and the resources of the countries he governs in, in aggressive 
expeditions against neighboring districts.” 32  Although the occupation of Aden was 
further justified by the commercial potential of Yemen’s coffee trade and of the utility 
of an Aden coal station, it was clear to all that the real purpose of conquering Aden was 
primarily to counter Egyptian imperialism.
33
  Aden would serve in that same role 
during the 1960s. 
The Suez Group and the Anti-Nasser Movement 
Muhammad Ali’s imperial ambition was adopted by the Egyptian successor to Ali’s 
dynasty, Gamal Abdel Nasser when he rose to power in 1954.
34
 In his treatise, The 
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Philosophy of the Revolution, published in 1955, Nasser portrays himself as the 
inheritor of a century of incomplete Egyptian revolutions.  Beginning with Muhammad 
Ali’s failed experiment at representing the Egyptian people, Nasser highlighted Urabi’s 
Revolt in 1881 and Sa’ad Zaghloul’s failed 1919 revolution.  The Free Officers 
Revolution on July 23, 1952, Nasser claimed, was the realization of Egyptian 
aspirations for nationhood since the founding of the modern Egypt state under 
Muhammad Ali.
35
 The expansion of Egyptian power and influence had been at the core 
of Muhammad Ali’s appeal to the Egyptian people and was the cornerstone of Nasser’s 
foreign policy as well.  Rather than marching an army of conquest through Sudan and 
the Arabian Peninsula, however, Nasser saw the expansion of his influence through 
anti-imperialist rhetoric and military support for regional allies as manifested in his 
personal Arab nationalist ideology, Nasserism. 
Nasserism has been characterized as an ideology, cult of personality, modernization 
effort, anti-colonialist movement, or a form of populism.  Nasser sought to modernize 
the Egyptian nation state, in a similar manner that Muhammad Ali attempted to develop 
Egyptian modernization according to the European model.
36
  Under both Ali and 
Nasser, particular emphasis was given to the modernization of the Egyptian countryside 
and the fellahin.
37
 Walid Khalidi describes Nasserism as an “attitude” of the people, 
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rather than an ideology like Marxism or Socialism.
38
 At the core of this “attitude” was 
an anti-imperialist drive and a sense of pan-Arab identity.   
P. J. Vatikiotis argues that, rather than an ideology, Nasserism was an authoritarian 
cult of personality dependent entirely upon Nasser, “his vision, style, and approach to 
power.”39 This centrality of Nasser in the Egyptian state is similar to Khaled Fahmy’s 
depiction of Muhammad Ali’s dynastic empire.  Nasser’s ability to appeal to the 
masses of Egypt, the Arab world, and the developing world was itself the concept of 
Nasserism.
40
 His charismatic authority, however, rested on his heroic performance, 
thereby necessitating constant success and foreign adventures abroad, an important 
factor when considering the Anglo-Egyptian rivalry.
41
  In an edited volume published 
fifty years after Nasser’s rise to power, Eli Podeh and Onn Winckler argue that 
Nasserism was in fact a form of populism in the Arab world.  His appeal to Egyptian 
peasantry and emphasis on mass public appearances resembles the Latin American 
populist model and Ali’s fellahin-directed economic reform and military 
modernization.  Like Ali, Nasser’s populism rested on his ability to appeal to the 
fellahin and the general population through continued efforts against imperialism and 
the British in particular.
42
 
Despite these similarities, Nasser’s revolution was not explicitly a reincarnation of 
Muhammad Ali’s empire, aside from elements of historical continuity and a very 
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compelling narrative.  After all, Nasser’s rise to power came at the expense of King 
Farouk, the last ruling member of Muhammad Ali’s dynasty. Nonetheless, Nasser’s rise 
to power and his ability to challenge British hegemony in the region, helped bring 
about the intersection of declining British power and rising Egyptian influence in the 
Middle East for the first time following the rule of Muhammad Ali.  The reemergence 
of the Anglo-Egyptian clash of equals reintroduced many of the racial, economic, and 
strategic concerns harbored by British officials during the 19
th
 Century, albeit from the 
perspective of events that had occurred in the 1950s. 
As if echoing Palmerston’s concerns over Muhammad Ali, British Prime Minister 
Anthony Eden considered Nasser an embodiment of all the threats to British hegemony 
including the balance of power in the Middle East, British oil supplies, economic 
export, and general national livelihood.
43
 British statesmen during the 1950s and 60s 
reused much of the Muhammad Ali era language to describe Egyptian colonialist 
involvement in Yemen during the 1960s, thereby introducing a second phase of Anglo-
Egyptian imperial rivalry.  During a cabinet meeting on November 25, 1955, 
Conservative Member of Parliament (MP) Julian Amery, stated that “every Egyptian 
Government must embark on a policy of foreign adventure”.44 In his maiden speech as 
an MP on the floor of the House of Commons on March 7, 1956, Colonel Neil ‘Billy’ 
McLean observed: “I feel that our Egyptian friends and the Egyptian government must 
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realize that admiration for Egypt is not the same thing as love for Egyptian 
imperialism”.45 
On July 26, 1956, when Nasser nationalized Suez Canal Company, British 
condemnation of the Egyptian President grew more vitriolic.  The Canal was 
immensely important for the British. Every year, six million tons of oil passed through 
canal with two-thirds allotted for Western Europe fuel requirements.  Britain in 
particular was dependent on trade passing through the Canal.  In 1955, for example, 
14,666 ships passed through Canal, with one-third destined for British ports, and three-
quarters for NATO countries in total.
46
 British newspapers expressed the views of the 
British public describing the nationalization as “an act of brigandage”,47 claiming that 
“the time for appeasement is over. We must cry ‘Halt’ to Nasser as we should have 
cried ‘Halt!’ to Hitler.  Before he sets the Middle East aflame, as Hitler did to 
Europe.”48 
Given his position as Prime Minister in 1956, Anthony Eden logically received a 
great deal of blame in the historical critique of the Suez Crisis.  More apologetic and 
pro-Eden historians have been keen to absolve Eden of complete responsibility for the 
1956 fiasco.  They argue that Anthony Eden did not willingly pursue military options in 
Egypt.  Rather, he was forced into the Suez War by a combination of domestic political 
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pressures, his own failing health, American reluctance to act, and pressure from Israel 
and France.
49
 Whether these reasons account for Eden’s decision-making in 1956 is a 
matter of debate.  What is not debatable, however, is the political drama that overran 
Whitehall during the 1950s regarding the Anglo-Egyptian rivalry.  At the core of the 
anti-Nasser coalition in the British government was a group of twenty six Conservative 
Party MPs, headed by Captain Charles Waterhouse, a longtime MP and a senior advisor 
in the Privy Council.
50
 Known as the Suez Group, Waterhouse’s coalition was a last 
vestige of swashbuckling British soldiers and administrators who continued to view 
themselves as global kingmakers through the end of the 1960s.
51
   
The group rose to prominence following the October 19, 1954 British agreement 
with Egypt to withdraw British troops from the region, in exchange for the maintenance 
of the Suez Canal as a vital British base.  The Suez Group believed that their 
subsequent anti-Egyptian posture was representative of the general sentiments of the 
British public.
52
 The members of the group were still intent on maintaining remnants of 
the British Empire at a time when the U.S. under President Eisenhower was pushing a 
policy of decolonization.  Having grown impatient with the lack of American support 
for continued British presence in the Middle East, some went as far as proposing an 
alliance with the Soviet Union, trying to convince the Russians that a British presence 
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in Middle East would be better than an American takeover.
53
 Karl Pieragostini 
observed that during the 1950s and 60s British officials, specifically those of the Suez 
Group, saw themselves as locked in a battle with Nasser for the future of South Arabia 
and the British role in the Middle East.
54
 This group, however, was held together by 
more than their disdain for Nasser.  A combination of political intrigue, familial ties, 
and close friendship brought together the members of the Suez Group to exert influence 
on a decade of British foreign policy in the Middle East. 
The political origins of the Suez Group can be traced back to the anti-appeasement 
coalition of the 1930s which included most notably Winston Churchill and his protégé 
Anthony Eden.  Between 1951 and 1955, Eden, who served as Foreign Secretary and 
Deputy Prime Minister under Churchill, was instrumental in formulating British foreign 
policy globally and in the Middle East in particular.  On January 29, 1953, Eden 
returned from a meeting with his Egyptian counterpart during which they had been 
negotiating the independence of Sudan and the withdrawal from the Suez Canal.  Upon 
hearing news of progress in the negotiations, Churchill reprimanded Eden as a failed 
Foreign Secretary and claimed that his former partner in “anti-appeasement” in the 
1930s was now practicing a policy of appeasement in the Middle East.  Churchill 
claimed that he “never know before that Munich was situated on the Nile.”55  After 
Churchill retired in 1955, Eden succeeded him as Prime Minister, but could not avoid 
Churchill’s continued criticism.  Eden’s Foreign Secretary and later Chancellor of the 
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Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, with his eyes on the Prime Minister position himself, 
willingly joined with members of the Suez Group along with Churchill in undermining 
Eden’s foreign policy with Egypt. 
Although not an official member of the Suez Group himself, Churchill acted as the 
group’s ideological and political mentor.  Churchill’s most influential political analysis 
often occurred while intoxicated or enraged.  In a conversation with his doctor Lord 
Maron, Churchill shared a blunt opinion of Nasser: “Whoever he is he’s finished after 
this.  We can’t have that malicious swine sitting across our communications.” 56 
Churchill’s unfavorable opinion of the Egyptians did not exclusively or specifically 
target Nasser, but predated his rise to power.  In October 1951, the Wafd, the Egyptian 
nationalist part, unilaterally abrogated the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty, declaring 
victory over British imperialism.  Subsequent protests near the Suez Canal presented a 
serious political crisis for the British.  In a meeting with Anthony Eden, during a 
moment of exasperation, Prime Minister Churchill approached him with clenched fists 
and a growl saying, “tell [the Egyptians] that if we have any more of their cheek we 
will set the Jews on them and drive them into the gutter, from which they should never 
have emerged.”57 
The Suez Group’s image was of “backwoodsmen – a motley collection of colorful, 
marginal political eccentrics.”  They formed backbench pressure on the cabinet and 
were central to Conservative Party thought during the 1950s and later during the 1960s 
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under a different name.
58
 During the 1950s, the group consisted of two types of 
members.  The elderly contemporaries of Churchill included Loran Hankey, the 
Director of the Suez Canal Company, Leo Amery, a close confidant of Churchill’s anti-
appeasement Munich coalition during the 1930s (he died in 1955), and Lord Killearn, 
the ex-Ambassador to Egypt and the author of the 1942 coup in Egypt.  The other 
consisted of young Tories such as Enoch Powell the well-known moral critic of British 
policy in Kenya, Fitzroy MacLean who had served under Churchill’s WWII command 
in Cairo, and Julian Amery.
59
   
The Suez Group’s pressure on Prime Minister Eden continued at the Conservative 
Party conference in Llandudno, Wales from October 11-13, 1956, compelling him to 
further consider military action against Egypt.  Waterhouse and Julian Amery 
introduced a party amendment that stipulated the specific requirement that any 
agreement with Nasser must ensure the international control of the Suez Canal.  The 
Suez Group’s influence did not stop at party headquarters, but gained the sympathy of 
media figures as well.  Malcolm Muggeridghe of the Daily Telegraph and Randolph 
Churchill of the Evening Standard and Daily Express, for example, vilified Eden as a 
Munich politician (appeaser) and supported the more hawkish Macmillan.
60
 
In his effort to supplant Eden as Prime Minister, Macmillan was able to rely heavily 
on the support of his son-in-law Julian Amery, a Conservative member of Parliament 
and the son of the prominent British political Leo Amery.
61
  Julian Amery’s passionate 
and energetic patriotism is often attributed to the fate of his brother John, who was 
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hung for treason in Wandsworth jail in December 1945.
62
 Neil McLean, a “political 
soul-mate and inseparable friend”63 of Julian Amery from their time serving together as 
intelligence officers in the Balkans, also assumed an important role in the group.
64
  
When Eden resigned in 1957 in the aftermath of the Suez political disaster, Queen 
Elizabeth took the advice of Churchill and appointed Macmillan as the next Prime 
Minister rather than Rab Butler, who was Eden’s Deputy Prime Minister.65 
According to Julian Amery’s assessment, Nasser was within 48 hours of being 
overthrown and the British and French already had alternative government waiting.  It 
was clear that the Soviets had withdrawn military support from Egypt and Nasser 
would likely flee Cairo with little resistance.  As a consequence of the Suez failure, 
nicknamed the European “Waterloo” of the Middle East, a major power vacuum 
emerged.  According to Amery, this vacuum was filled by two Arab-Israeli wars, the 
Egyptian invasion of Yemen, the murder of Nuri Al-Said and King Faisal in Baghdad, 
the rise of Muammar Qadafi in Libya, and the Sovietization of Aden and Ethiopia; in 
sum all of the region’s problems.  He believed this would never have happened if the 
British and French had been allowed to prevail in Suez.
66
  
Although Amery’s British-centric perspective of events in Egypt and the Middle 
East was certainly biased and influenced by personal interest, there is little doubt that 
American intervention in the Suez Crisis was a personal affront to the foreign policy 
                                                          
62
 Sue Onslow, “Julian Amery and the Suez Operation,” in Reassessing Suez 1956: New 
Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath, ed. Simon C. Smith (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2008), 
76. 
63
 Onslow, “Unrestricted Nationalists and a Minor Gunboat Operation,” 73. 
64
 Onslow, “Julian Amery and the Suez Operation,” 70. 
65
 Harold Macmillan, The Macmillan Diaries, The Cabinet Years, 1950–1957, ed. Peter 
Catterall  (London: Macmillan, 2003). 
66
 Amery, “The Suez Group”, 120. 
41 
 
 
aims of the Suez Group and an episode that they would not soon let the Americans 
forget.  As Tore Peterson describes it, “Suez became a useful bludgeon to beat the 
American with in times of Anglo-American disagreement.  After administrating defeat 
to the British during the Suez crisis, the Americans became extremely solicitous of its 
main ally.”67  John Darwin adds that “successive American administrations showed a 
surprising tenderness towards British pretensions to remain an independent great 
power.”68 
In 1957, in response to the British retreat from Egypt and Iraq, and the tenuous hold 
on military bases in Cyprus and Kenya, the Suez Group transformed the relatively 
minor British port of Aden into the center of British power in the region.  The 
construction of the British Petroleum (BP) refinery in 1954 helped Aden become the 
fourth largest refueling station in the world.
69
 
The Aden Group 
In the years following the Suez War, McLean observed that “cotton and Suez Canal 
dues, have been mortgaged to the USSR…coupled with heavy government 
expenditures in prestige projects such as the Aswan dam and on military equipment 
from the Communist bloc countries has produced a large annual trade deficit which, in 
turn, has caused serious monetary inflation and a very low standard of living in 
Egypt.”70  McLean and Conservative members of the British Foreign Office argued that 
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Nasser aimed to expand his dominion over the Arabian Peninsula in an effort to stave 
off economic disaster in Egypt with the aid of Saudi oil money.  Moreover, it was 
believed that North Yemen would serve as a haven for anti-British terrorists in Aden. 
According to Daniel Lerner, post-Suez Egypt suffered from the “Nasser Syndrome”, or 
the “shift from home democracy to global imperialism”.71 
In the aftermath of the 1956 Suez War, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser was 
intent on driving the British out of the Red Sea region and Aden in particular for fear 
that it would become a base to reestablish British influence over Egypt and the Suez 
Canal.   Nasser would later describe himself as a “thorn in the British throat.”72  Aden, 
a port city initially captured as a deterrent to Egyptian nationalism, found itself once 
again at the forefront of the British-Egyptian imperial struggle.  The last Anglo-
Egyptian confrontation in Yemen, from 1962-1967, marked the bookend to a long 
history of British and Egyptian power relations in the Middle East. 
Having failed to secure the Suez Canal in 1956, the Conservative remnants of the 
Suez Group turned their political intentions towards the last British military base in 
Aden.  Following the arrival of Egyptian troops to North Yemen in October 1962, the 
group, under the leadership of Julian Amery and Neil McLean, would be renamed the 
Aden Group.  Its anti-Egyptian and anti-Nasser agenda would remain the same.  In the 
eyes of the Aden Group, the Yemeni Civil War was the second round of the final 
Anglo-Egyptian confrontation that began with the Suez War in 1956.  In the eyes of the 
historian, however, the history of the Anglo-Egyptian rivalry in Yemen began over 100 
years earlier, with the British capture of Aden in 1839. 
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Chapter 2: International Intrigue and the Origins of September 1962 
 At 11:00 PM on September 26, 1962, a small column of T-34 tanks and armored 
vehicles, led by a tank that would be named al-Marid (“the Rebellious”) entered the 
courtyard of Imam al-Badr’s palace of Dar al-Basha’ir (“House of Good Tidings”).1  
Al-Badr had been warned of an impending coup following his father Ahmad’s death a 
week earlier, and gave the order for reinforcements from Hodeidah.  In the meanwhile, 
he was surrounded by 500 to 600 personal bodyguards and had the services of several 
tribal armies and a special battalion of troops known as the “Badr Battalion”.  As al-
Badr would find out, he could trust none of these groups.
2
  When the vehicles arrived 
from the nearby al-Urdi military barracks
3
, al-Badr was sitting in a political meeting 
with Yemeni Colonel Abdullah al-Sallal in attendance.  The revolution was carried out 
with the help of 13 tanks from the Badr Batallion, six armored vehicles, two mobile 
artillery cannons, and two anti-air guns.
4
  
According to al-Badr’s version of the night’s events, he had been presiding over the 
new Council of Ministers in the Royal Palace compound.  When he stepped out into the 
hallway, Hussein al-Shukeiri, the deputy to Sallal, attempted to shoot him from behind 
in the hallway, but the rifle trigger jammed.  He ended up shooting himself in the chin 
while al-Badr’s guards were trying to arrest him.  The palace’s electricity was cut off, 
followed by an exchange of gunfire.  Al-Badr claims that the resistance lasted for 
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twenty four hours during which he escaped from a hidden passageway out of the 
building.  Al-Badr’s account claims that a Yemeni officer named ‘Abd al-Ghani was 
the principal ringleader, and the main contact for the Egyptian Embassy.  Conveniently 
for al-Badr’s tale, al-Ghani was killed during the initial exchange of fire and Sallal was 
given command of the coup.
5
 
Timed to meet the arriving troops, Sallal excused himself from the meeting and 
exited the palace.  Once outside, he directed the approaching tanks to aim their fire at 
al-Badr’s residence.  Simultaneously, another group of Yemeni soldiers seized the 
Sana’a radio station, announcing prematurely that Imam al-Badr had been killed and 
that Sallal and the military revolutionaries had declared the foundation of the Yemen 
Arab Republic (YAR).
6
 
Whose revolution? 
The debate, both during the civil war and in the academic literature in the following 
decades, has focused on the extent of Egyptian involvement in the planning and 
hatching of the coup.
7
  There were certainly strategic advantages to Egyptian 
intervention.  By 1962, Egypt was the most politically isolated country in the Middle 
East, following the breakup of the United Arab Republic with Syria and the formation 
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of a Jordanian-Saudi alliance.
8
 Of the major Arab states, only Algeria maintained 
friendly relations with Egypt, while Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, and Saudi 
Arabia remained united in their disdain for Nasser’s Middle East machinations.9  
Khaled Mohieddin, a prominent member of the Egyptian military later admitted that 
“The Yemen war was a response to the break with Syria…a sign that Egypt’s Arab role 
was not over…as Syria was a blow to Egypt’s Arab leadership.”10 Mohieddin had long 
believed that “Egypt could achieve far more with propaganda than with tanks” and 
lamented in retrospect at having “become trapped in so humiliating a situation.”11 
According to Anthony Nutting, author of the well-known biography of Nasser, with a 
quick and decisive victory in Yemen, Nasser “might have been able to recover the 
leadership of the Arab world for more than just a fleeting moment.”12 
From a strategic perspective, it is not difficult to understand why Nasser might 
support the Yemen republic.  Backing Abdullah Sallal might give Nasser a chance to 
regain his stature in the Arab World.  Furthermore, the geographic location of Yemen 
would place Nasser in a unique position to pressure the Saudis for economic aid and aid 
anti-British nationalists in the south.
13
  Belaboring the British with an internal colonial 
uprising would discourage their foreign office from considering another Suez mission 
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and would give the Egyptians unchallenged military and political preeminence over 
both sides of the Red Sea.
14
  
British colonial officials and Yemeni royalists, in an attempt to delegitimize the 
YAR as a foreign entity, predictably accused the Egyptians of orchestrating the entire 
event.  The British colonial office associated the Yemeni coup with Nasser’s anti-
British agenda on the Arabian Peninsula.  As early as nine months prior to the outbreak 
of hostilities in September, British intelligence officials believed that there was 
increasing evidence that Nasser was planning to undermine the Yemeni government.  
Italian Minister Guillet, a close confidant of the Yemeni Imam Ahmad, informed High 
Commissioner of Aden Charles Johnston that according to his sources, the Egyptians 
were proposing a 'New Operation' in Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.  The plans 
would supposedly be coordinated by agents of the Egyptian Intelligence Service.
15
  
Some British historical accounts claim that the Soviet KGB and their British agent Kim 
Philby played a role in the coup, although these claims are mostly speculative and 
without sufficient evidence.
16
 
In January 1962, a Yemeni assailant known only as Qunbula, or “the grenade”, 
attacked and injured R. W. Bailey, the UK chargé d'affaires in Ta’iz.  Bailey would 
later recount the story and describe it as a harbinger of things to come: 
“Not long before the Revolution…the very kind gentleman called El-
qunbula or ‘the Bomb’ put a dagger into me.  He knocked at the legation 
door at about 1:00 in the morning…I opened the door and a dagger was 
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stuck straight into my chest…My wife came out of the bedroom in her 
nightie and she attacked him and threw him down the stairs and he 
injured himself on his own dagger though he managed to escape.”17 
 
Italian Minister Guillet later concluded that the Egyptians had been behind this 
attack.
18
 The fact that Radio Cairo later dubbed Qunbula a “National Hero”, further 
corroborated the suspicions of Egyptian intervention.
19
 An attack on German chargé 
d'affaires Stolz on February 8, 1962, continued the spread of rumors that Egyptian 
intelligence organizations were working to undermine foreign support of Imam Ahmad 
in preparation for his overthrow.
20
 The increased presence of Egyptian advisers and 
school teachers in major cities throughout Yemen coupled with militant verbal attacks 
on Imam Ahmad via Radio Cairo were later deemed a prelude to the Egyptian 
participation in the 1962 coup.
21
 
In a 1967 interview, Egyptian deserter Qassim al Sherif, further reinforced the 
British theory that Nasser had orchestrated Sallal’s coup d’état in 1962 and sent 
Egyptian soldiers towards Yemen ahead of the revolution date: 
“The soldiers left Cairo on 19th September, 1962 and boarded a ship 
called “The Sudan” on 21st September (4 days before the revolution 
started) and told they were going to Algeria.  We arrived at Hodeida on 
28
th
 September (2 days after the Revolution) and disembarked.  Other 
ships – the Nile, al Wadi and Cleopatra – loaded with weapons and 
ammunition also arrived in Hodeida on the same day.  The ships al 
Wadi, the Nile and the Sudan, each carried a full Brigade of 1,000 men.  
The Egyptians’ expeditionary force immediately headed for Sanaa [sic] 
with two Brigades, while other Egyptian troops remained in Hodeida 
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and took control of Manakhah…First fighting broke out on 3rd or 4th 
October when an agreement with the tribes was broken.”22 
 
Former Yemeni revolutionaries claimed that the coup was part of an Egyptian 
conspiracy orchestrated by Nasser’s vice president Anwar Sadat and his brother-in-law 
the half-Egyptian half-Yemeni ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Baydani who was working with 
Yemeni revolutionaries in Sana’a.  In a 1962 interview, Baydani told an elaborate tale 
of acting as an intermediary between Sadat, Nasser, and the Yemeni revolutionaries, 
using a system of codes for secure communication.  He claimed to have sent a message 
on September 26, 1962 to signal the start of the revolution of which he had been at the 
center.
23
 Baydani’s story seems highly unlikely, which is unsurprising considering the 
description of him offered by Robert Stookey, the first secretary and counselor of the 
US Embassy in Yemen (Ta’iz): “Baydani is an incorrigible publicity hound and prone 
to distort facts and some elements.”24  Seemingly having lost patience with Baydani’s 
penchant for mischief, Nasser arranged to have him arrested during a trip to Cairo in 
January 1963, keeping him away from Yemeni politics for several months.
25
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Fig. 2.1 ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Baydani (AP)  Fig. 2.2 ‘Abd al-Latif al Baghdadi (AP) 
 
Memoirs of Egyptian officials and military personnel claim that Egypt played at 
most a minimal role in orchestrating events in September 1962.  They argue, instead, 
that Egyptian troops and support arrived, purportedly, in support of a genuine national 
revolution in Yemen.  ‘Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, an original member of Nasser’s Free 
Officer’s Movement who had broken with Nasser politically in 1964 over the 
intervention in Yemen, argued that war in Yemen came as a surprise.  Furthermore, 
Nasser’s decision to send a small contingent of troops was made only after he received 
the false reports of al-Badr’s death and assumed there were no other viable political 
leaders to support.
26
  
Differing from Baghdadi’s interpretation, Salah al-Din al-Hadidi, the head of 
Egyptian intelligence and an early critic of Nasser, claimed to have known about the 
revolution, but that Egypt made it their official policy not to interfere.  Perhaps in an 
attempt to maintain the innocence of the Egyptian intelligence, Hadidi claimed that 
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Baydani, acting at the behest of the Egyptians, waited until September 29, 1962 to 
arrive in Sana’a with a small contingent of Egyptian officers with a direct wireless 
transmitter link to Cairo.
27
  
A particular point of contention between British and Egyptian version of the events 
was in regards to the Egyptian ship Sudan and the timing of its arrival in the Yemeni 
port of Hodeidah.  According to British sources, four Egyptian ships, the Nile, al-Wadi, 
Cleopatra, and Sudan set sail four days prior to the coup.
28
 Salah al-Din al-Hadidi 
claims that the Sudan did not set sail prior to the coup.  It was waiting in the port of 
Suez on the night of October 2
nd
 under “confidential orders to be equipped with 
everything deemed necessary by Marshal Amer.”  The ship set sail as soon as word was 
received and reached Hodeidah three days later.
29
 Hadidi’s version of the Sudan 
episode supports his argument that the Egyptian intelligence knew of the plans but 
consciously declined to intervene, allowing the Yemeni coup take its course. 
British accounts are motivated by a disdain for Nasser and his Yemeni intervention 
while Egyptian accounts aim to absolve themselves of commandeering a nationalist 
revolution.  In the months and years that followed, the Yemeni coup was quickly 
overrun by other nations, who had been establishing positions of influence in South 
Arabia in the years prior to the outbreak of the civil war.  In less than two years, Nasser 
would amass 70,000 Egyptian soldiers in Yemen and Americans and Soviets would 
intervene with political and diplomatic capital.  The massive Egyptian intervention in 
the later years of the civil war has clouded the debate over the origins and organizers of 
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the September coup.  The massive scale of Egyptian involvement throughout the course 
of the civil war does not presuppose Nasser’s role in planning and carrying out the 
coup.   The Yemeni 1962 coup was, in actuality, the culmination of two decades of 
anti-Imam sentiments by a new generation of Yemeni intelligentsia that preceded the 
rise of Nasser and the Egyptian Free Officers in 1952.  A few guns and perhaps some 
logistical training by Egyptian officers were relatively minor when compared with the 
historically Yemeni roots of September 1962.   
The Famous Forty 
In 1934, Yemen and the newly-formed state of Saudi Arabia fought a brief war over 
disputed border territories claimed by both countries.  After Yemen’s military failure 
and the loss of the Jizan, Najran, and ‘Asir territories, Imam Yahya, who fought the 
Ottomans for national liberation and founded the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen in 
1918,  undertook a project to create a national army, thereby lessening his reliance on 
tribal militias in the time of war.  Taking advantage of a Yemeni Treaty of Friendship 
with Iraq, Yahya sent students to the Military Academy in Baghdad.  Abdullah al-
Sallal, the first President of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) along with other 
members of this group would later serve as the core of the Free Yemeni Movement 
(FYM).
30
  
Sallal recalls that his time in Baghdad had a great influence on the decision to be 
involved in revolution in Yemen: 
“We talked about Arabism and the future of the Arab struggle.  And I 
was thinking while listening to these discussions about my 
country…which was ruled by despotism, in ignorance, backwardness 
and underdevelopment.  Hope began to stir in my chest…Why don’t we 
spread the call for progress when we return to Yemen.”31 
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According to historian J. Leigh Douglas, although the FYM can be traced 
functionally to a few small and scattered groups, it was in reality the embodiment of a 
new generation of Yemeni urban intellectuals, those “who held a privileged position in 
Yemeni society by virtue of their relative wealth, social position and education which 
allowed them the time and the opportunity to sit and debate questions arising from the 
foreign literature they were able to obtain.”32  These young educated Yemenis saw that 
“no country was more in need of enlightenment than their own.”33 The group’s 
designation as a haraka or “movement” connotes a diffuse intellectual force and spread 
of ideas rather than a tangible political organization.
34
 
In addition to the main group of the FYM, several additional Yemeni opposition 
groups were formed.  In 1935 Hay’at al-Nidal (“The Committee of the Struggle”) met 
in secret to discuss Arab poetry and literature that had been formally banned from 
Yemen and the need for reforms to the Imam’s government.35 Paul Dresch describes 
hay’at al-nidal as the first “modernist” opposition to Imam Yahya as they were a 
reflection of the young generation’s desire to debate the succession of the next Imam.36  
Under the same pretext, Fatat al Fulayhi (“The Youth of Fulayhi”), met in the al-
Fulayhi mosque in Sana’a to discuss concepts of Arab nationalism.  Members of this 
group came to be known as the shabbab, or young men.  They formed the core of the 
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young generation’s dissatisfaction with rule under the Imam.37  In the late 1930s, 
Majallat al-Hikma al-Yamaniyya (“The Yemeni Review of Wisdom”), the only local 
magazine published at the time aside from Yahya’s Al-Iyman (“The Faith”), further 
spread the call for reforms.
38
 
In Aden, Baghdad, and Cairo, groups of Yemeni émigrés founded dissident 
organizations.  Among the most prominent of these was the al-Jamiyya al-Yamaniyya 
al-Kubra (“The Grand Yemeni Association”), which formed in Cairo in January 1946 
by Ahmad Nu’man and Muhammad al-Zubayri.  The two leaders would continue to be 
prominent revolutionary intellectuals throughout the 1960s.
39
 Yemeni émigrés were 
joined by several hundred young Yemeni men who traveled abroad for secondary and 
higher education between the years of 1947-1959.  The “chain migration” from Yemen 
was encouraged by Yemeni family and tribal networks that had already been 
established in Aden and Cairo and that facilitated the mass study abroad.
40
    
At the core of these numbers was the Famous Forty, a group of Yemeni students 
who would return to Yemen in 1962 to lead the first generation of Yemeni modernists 
as government officials, military officers and cabinet ministers to the new YAR.
41
 
Imam Ahmad, while he was still a Crown Prince in 1947, commissioned scholarships 
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for forty teenage Yemeni students for study abroad.  This decision was monumental in 
that it was the first of its kind for an Imamate known for the forced isolation of local 
population.  Following Yahya’s earlier example, Ahmad understood the necessity of 
educating a core of leaders to modernize Yemen’s army and domestic infrastructure.  
One of the students, Mohsin al-‘Ayni, was considered a leader of the group and would 
rise to become the YAR’s first foreign minister and four-time prime minister.  Several 
other students would gain prominence as members of the FYM and the Yemen republic 
including ‘Abdullah al-Kurshami, a future prime minister, ‘Abdullah Juzaylan, the 
future deputy commander of the armed forces during the civil war and Muhammad al-
Ahnumi, a future republican revolutionary officer.
42
 Hassan Maki, a later member of 
the “Soviet-Five” and a future prime minister, was separated from the rest of group and 
sent to pursue a doctorate in Italy.
43
 According to Robert Burrowes, the Famous Forty 
constituted the “first-generation modernists” of Yemen.44 
 In the 1940s, leaders of the FYM resolved, albeit reluctantly, to maintain the 
Imamate as it was, at the time, more legitimate than a republic.  They hoped, however, 
to make the Imam’s power decentralized through a modern administration with more 
power given to the tribes to govern themselves.
45
 In February 1948, Abdullah Ahmad 
al-Wazir, a rival tribal sayyid, or descendent worthy of rule, of Imam Yahya’s Hamid 
al-Din family orchestrated the assassination of Imam Yahya with the intention of 
seizing power.  Ali Nasir al-Qarda’i and members of the Bani Hushaysh tribes killed 
Imam Yahya but the plan to simultaneously murder Crown Prince Ahmad in Ta’iz was 
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not carried out.
46
  Jamal Jamil, the Director of Public Security and the Deputy Minister 
of Defence in the post-Yahya regime of al-Wazir, entered Yahya’s palace with 2,800 
soldiers, killing two of his remaining sons, and carrying out what was considered 
among the first military coups in the Middle East.
47
  By the end of the month, however, 
the northern tribes, in alliance with the Crown Prince, looted the city of Sana’a and 
arrested the perpetrators.   
The 1948 coup failed to maintain a lasting new government for a number of reasons.  
The assassination of Imam Yahya was undignified in the eyes of traditional Yemeni 
society, particularly when they recalled the elderly Imam’s last act of diving in front of 
his young grandson to protect him from the barrage of bullets.  Although Jamal Jamil 
managed to kill two of Yahya’s sons, Crown Prince Ahmad escaped the hands of the 
conspirators and was able to gather tribal support in the Yemeni northern highlands.  
According to Muhammad al-Fusayyil, a veteran of Yemen’s revolutions, the 1948 coup 
failed because the general population did not understand the concepts of 
"constitutionalism."  The core leadership of the coup was elitist and did not engage the 
local population in the way that it would 14 years later.
48
  The final missing element of 
a lasting coup was international support, of which al-Wazir received none.   
 Those conspirators who were not executed following the coup were incarcerated for 
a number of years at the Hajja prison located northwest of Sana’a.  Prisoners in Hajja, 
and in the Middle East in general, were rarely kept in solitary confinement, often 
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meeting each other on a daily basis.  Sallal, who was among the jailed conspirators, 
would later refer to the prison as “the university of Hajja” because of all the political 
discussions amongst the educated revolutionaries.
49
 Among Sallal’s reading list in the 
prison were a number of books on the French Revolution and Nasser’s Philosophy of 
the Revolution.
50
   
During the 1950s, the FYM continued to operate through its international branches 
of the Yemeni Union, drawing on the support of the diaspora Yemeni population.  For 
example, Muhammad Abd al-Salih al-Shurjabi founded the Yemeni Young Men’s 
Association in Aden and later published the Saba newspaper, a publication focused on 
anti-Imam rhetoric.
51
 Ahmad, Muhammad Nu’man’s son and Zubayri published a 
popular pamphlet “Matalib al-Sha’b” or “The Demands of the People”: 
“Poverty has driven hundreds of thousands abroad.  The rulers of the 
country have been evil, false, and ignorant…No-one is left in towns and 
villages.  All live in fear of robbery, bloodshed and rebellion.  Foreign 
powers hope to occupy, colonise and enslave the Yemen, seeing that the 
Yemenis have no government…”52 
 
In 1952, Zubayri, who had been in exile in Pakistan since the 1948 coup, moved to 
Cairo where he founded a branch of the Aden-based Yemen Union along with student 
members of the Famous Forty.
53
  Zubayri used members of the student group, included 
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al-‘Ayni, as couriers to Yemen to deliver Zubayri’s letters to local FYM supporters.54 
Nu’man would join the group in 1955 after his release from the Imam’s prison in Hajja. 
In 1955, another coup was attempted against Imam Ahmad, averted only by 
Ahmad’s heroic actions.  On April 4, 1955 when the cars arrived for the imprisoned 
Imam and his family, Ahmad marched from the entrance of the Palace carrying a gun in 
one hand and a sword in the other.  He quickly regained the support of his personal 
bodyguards, commandeered three military cars and took 80,000 riyals (12,000 pounds 
sterling) out of the treasury.  With these resources in hand, Ahmad managed to rally 
supporters and reestablish power.
55
   
Although both the 1948 and 1955 attempts to overthrown Imam Ahmad failed, the 
foundation of the Free Yemeni Movement would remain at the core of the 1962 coup.  
The most influential contingent of the Yemeni Union branches was located in Cairo, 
which constituted the majority of Yemenis studying abroad.  Between 1958 and 1961, 
while Imam Ahmad was a member of the United Arab Republic (UAR) with Egypt, 
Syria, and Yemen, Nasser curtailed support for the anti-Imam Yemeni Union in Cairo.  
Following the breakup of the union and Nasser’s disenchantment with Ahmad, Nasser 
allowed them to prepare for the September 1962 coup from Egyptian territory.  The 
Cairo and Aden branches of the Yemeni Union worked with dissident elements of 
domestic military and political circles to prepare for the nationalist coup in Yemen.  
The most obvious element of cooperation, at least with Baydani, was through Egyptian 
media.  On May 12, 1962, Baydani broadcast a speech calling for social justice and 
economic development in Yemen entitled “Blueprint for a Yemeni Republic”.  In July 
and August, he gave a series of talks on Cairo radio entitled “The Secrets of Yemen”.  
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The popular Egyptian magazine Ruz al Youssef published a series of Baydani’s anti-
Imam articles in the month before the revolution.
56
 While Baydani and other Free 
Yemenis made use of Egyptian media, the aid was limited for the most part to 
broadcast and print. 
For those who questioned the extent of Nasser’s involvement in orchestrating the 
coup in Yemen, perhaps it is necessary to reconsider this line of reasoning.  The FYM 
laid the foundations of September 1962 well before Nasser came to power, and it was 
primarily responsible for its own nationalist revolution.  According to Al Thawra, the 
1962 revolution was a third stage of a process that began in 1948 and continued in 
1955.
57
  Egyptian intervention in the Yemeni coup was only one part of a broader 
international involvement in South Arabia that began in the 1950s. 
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Al-Badr and the Soviets 
 While the FYM was working to undermine Imam Ahmad’s authority, Soviet 
economic delegations were cultivating a close relationship with Crown Prince al-Badr.  
Al-Badr was a man of great dreams living in a world of Yemeni poverty, lack of 
modern infrastructure, and international political irrelevance.  Desperate to advance his 
own political interests and his vision for a modern Yemeni state, al-Badr was inclined 
to ally with any nation or organization that promised great things for his country.  
Predictably, al-Badr became a self-declared Nasserite, having been corralled by the 
ideological rhetoric of Arab nationalism and Nasser’s personality and charisma.  When 
the Soviets approached him with promises of economic development, he was an 
enthusiastic recipient.
58
 
 Even his own family members harbored negative opinions of al-Badr’s royal 
qualities and his designation as Crown Prince.  His cousin Abdullah ibn al-Hussein 
regarded al-Badr as “dissolute, incompetent, and gullible.”59 Al-Badr’s character 
inequities were overshadowed only by his display of pomp and hubris.  V. A. Galkin, a 
Soviet doctor practicing in Yemen in 1961 described a scene in Sana’a of a large 
retinue of Yemeni soldiers on horseback followed by tanks in honor of Prince al-Badr, 
whom he describes as “tall, surrounded by a dense ring of bodyguards dressed in blue 
who did not step aside even for one minute.”60 
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Fig. 2.3 Al-Badr arriving to oil concession ceremony with pomp and lavish retinue.
61
  
 
Soviet strategy in Yemen during the 1950s was small-scale, long-term, and low-risk.  
In 1955, the USSR signed a Treaty of Friendship with Yemen.  Imam Ahmad received 
enough small arms to encourage more hostile anti-British action, but not enough to start 
a large-scale war that would drag Soviets into the conflict.  Moscow’s logic in this 
agreement was that the continued use of Soviet weapons would increase Yemen’s 
dependence on Soviet technicians, spare parts, and additional shipments for the 
foreseeable future.  In supplying Yemen’s army, the Soviets encouraged Ahmad to 
attack the British, a position that he likely would have taken regardless.  There was 
little chance for a British victory and a high likelihood that Yemeni attacks would 
weaken the British position in Arabia.
62
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Furthermore, Moscow envisioned Yemen as a staging post for Soviet expansion into 
Arabian Peninsula at the expense of Western interests.
63
 Vladimir Sakharov, a Soviet 
diplomat to the YAR who defected to the US in 1971, explained that Moscow had no 
diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia or any of the other oil sheikhdoms at the time.  
North Yemen, and South Arabia more generally, was envisioned as s Soviet entry point 
into both the Arabian Peninsula and the Red Sea.
64
 
In 1956, as per the terms of the Yemeni-Soviet trade agreement, planned projects 
were launched for cement, leather, juice, and metal packaging factories, a depot for oil 
storage, and a new port in Hodeidah.  Soviet trade delegations in January and March of 
that year oversaw the implementation of these projects.
65
  In addition, a credit of 13.5 
million rubles was granted to Yemen.  In July 1956, al-Badr led a well-publicized 
Yemeni delegation of twelve Yemeni ministers to visit Moscow and formalize military 
and economic cooperation.
66
 Al-Badr received “permission” from his father to embark 
on a world tour to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the USSR and other Eastern 
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European countries only after he proved his worthiness by rallying tribal allies 
following the 1955 coup.
67
 
The first Russian mission opened in Ta’iz in January 1958 and the Soviet 
ambassador to the UAR served as chargé d'affaires for Yemen as well.  In response, a 
Yemeni delegation visited USSR in 1959.
68
 Following their meeting, the Chinese sent 
engineers and laborers to build roads in Yemen, while the Soviets sent specialists to 
begin work on the port in Hodeidah.
69
  In 1957 there were only 50 Soviet and Chinese 
specialists in Yemen.  By 1959 there were 600 Chinese and several hundred Russians 
and by 1960 there were over 1,100 Chinese laborers working on Yemeni roads.
70
  The 
Hodeidah port, named Port Ahmad, required 300,000 tons of modern construction 
material for the port and facilities to create the capacity for storing 9,000 tons of oil.  
The area around the port was to be equipped with electricity, mechanized factories, 
cars, Soviet technicians and specialists.  In addition, the Yemenis were granted $2 
million credit to facilitate these projects.
71
  Soviet media covering the arrival of 
tractors, excavators, and other heavy machinery to the port construction site noted that: 
“While working together, the Soviet-Yemeni friendship widened, fraternal cooperation 
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is growing, and they have achieved together a new brightness in the completion of Port 
Ahmad – a port of peace and friendship.”72 
British intelligence reports in 1961 observed: "It is widely said that the Soviet 
purpose in providing tanks and guns, which are beyond the Yemeni capacity to operate, 
is to form a stockpile that could be manned in time of war by Egyptians and Russians."  
Furthermore, British observers claimed that Soviets were allowed to build 
meteorological stations in Hodeidah, whereas the Americans were rejected on 
supposedly religious grounds, supposed further evidence that Yemen was the next 
target of Soviet machinations.  British alarmists were worried that their colony in Aden 
was the next target, followed by Somalia, where the Chinese already had a charges 
d'affaire.
73
 
The Soviets had given their support to Ahmad despite his “feudal” country and 
absolute theocracy.  His personal character trait of frugality and good intentions were 
exemplified by the state of his palace which the Soviets deemed “modest” and his 
sincere efforts to improve public health.  The real target for Soviet foreign policy, 
however, was al-Badr, who preferred a more rapid Soviet-supported modernism.
74
 In 
the spring of 1962, al-Badr organized another trade delegation to Moscow, this time to 
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accept a Russian agreement to use Yemen as a transit point for oil shipments to 
Africa.
75
  Al-Badr’s affinity for the Soviets was apparent during a speech that he gave 
in June 1962 at the opening ceremony of the Ahmad Port in Hodeidah, less than four 
months before the start of the Yemeni revolution.  He opened with lengthy and poetic 
verses about the triumph of the Yemen people in the construction of the port.  Amidst 
this long oration, he dedicated several elaborate sentences of praise and gratitude to the 
Soviet Union for their aid in funding and constructing the port: “We and the Soviet 
People – Brothers, you are the most true and faithful of our friends… Many thanks to 
the Soviet government for their generous help to Yemen.”76 Several pages of text later, 
al-Badr returned to the subject of the Soviet-Yemeni cooperation in greater detail: 
“I am happy to be among you on behalf of his Majesty the King…at the 
opening of port Ahmad.  This immortal project was until recent times a 
dream of many and it seems a utopia far from implementation…and here 
this port that speaks for itself, here this high building ascends to the 
heaven, and here is mastery and mechanism.  This great work continued 
day and night.  Colossal efforts given by our Yemeni sons and brothers 
in a joint operation with our Russian friends cause us great respect and 
wonder.  I send you a thousand welcomes and respect. Port Ahmad is 
the first of projects that are needed to carry out the service for the benefit 
of our own country…thank our dear friends, to share in the opening of 
our first grand project…”77 
 
Al-Badr’s Port Ahmad speech praised Yemeni-Soviet cooperation and viewed the 
current project as part of a long-term relationship between the two countries.  In a 
speech eulogizing his father, the late Imam Ahmad on September 21, 1962, al-Badr 
even claimed that his father’s dying wish was to “adopt socialist economic, military, 
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and political standards for the people.”78 Khrushchev echoed al-Badr’s sentiment and 
described Ahmad in his condolences as having “made a worthy contribution to the 
cause of consolidating the political and economic independence of Yemen.”79 
 Armin Meyer, the former American ambassador to Iran, best described the plight of 
al-Badr, whom he referred to as the  red prince”: “He had been impatient with West, 
had gone to Moscow, been wined and dined, and delightedly embarked on arms 
procurement road with Soviets.  Months later, when he was murdered by recipients [of] 
those arms, Soviets shed no tears but cynically and quickly recognized his 
successors.”80 David Holden, the Middle East correspondent for The Guardian 
described al-Badr in equally unflattering terms: “Al-Badr was, in fact, what is usually 
described as a wooly-minded liberal, sincerely anxious to reform his country without 
much idea of how to set about it or what passions reform might release.  He was full of 
good intentions which ultimately, and appropriately, paved the way to his downfall.”81 
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Al-Badr and Nasser 
 Anti-Ahmad plots were not limited to the fringe members of tribal opposition or the 
FYM, but included Al-Badr himself.
 82
  According to al-Badr’s account, he was 
recruited by Nasser to overthrow the leadership of his own father and establish an 
Egyptian hub on the Arabian Peninsula. 
83
  
Al-Badr and Nasser first met in 1954 during a two-month visit to Cairo after which 
Nasser announced a large aid program for Yemen.  During a subsequent trip to Cairo in 
1955, al-Badr met with the local branch of the Yemen Union, developing a contingent 
of supporters among the FYM.
84
 During his third visit to Cairo to sign the Jeddah 
Defense Pact with Egypt in 1956, al-Badr promoted 13 Yemeni cadets from the 
Egyptian military school ordering to first lieutenants.  Following graduation several 
months later, the newly promoted cadets set out for Yemen and were greeted personally 
by al-Badr at the Hodeidah port.  ‘Abd al-Latif Dayfallah, a future Yemeni prime 
minister and one of the thirteen returning, remarked: 
“The thirteen Yemeni officers---by the way the same number as the 
Egyptian Free Officers---was quickly being molded into the Egyptian 
model.  The Egyptian Free Officers movement which overthrew the 
monarchy in Egypt was something we emulated.”85    
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Dayfallah and ‘Abdullah Juzaylan, who was also one of the thirteen, were instrumental 
in forming the Yemeni Free Officer movement in 1960.  The group of young officers 
would be at the core of the September 1962 overthrow of the Imam.
86
 
In a long conversation with British MP and mercenary Neil McLean during the 
Yemeni Civil War, al-Badr confessed to the extent that his naiveté, trustworthiness, and 
hubris almost caused him to sacrifice his father and the independence of his country for 
empty promises.  During al-Badr’s many trips to Cairo, Nasser had been cultivating 
him as a protégé, hoping to secure a Nasserist ally in South Arabia. 
After Yemen officially joined the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958 al-Badr 
made a trip to Damascus to meet with Tito, Nasser, Syrian President Shukri al-Quwatli, 
and a cohort of Egyptian officials including Ali Sabri, Hakim Amer, Anwar Sadat, 
among others to discuss the planning of a revolution against his father Imam Ahmad.  
Nasser explained that he envisioned turning Yemen into a base for Arab nationalism 
and anti-imperialism in Arabia.  He promised to send al-Badr two cases of pistols, 
Egyptian £25,000 (around $42,500), and an additional £50,000 sterling after 
completion. 
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87
 
 
 
Later that year, Nasser called al-Badr on the private wireless transmitter that Nasser 
had installed in al-Badr’s palace in Sana’a, and instructed him to meet ‘Abd al-Salam 
‘Arif, the Iraqi Arab nationalist leader and Nasser supporter in Baghdad for further 
instructions.  In a series of comical episodes, Iraqi Prime Minister ‘Abd al-Karim 
Qasim incessantly interrupted al-Badr’s meetings with ‘Arif, refusing to leave them 
alone for even five minutes, perhaps fearing that they were conniving against his own 
rule.  ‘Arif’s final attempt at passing a letter to al-Badr was intercepted personally by 
Qasim, punctuating an unproductive visit to Baghdad.
88
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Fig. 2.4 Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser and Shukri al-Quwatli receiving 
Yemeni Crown Prince Mohammad Badr in Damascus in February 1958, in 
celebration of the United Arab Republic (UAR) formation. 
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 The next year in 1959, al-Badr was again called to Alexandria, where he was 
spirited off in a lengthy car ride to an isolated house near the town of Borg el-Arab.
89
  
Al-Badr arrived in time to see off a group of men who Nasser explained were Saudi 
dissidents looking to overthrow King Saud.  In what was no doubt a planned charade, 
Nasser led al-Badr to believe that he had plans for overthrowing the Saudi royal family 
and perhaps restoring the honor and land that the Yemenis had lost in 1934.  Al-Badr 
and Nasser then returned to Cairo to meet with leaders of the Algerian FLN Ferhat 
Abbas and Benyoucef Benkhedda who explained the role envisioned for Algerian 
commandoes and saboteurs.  The plot thickened when Soviet naval agents proposed 
sending a fleet to Hodeidah to block off any attempts at American or British 
intervention during the Yemeni revolution.
90
  
According to Neil McLean, Nasser came to an agreement with the Algerian FLN to 
send volunteers to Yemen and organize terrorist activities against Aden through 
extensive training camps in Egypt.   In the first phase of his plan, he would occupy 
Yemen and set up government ready to become a member in the United Arab 
Republic.
91
  Then, as part of the second phase, he would undermine Saudi monarchs 
and arm opposition parties in Aden and Saudi Arabia thereby fomenting an Arab 
Socialist revolution on the Arabian Peninsula.  For the third and final phase, Egypt 
would occupy the Persian Gulf, thus gaining access to oil money.  The Russians and 
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Chinese had purportedly approved this plan as it suited their own idea of weakening 
Arab-Western ties.
 92
 Portions of this version were later corroborated in October 1962 
by a wounded Egyptian paratrooper who had been told by Nasser that they were going 
to Yemen to fight the British in Aden.
93
 
At the urging of al-Badr, Imam Ahmad’s Italian doctors declared him incapacitated 
because of a morphine drug addiction.
94
  From April-August 1959, the ailing Imam 
flew to Rome for medical treatment, leaving his son al-Badr in charge.  Al-Badr invited 
Egyptian advisers and technicians to the country
95
 and made promises of a substantial 
pay raise to army officials.   These promises precipitated a political crisis once the 
Yemeni officers realized that al-Badr did not have sufficient funds in his possession to 
meet these promises.  Ahmad flew back and ordered the withdrawal of all Egyptian 
advisers, fearing that they had orchestrated a coup against al-Badr in his absence.  He 
called Ahmad Abu-Zeid, the Egyptian Ambassador to Yemen, and warned him that 
unless the Egyptians ceased their plotting against him, he would forcibly remove 
Egyptians from the country permanently, as his father Imam Yahya had done before 
him.  To punctuate the statement, during a face-to-face meeting with Abu-Zeid, Ahmad 
tore up the civil-air agreement recently signed between the two countries.
96
  He also 
tried to secure the repayment of bribes given by al-Badr to the tribes, but managed only 
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to further alienate his tribal alliance, who had become more amenable to the tenets of 
the FYM.   
The remaining years of Ahmad’s life were punctuated by multiple unsuccessful 
attempts to assassinate him during which the Imam had managed during the last year of 
his life to make enemies of both local tribes and Gamal Abdel Nasser, a combination 
that would be disastrous for his unprepared Crown Prince.
97
  Making matters worse for 
al-Badr, following his failed attempt at reform and based on suspicious evidence of al-
Badr’s dealings with the Soviets, Ahmad essentially grounded his son and refused to 
grant him permission for international travel. 
In late 1961, al-Badr again spoke with Nasser, explaining that he was grounded, 
monitored by his father’s confidants, and not at liberty to coordinate the revolution.  
Nasser responded that he would “take care of it” and arranged for Chinese laborers to 
ship unmarked boxes of guns and explosives disguised as construction equipment for 
one of the road building projects.  In the spring of 1962, the Egyptians prematurely 
spread a rumor that a plot against the Yemeni Imam was impending.  Nasser sent an 
urgent telegram to al-Badr asking him to kill his father Ahmad.  In way over his head, 
al-Badr finally confessed the details of the intrigue to his father, who forgave him, but 
instructed him to leave his relationship with Egypt behind.  Instead, he should invest 
his energies into improving Yemeni relations with Saudi Arabia and Jordan and 
perhaps join the Pact of Ta’if recently signed between the two kings.  Several weeks 
prior to his Imam Ahmad’s death, al-Badr did, in fact, lead a Yemeni delegation to 
Saudi Arabia to negotiate Yemen’s entry into the Ta’if Pact.  In the meanwhile, Ahmad 
expelled the Egyptian ambassador, leaving only the Egyptian diplomat Muhammad 
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‘Abd al-Wahad behind.  On the day of his father’s death, al-Badr received an ultimatum 
from Nasser and a personal visit from ‘Abd al-Wahab demanding an immediate union 
with Egypt.  Before al-Badr had time to consider his options, however, his palace was 
being shelled and his time for naiveté had expired.
98
 
According to Ali ‘Abd al-Rahman Rahmy, an Egyptian officer who served in the 
Yemeni Civil War, “In Cairo, al-Badr was attracted by Nasser, to a point where he was 
convinced he had Nasser’s personal friendship…and wished to emulate the Egyptian 
leader as much as possible.”99  Aden High Commissioner Kennedy Trevaskis remarked 
in 1961 that al-Badr was seen by both British colonial officials and Zaydi tribal 
authorities as a protégé of Nasser.
100
  
Al-Badr developed an open diplomatic policy of what he referred to as “positive 
neutrality”, or as Rahmy explained it, “a modernist on friendly terms with Russia.” 101  
Prior to September 1962, it was apparent to any observer, that Imam Ahmad’s son, 
Crown Prince al-Badr was sympathetic to both Soviet machinations and Nasser’s Arab 
nationalist plans in Yemen.  From the perspective of the Soviet Union, al-Badr was an 
Arabian leader who expressed enthusiasm for Soviet construction and development 
efforts and had functionally granted them the keys to the Red Sea through the port of 
Hodeidah.  Given the potential and actual benefits of a closer relationship with the 
Yemeni royal family, it mattered little whether al-Badr was a communist, a capitalist, 
or an autocratic dictator.  From the vantage point of the Soviet Union on the Arabian 
Peninsula, economic and political strategy was more significant than ideology in 
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determining their foreign policy.  Nasser viewed al-Badr as a naive and spineless ruler 
who could be cajoled into supporting even the most outlandish of his Arab nationalist 
schemes.  Al-Badr himself was hubristic and trusting as was evident from his 
confession of globetrotting and plotting at the behest of Nasser’s Arab nationalist 
vision.  While one might add the characteristic of ‘fanciful story-teller’ to his 
repertoire, there is no denying that both the Soviets and the Egyptian were tempted by 
the malleability of al-Badr’s leadership in Yemen.  Their eventual support of Sallal and 
the YAR, however, was mainly a product of circumstances in the days following the 
outbreak of the Yemeni revolution in September 1962, rather than a preordained plot to 
overthrow both Imam Ahmad and al-Badr, as will be detailed in the next chapter. 
The US Attempt to “Locate” Yemen 
At the same time that the Soviets were investing economic and political capital in 
Crown Prince al-Badr, their American counterparts were investing political efforts in 
their alliance with Saudi Arabia, while top decision-makers could scarcely find Yemen 
on a map.  President Dwight Eisenhower’s Middle East policy, known as the 
Eisenhower Doctrine, supported and united the conservative Arab regimes of Iraq, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, placing them as an ideological counter to 
“Nasserism”.102 By June 1957, Eisenhower succeeded in polarizing the Arab world and 
creating a “royalist axis” of conservative regimes that were willing to counter and 
criticize Egypt and Syria.
103
  The 1958 coup in Iraq and the US military intervention in 
Lebanon conversely discredited US intentions in the Middle East and strengthened 
Nasser as the anti-imperialist.  After abandoning the failed Eisenhower Doctrine in 
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1958, the administration decided to seek political accommodation with the Nasserist 
movement.  Toward the end of the Eisenhower presidency, Soviet-Egyptian tensions 
arose over Nasser’s policies targeting domestic communist parties, presenting an 
opening in US-Egyptian relations.
104
  Upon entering office in 1961, Kennedy was 
therefore inclined to consider not only US obligations towards Saudi Arabia, but a 
continuing effort to court Nasser’s friendship.  The importance of oil exports from the 
Gulf and the stability of the Saudi Arabian government lent an added level of 
importance to every policy decision made in the region.
105
  The US had no comparable 
strategic interests in Yemen.
106
  Prior to the civil war, relatively few Foreign Service 
officers and Arabic speakers had served in Yemen.
107
 
The following demonstrative episode occurred during a meeting between Chester L. 
Cooper, the liaison officer to National Security Council staff from Central Intelligence 
Agency, Allen Dulles, the director of Central Intelligence, and William Putnam “Bill” 
Bundy, a member of the CIA and Kennedy’s foreign affairs advisor, best illustrates the 
importance, or lack thereof, of Yemen in the eyes of US officials:  
“When Bundy and I were discussing the next day’s NSC meeting, we 
were interrupted by an unexpected visitor… 
Dulles’s secretary came in to say that the head of the Middle East 
Division was calling.  ‘He says it’s urgent.”  Allen reached for the 
phone.  I crossed my fingers.  Bill rolled his eyes. 
‘Yemen?’ Dulles asked.  “Who’s he?...Oh. Is it really important?...Well, 
send him up.”  And up he came… 
“Well?” Dulles stared at the obviously frightened analyst.  ‘Yemen?’ he 
asked again.  ‘What’s the Yemen? ... A country? ... Never heard of it.  
Where is it?’ 
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The expert pointed with a shaking finger to a small speck on the edge of 
the Red Sea.  ‘There, Mr. Dulles.’ 
‘I can’t see it.  But what’s happening there that’s so important?’ 
‘It’s the Imam sir.’ 
‘Imam? Never heard of that either.’ 
‘It’s a person, sir.  A religious person.  He’s the head of the government 
– the imam of Yemen.’ 
Dulles’s eyes were wandering.  He looked first at Bundy, who shrugged.  
Then at me, who was trying to keep a straight face.  Then at his watch.  
‘All right.  What about him?’ 
‘He’s leaving the country, sir.  The first this has ever happened – the 
imam leaving Yemen.  There may be a coup.’ 
‘Where’s he going?  Moscow?  Beijing?’ 
‘No, sir.  He’s going to Switzerland.  Zurich.’ 
‘Very nice.  A holiday?’ 
‘No, Mr. Dulles.  He’s going to see a doctor.  A specialist.’ 
Dulles suddenly became interested.  ‘Oh, why?’ 
‘He has syphilis, sir.’ 
‘Well,” sighed Dulles, ‘you’ve finally told me something that will 
interest members of the NSC.  Thank you.  Good night.’108 
 
Yemen was barely on the radar of US foreign relations in the beginning of the 
1960s.  In fact, even in November 14, 1962, during a meeting regarding the Yemeni 
Civil War, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan recorded in his diary that 
President Kennedy had said, “I don’t even know where [Yemen] is”.109 The ignorance 
of world leaders and what they do not know, is as important as what they claim to 
know when it comes to decision-making. 
 Despite the relative obscurity of Yemen in American foreign policy circles, there 
was an American presence in Yemen prior to the Yemeni coup, albeit through the 
operations of private oil companies.  The extent of Soviet investment in the Yemeni 
port of Hodeidah and their developing relationship with al-Badr set off a flurry of 
activity focused primarily on understanding Soviet plans for the Arabian Peninsula.  
During the 1950s, American diplomatic officials had virtually no presence in Yemen 
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under the rule of Imam Ahmad, who prided himself on limiting the penetration of 
foreign powers in his country.   
The first significant contacts with the Yemeni royal family were made in December 
1955 by the Yemen Development Corporation (YDC), a small oil exploration company 
formed in cooperation with the CIA for the express reason of infiltrating North Yemen.  
At the core of the YDC were veteran Texas oilman John Alston Crichton, a former US 
intelligence officer with the Office of Strategic Services during WWII, Walter S. 
Gabler, a Washington DC investment banker consultant, and George Wadsworth, US 
ambassador to Saudi Arab and Yemen.  Gabler, who had previously negotiated 
American oil concessions in Egypt in 1951, raised $20 million to purchase oil and 
mineral exploration rights from Imam Ahmad.
110
  Aside from this agreement with the 
YDC, a German oil company stationed in the country’s Tihama costal region, was the 
only other foreign entity to have secured exploration rights in Yemen.  In a subsequent 
meeting with Imam Ahmad, Ambassador Wadsworth noted that Ahmad assumed this 
agreement would lead to further agreements for economic cooperation between the two 
countries, specifically in regards to expanded road networks and privately financed 
factory projects.  Ahmad threatened to otherwise accept the Soviet overtures of 
economic assistance.
111
 
Crichton, later explained that the company had the explicit support of the State 
Department, who expressed a sincere interest in American commercial activity in 
Yemen to counter the rising Soviet interests in Arabia.  In November 1955, the YDC 
signed a thirty year agreement with Imam Ahmad giving him a fifty percent stake in an 
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oil profits.
 112
  In return for the concessions, Crichton recounts that Ahmad was given 
“$300,000 in bonus payments and a bullet-proof Cadillac so he could take the ladies of 
the harem for rides.”113  
 
Fig. 2.5 Members of YDC waiting for audience with Imam Ahmad  
   
Fig. 2.6 Imam Ahmad and YDC members  
 
 Having been originally founded as a base for American intelligence gathering, the 
YDC unsurprisingly accomplished very little actual oil exploration.  By 1957, they had 
run out of money and were sold off to Resource Associates, an investment group that 
included Wallace Whitaker, the president of the Intercontinental Hotel chain and 
                                                          
112
 Phil H. Shook, “Yemen Oil Fields, Dallas Feud,” Dallas Star, March 20, 1988.  In 1981, 
Hunt Oil Company, discovered oil in the same region where Crichton and his team had 
obtained concessions.  A fierce legal battle ensued to determine the owner of the Yemeni oil 
proceeds. 
113
 Crichton and Anderson, The Middle East Connection.  Crichton, who was among the first to 
recognize the importance of oil deposits in the Middle East, would later publish this book based 
partially on his experiences in Yemen as part of the YDC. 
78 
 
 
 
William Casey, who would later become the director of the CIA.  Hatem al-Khalide, an 
American-educated Lebanese geologist, remained with the company in Yemen 
throughout its transition and would later write his own book based on his experience 
with the company, divulging the company’s involvement with the US intelligence 
community.
114
  
The State Department was reluctant to relinquish control over the Yemeni oil 
concessions for fear that it would be open to the Soviet technicians already present in 
the country and that the US would lose a vital intelligence source in the region.  When 
other options such as Standard Oil Company of New Jersey remained reluctant to 
assume oil exploration in Yemen, the US State Department admitted that maintaining 
the oil concession “was only to preserve the US position on the Arabian Peninsula and 
not for commercial reasons.
115
  After the departure of the YDC team, convinced John 
Mecom Oil, based in Houston, Texas to assume responsibility for oil exploration in 
Yemen.  John Mecom, a prominent Texas oilman, was well-known for pioneering 
commercial oil exploration in the Middle East in countries including Libya, Jordan, and 
Yemen.  Perhaps at the behest of the American Overseas Investment Corporation which 
was funding the expedition, Mecom Oil’s exploration team moved to a location only 
55km north of Hodeida, near the location where the Soviets were currently constructing 
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Port Ahmad.
116
 On April 17, 1961 Imam Ahmad met with John Mecom Sr., the 
president of Mecom Oil and granted his company permission to conduct explorations 
for oil in the region of Salifa and in other regions of Tihama.
117
  
 
Fig. 2.7 John Mecom Sr. standing to the right of King Hussein of Jordan in 1964
118
 
 
Despite John Mecom’s high expectations, no oil had been found, much to the ire of 
Imam Ahmad who had grown jealous of Saudi oil riches.
119
  In an interview on May 3, 
1962, Mecom was forced to account for the delays in the progress of the search for oil 
in the region of Tihama:  “He explained that the delay in the exploration was due to 
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natural conditions and promises to resume drilling after the arrival in Yemen of a new 
more powerful drilling rig.”120 John Mecom did not have much time to fulfill or renege 
on these promises as the country would be thrown into turmoil four months later, 
making oil exploration impossible for the rest of the decade.  Oil would be discovered 
in 1981 in the very same locations where YDC and Mecom Oil teams explored in the 
1950s and 1960s.  The arrest of Muhammad Galeb Farakh, a Yemeni university student 
and an employee of Mecom Oil, on charges of spying for the Americans served as 
further evidence of the presence of American intelligence agents amongst the oil 
exploration teams.
121
 
Throughout his six year flourishing relationship with Nasser and the Soviets, al-Badr 
formulated a policy centered around socialist reform and anti-British rhetoric.  
American onlookers were concerned that al-Badr would consciously or unconsciously 
open the doors of the Arabian Peninsula to Soviet penetration.  Prince Hassan, Al-
Badr’s uncle and Imam Ahmad’s brother who was deemed to have been “less militantly 
anti-Western” was the ideal Anglo-American choice as a successor to Ahmad.  
According to a 1958 CIA intelligence assessment, in the event of a succession crisis al-
Badr was likely to receive the military support of the Egyptians and perhaps Soviet 
intervention as well.
122
  British observers were particularly alarmed by al-Badr’s claim 
to the Aden Protectorate and his declared interest in expanding the anti-British border 
attacks began under his father Imam Ahmad.  Alan Lennox-Boyd, the first Viscount 
                                                          
120
 AVPRF, Fund 585, Opis 14, Papka 7, Dela 9, File 89, May 3, 1962. “Al Nasser” published 
interview. 
121
 GARF, Fond 4459, Opis 43, Dela 195, File 73, March 6, 1961.  French Press Correspondent 
in Hodeidah reported the arrest.  Muhammad Galeb Farakh had previously worked for the US 
diplomatic mission in 1959. 
122
 FRUS 1958-1960, Vol. XII, 366, Special National Intelligence Estimate: The Yemen 
Situation, November 12, 1958. 
81 
 
 
 
Boyd of Merton briefed British Prime Minister Macmillan on joint British-American 
plans for a Yemeni coup to replace Imam Ahmad with his brother Hassan, thereby 
preventing the anti-British al-Badr from coming to power.
123
 Hatem al-Khalide, as well, 
makes reference to the American attempts at befriending Hassan and orchestrating the 
assassination of Ahmad and al-Badr.
124
 Even after Imam Ahmad’s death, however, the 
US Foreign Office refused to intervene in support of Prince Hassan, unless “Yemen 
should veer too far in the direction of the Soviet Union.”125   
Conclusion 
 The events of September 26, 1962 were the culmination of decades of popular anti-
Imam sentiment, planning, and failed attempts at the hands of the Free Yemeni 
Movement and their affiliates.  Behind the scenes of national Yemeni revolutionary 
politics, Egypt, the USSR, and the US were making political inroads into the Imam’s 
Yemen, forming alliances with members of the royal family.  With the success of the 
1962 coup and the foundation of the YAR, the broader international community was 
pulled into Yemeni power politics by a weak revolutionary central government that 
sought to replace its lack of tribal legitimacy with international support.  In doing so, 
the Americans, British, Egyptians, Saudis and Soviets found themselves supporting 
sides in the conflict that would not have been considered only days earlier.  What 
ensued was a series of political divisions and alliances dominated by historical irony 
and ad hoc diplomatic decisions.  As will be discussed in the next chapter, the fateful 
decisions made by Abdullah al-Sallal in the first days of the coup and the ensuing 
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international divide over the recognition of the new republic, set the stage for a lengthy 
and costly internationalized civil war in Yemen. 
83 
 
Chapter 3 – Recognizing the New Republic 
YAR President Abdullah Sallal must have realized relatively quickly that al-Badr’s 
body was not among the rubble of his palace.  It would seem that he committed the 
errors of his predecessors from the 1948 and 1955 coups by failing to carry out the 
regicide of the Hamid al-Din family.  By this point, al-Badr was on his way north to 
rally tribal support for an assault on Sana’a.  The YAR would last no more than a few 
weeks unless Sallal could elicit foreign assistance.   Given al-Badr’s popularity with 
Nasser and the Soviet Union, it seemed unlikely that Sallal would receive their 
recognition if either power knew that the Imam was alive.   
Although he failed to kill al-Badr, Sallal’s capture of the Sana’a radio station and 
telephone exchange was the key to saving his republic.
1
  Upon hearing the first shots 
fired, Yemeni revolutionary officer Hassan al-‘Amri led an assault team to seize the 
communication stations and inform groups of coconspirators in Ta’iz, future YAR 
prime minister Hamoud al-Jaifi in Hodeidah, and other urban centers that the coup had 
been successfully launched.
2
  With the radio and telephone in Sana’a in his possession, 
Sallal controlled domestic and global access to information about events on the ground 
in Yemen.  Furthermore, his supporters captured al-Wusul palace, a reception area for 
foreign dignitaries who had been waiting for an audience with the new Imam.  In the 
weeks following the coup, Sallal and his revolutionary council would conceal the truth 
of events on September 26 in an attempt to secure international recognition and support 
prior to the organization of an opposition to the republic. 
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Claude Deffarge and Gordian Troeller, two French journalists who witnessed the 
first stages of the Yemen civil war, summarized Sallal’s September 26, 1962 radio 
broadcast:  
“Armored units and tanks, acting on the orders of the military high 
command, have surrounded the royal palace and asked the tyrannical 
dictator to surrender.  Upon his refusal, artillery opened fire on the 
palace. The next morning, the monarchy collapsed.  The tyrant was 
dead, crushed under the rubble of his palace.”3 
 
 
Fig. 3.1 Al-Badr’s palace the day after the September 1962 tank shelling.4 
  
As the newly appointed deputy prime minister of the YAR, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-
Baydani managed to dig a deeper political hole for the new republic with his penchant 
for storytelling.  During a radio address on October 11, Baydani declared that Yemeni 
forces had defeated Hassan's supporters in the city of Sa’dah and had seized all the 
national territory of Yemen.  He boldly stated that any aggressive action on the part of 
Saudi Arabia will be construed as an act of war.
5
 Deffarge and Troeller pressed 
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Baydani on the issue of confirming al-Badr’s death during an interview one week after 
the coup.  He emphatically dismissed rumors that al-Badr was still alive.  Baydani 
explained that “Yemenites like stories.  They will grow weary of them quickly.”6 
Baydani was not alone in stretching the truth of facts on the battlefield.  During an 
October 15 rally in Sana’a, Sallal declared:  We have defeated the rotten monarchy.  
The revolutionary regime is recognized by 20 countries.  Anyone who tries to restore 
the monarchy in Yemen is the enemy.  Our troops entered Sa’dah.  They have defeated 
the enemy and send King Saud and King Hussein retreating.  Our troops have already 
occupied Ma’rib. 7 Later that month Sallal reiterated his ambition to establish a 
"Republic of the Arabian Peninsula," further increasing Saudi suspicions of the new 
republic’s aims.8 
To make matters worse, on October 19, Sana’a radio pronounced the death of 
Crown Prince Hassan, who had assumed the role of Imam after the purported death of 
al-Badr.  The YAR government ordered his property and that of fifteen other members 
of the royal family confiscated,
9
 an approximate amount of 40,000 acres.
10
  As the 
world soon found out, aside from requisitioning royal property, none of these 
pronouncements were true. 
Baydani and Sallal’s declarations did not last beyond November 12, 1962 when 
there was an official media affirmation that al-Badr was alive and leading the 
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counterrevolutionary forces in the north.  French journalist Jean-Francois Chauvel 
conducted a public interview with al-Badr along with live photographs, confirming that 
he was alive and along the Saudi border.
11
 In the interim, however, both Egyptian and 
Soviet sources believed that al-Badr, their once stalwart ally in South Arabia, was 
presumed dead.  When al-Badr’s relatively pro-American uncle Hassan declared 
himself Imam, Egypt and the Soviet Union were left with no other option but to 
recognize the new Yemeni republic and salvage what they could from their previous 
foreign policy investments and visions for the region.  The Saudis, on the other hand, 
were compelled by historical and strategic circumstances to support the Yemeni 
opposition.  Within months, Egypt and the USSR found themselves supporting a weak 
and unknown state, while Saudi Arabia was supporting a loose coalition of stateless 
tribes along its border.  The US intervened in a situation rife with historical and 
political irony, offering the Saudis and Egyptians a diplomatic solution to their mutual 
strategic conundrums.  Negotiating the withdrawal of reluctant foreign support for the 
Yemen civil war would become the dominant theme throughout the next two years of 
the conflict. 
The Egyptian Pledge of Support 
Although Nasser played a role, albeit a minor one with little significance, in 
overthrowing Imam Ahmad, the decision to support the YAR was not inevitable.  
Nasser and the Egyptian population did not harbor favorable opinions of the Yemenis, 
whom they regarded as violent and uneducated Bedouins.
12
  There is no doubt that 
these negative perceptions factored into the formation of Nasser’s Yemeni policy and 
the need to invest a vast amount of Egyptian resources in support of the revolution.  
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The following satirical story illustrates the skepticism that many Egyptians held 
towards the new Yemeni government: 
“The story went around Cairo that Sallal sent a telegram to the Egyptian 
government saying, now that the war is succeeding the greatest need of 
revolutionary Yemen is education.  Please send us 500 schoolteachers.  
The next week came another telegram saying, the greatest need in 
revolutionary Yemen is still education.  Please send us 20,000 
schoolbooks.  The third week there was another telegram saying, the 
greatest need in revolutionary Yemen remains education.  Please send us 
50,000 students at once.”13 
 
Between September 29
 
and October 4, 1962 a series of telegrams were exchanged 
between Sallal and Nasser including a formal request for recognition, the UAR 
recognition, subsequent offers of aid, and finally a YAR response thanking Egypt for 
recognition and aid.
14
  Egyptian General Ali ‘Abd al-Hameed was dispatched to Sana’a 
for an investigative mission on September 29.  After seeing the alarming state of the 
revolutionary council and the armed forces supporting the state, Hameed asked Nasser 
for a Sa’aqah, or Special Force battalion, which arrived on October 5 and acted as 
Sallal’s personal bodyguard.15 
In the midst of, or perhaps in response to this correspondence, on October 1 
Muhammad Zubayri, the new YAR Minister of Education, and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-
Baydani, made an important trip to Cairo to enlist Nasser’s help.16  It was clear from 
the urgency of this first foreign trip for the new republic and the timing of it so near to 
the start of the revolution that Nasser’s support for Arab revolutionaries was not taken 
for granted.  It took until October 6 for an Egyptian steamer to arrive in the Soviet-
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constructed port of Hodeidah with soldiers in uniform.
17
  While there were certainly 
stipulations and rumors that Egyptian soldiers had arrived in Yemen within hours of the 
revolution, the October 6
 
arrival was the first widely documented demonstration of 
Egyptian support and might well have been a reaction to Zubayri and Baydani’s visit 
several days earlier. 
In a cable sent to Nasser on October 3 Sallal declared that, as a representative of the 
Yemeni government, he was adhering to the tripartite Jeddah Military Pact of 1956 
made between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.  In his response Nasser assured Sallal 
that “the UAR is pledged to live up to every pact it has concluded and moreover, 
emphasize that the UAR put the Jeddah Pact into effect at the very moment it received 
news of the Yemeni people’s revolution.”18 Mahmoud Riad, Egyptian Ambassador to 
the UN explained that the Egyptian intervention was a response to Saudi assistance 
given to royalists rather than an Egyptian invasion.
19
  In justifying Egyptian 
intervention in Yemen, Nasser cited the collective defense clause in Article 2 of the 
Jeddah Pact: 
“The contracting states consider that any armed aggression upon any one 
of them, or upon its forces, is an aggression directed against all of them, 
and hence, in conformity with the legal right of individual and collective 
defense for their existence, they are all bound to hasten to the relief of 
the country aggressed upon, and to take at once all necessary measures, 
by contributing resources and armed forces to repel the attack, and re-
establish security and peace.”20 
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Using the Jeddah Pact as justification for Egyptian intervention in Yemen was both 
halfhearted and in contradiction with the wording of the pact.  First, when Nasser 
issued a declaration of military support on October 3 there was no foreign presence in 
Yemen.  In fact, the supporters of the Imam had not even publicly declared their 
opposition until two days after Nasser’s declaration of support.  Furthermore, the pact 
called for the collective action and agreement of all three parties including Saudi 
Arabia, with whom Nasser did not consult prior to making his declaration.
21
 
Muhammad Haykal would further elaborate on this justification in a November 1962 Al 
Ahram article: “We did not go to Yemen to start a war but to prevent a conflict.”22 
The identification of the Yemeni state that was party to the Jeddah agreement was an 
added layer of difficulty.  In justifying Nasser’s legal right to intervene in Yemen, legal 
historian Alf Ross explains that “although the military occupation of one state by 
another is a violation of the law of nations, the prior or simultaneous consent of the 
existing government legitimates the intervention.”  This means that Nasser referred to 
earlier agreements made with the Imam’s government, despite the fact that Egypt was 
supporting the Imam’s deposition.23 
Nasser might have offered legal justifications for military intervention and support 
of the new Yemeni republic, but the truth is that Baydani and Zubayri simply showed 
up at the right time.  Defarge and Troeller claimed that “the Yemeni operation was a 
miracle for Nasser,” and may have temporarily saved his political isolation in the Arab 
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world.
24
 As the historian Eli Podeh explains, origins of Nasser’s intervention in Yemen 
were found during the Iraq crisis in 1961.  On June 25, 1961 ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, the 
Prime Minister of Iraq since his coup d’état against the monarchy in 1958, declared his 
intentions to incorporate Kuwait as part of Iraq.  This announcement only six days after 
the British granted Kuwait independence precipitated a regional-crisis as British and 
Arab armies dispatched troops to protect Kuwait’s sovereignty.  According to Podeh, 
the 1961 Kuwait-Iraq Crisis was the first Arab dispute “neither initiated by Nasser nor 
in which he played a leading role…Iraq’s bid for Kuwait may be construed as a bid for 
Arab leadership as well, though Qasim would have not necessarily admitted it.” 
Following a military coup d’état in Syria in September 1961, the new Syrian military 
regime withdrew from the United Arab Republic (UAR) with Egypt.  Ostensibly to 
prepare his troops for a possible intervention in Syria, Nasser prematurely withdrew 
Egyptian soldiers from Kuwait on December 20, 1961, leaving him politically isolated 
in the Arab world.
25
 Although Egypt remained the only member of the UAR after 1961, 
Nasser continued referring to his country as the UAR until after his death in 1970. 
With each passing month, Nasser’s political stature and the well-being of the 
nationalized Egyptian economy continued to deteriorate.  The Yemen civil war was a 
foreign policy opportunity for Nasser to become relevant once again.  Khaled 
Mohieddin, a member of the Egyptian Free Officers Movement and a close confidant of 
Nasser, stated emphatically that “The Yemen war was a response to the break with 
Syria…a sign that Egypt’s Arab role was not over.”26  Nasser’s intentions in Yemen 
were not specifically for the success of the YAR.  Rather, he envisioned Sana’a as a 
                                                          
24
 Deffarge and Troeller, Yemen, 88. 
25
 Eli Podeh, “‘Suez in Reverse’: The Arab response to the Iraqi Bid for Kuwait,” Diplomacy 
and Statecraft 14:1 (2010), 103-130. 
26
 Habib, Tariq, Milaffat thawrat yuliyu (Cairo: Al Ahram, 1997), 244. 
91 
 
 
base through which he could extort economic and political aid from the Americans, 
Saudis, and Soviets and score political points against the British in Aden.
27
 The 
relationship between Egypt and the YAR was formalized when a five-year mutual 
defense pact was signed by Sallal and Anwar Sadat in Sana’a on November 10, 1962 
and ratified by Nasser the next day.
28
  According to an Al Thawra article in December 
1962, even Yemeni republicans began to view their own revolution as part of Nasser’s 
grand vision.
29
  This vision was codified in the April 17, 1963 Cairo Charter signed by 
Iraq, Syria, the UAR and the YAR, the outlined process for forming a unified “fertile-
crescent” and larger “Arab federal state”.30 
Nasser made the decision to support the YAR and Sallal under the assumption that 
al-Badr was dead.   ‘Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi insisted that Nasser would not have 
supported Sallal and the YAR if al-Badr had been confirmed alive at an earlier date.
31
 
Mahmoud Riad, Egypt’s representative to the UN and Minister of Foreign Affairs 
during the 1960s, concurred with this point and added that “Egypt would not have 
intervened in Yemen because al-Badr was an open-minded Imam and wanted to bring 
about a real change in Yemen.”32 While Baghdadi and Riad may have been advocating 
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a self-serving analysis of Egypt’s decision to intervene, it certainly seems likely that 
had Nasser received word from al-Badr during his meeting with Baydani and Zubayri, 
he would not have offered his support to an untested leader and to a republic that had 
yet to exhibit popular and tribal support.  On this matter, Riad readily blamed Baydani 
for intentionally feeding Egyptian officials with misinformation.  Anwar Sadat, 
Baydani’s brother-in-law, particularly “relied on Baydani’s analysis of the situation in 
Yemen.”  Riad explained that “because Sadat did not like to read, al-Baydani was able 
to control his mind.”33 
US ambassador to Cairo under Kennedy, John Badeau provided his own 
interpretation of Nasser’s opportunistic intervention in Yemen:  
“There is some reason to think that the revolutionary groups both within 
and outside Yemen may have expected Egyptian support if they 
mounted a potentially successful coup d’état.  Yet the decision to enter 
the Yemen struggle was largely a pragmatic one, made at the time of the 
revolt and in the light of its particular character.”34 
 
 According to multiple accounts, Nasser sent a small contingent of forces to support 
the YAR, likely intending only a short and limited Egyptian presence.  He had been led 
to think that al-Badr was killed and supporting Sallal and his revolutionaries was the 
only gateway into the Arabia Peninsula. Former Egyptian General Muhammad Fawzi, 
who served as minister of defense during the 1960s, explained that Egyptian support 
was originally conceived as "a limited action comprising political, moral and material 
support -- by no means was it envisaged as an action that could drain our resources." 
Nasser sent two battalions of Special Forces and an aircraft squadron, a force that he 
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described as “symbolic”.  By 1964, the Egyptian commitment to Sallal would reach 
70,000 troops.
35
 
Saudi Arabia and Tribal Loyalties 
 The 1934 Treaty of Ta’if between Saudi Arabia and Yemen brought an end to the 
first modern conflict between the two Arabian states.  The Saudi war effort in Yemen 
had been led by Crown Prince Saud ibn ‘Abd al-Aziz, who would be king during the 
outbreak of the Yemen civil war.  The first article of the treaty brought hostilities to an 
end and created the foundation for a peaceful coexistence between the two countries.  
Article 18 added on to those foundations and guaranteed that both parties would not 
support or recognize any armed opposition to either monarchy.   
Article 18: In the event of insurrection or hostilities taking place within 
the country of one of the high contracting parties, both of them mutually 
undertake: 
a) To take all necessary effective measures to prevent aggressors or 
rebels from making use of their territories. 
b) To prevent fugitives from taking refuge in their countries, and to 
expel them if they do enter. 
c) To prevent his subjects from joining the rebels and to refrain from 
encouraging or supplying them 
d) To prevent assistance, supplies, arms and ammunition reaching the 
enemy or rebels.
36
 
 
In 1937, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Iraq, the first three independent Arab states, 
signed a mutual defense pact further solidifying the relationship established by the 
1934 Ta’if Agreement.  During both the 1948 and 1955 coups in Yemen, the opposition 
to the Hamid al-Din family asked Saudi Arabia for aid and recognition.  In both 
instances the Saudis refused to recognize their new regime, citing the first and 
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eighteenth articles of the Ta’if Agreement.37 During the 1950s, King Saud and Imam 
Ahmad forged a close relationship, punctuated by the 1956 Jeddah agreement and a 
continuously expanding trade relationship across a porous border to the north. 
 
Fig. 3.2 Imam Ahmad and King Saud with their families during the 1950s
38
 
 
 
As part of the Ta’if agreement, Imam Yahya of Yemen ceded the northern Yemeni 
territories of Najran, ‘Asir, and Jizan to Saudi Arabia for a period of sixty years.  
Although Sunni Arabs constituted the great majority of these territories, a significant 
minority consisted of Shi’ite Zaydi Arabs who were ethnically Yemeni and who 
adhered to the authority of the Zaydi Yemeni Imam.
39
  According to Article 22 of the 
Ta’if Treaty, the tenets of the agreement would be in effect for twenty lunar years, after 
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which either Yemen or Saudi Arabia would be able to demand arbitration in the case of 
a dispute.  In 1954, Imam Ahmad allowed the twenty years limitation to lapse without 
introducing arbitration.  Upon ascension to the throne, al-Badr had no intentions of 
calling for arbitration either.   It was not until the founding of the YAR that Sallal made 
a public declaration calling for an arbitration of the border dispute.
40
 The YAR 
government announced their specific intentions to regain the former Yemeni province 
of ‘Asir.  The Egyptian air force began flying missions over Saudi Arabia, dropping 
caches of small arms for use by local ‘freedom fighters’.  Rather than use the weapons 
against their government, however, local Bedouins sold the arms on the market or 
directly to the ‘Asir Government.41 
Parker Hart, US ambassador to Saudi Arabia in 1963, retold a similar story 
describing Nasser’s anti-Saudi intrigues: 
“One of the highlights of this episode was the dropping of 108 bundles 
of ammunition and weaponry on the Saudi coast in February of ’63 in 
the expectation on Cairo’s side that the Bedouins and others would pick 
these weapons up and go after the government.  They misestimated the 
whole situation—the Bedouins turned the weapons in to the police.  And 
there was no party of revolutionaries to pick up the enormous quantity 
of weaponry, ready-to-go-weapons, put the clips right in and start firing.  
I saw them, inspected them myself…This weapons drop deepened, of 
course, the feeling of distrust in Washington of Nasser’s intentions.”42   
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43
Fig. 3.3 
 
YAR Deputy Prime Minister Baydani, having also spread false rumors about al-
Badr and Hassan’s death, broadened his path of rhetorical destruction by declaring a 
state of war against Saudi Arabia.  He ordered the closure of the Yemeni legation in 
Saudi Arabia and publicized a hostile stance towards the Saudi monarchy: “We have 
taken all measures to move the battle to the Saudi territory itself and to Riyadh itself, if 
necessary.”44  
According to a US intelligence bulletin, Baydani “charged that Saudi actions in the 
present situation were tantamount to aggression, and stated that Yemen therefore 
considers itself to be in a state of war with Saudi Arabia.” According to the CIA 
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analysis “this statement, while certain to add to the tensions in the area, appears to be 
primarily an attempt to justify the presence in Yemen of Egyptian forces.  It follows 
frequent recent assertions by Cairo that the UAR, under the old “Jidda Pact” signed in 
1956 by Egypt, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia, would defend Yemen against outside 
aggression.”45 
Yemeni Prince Hassan and Saudi Prince Faisal were sitting together in New York at 
a UN meeting when news of the coup arrived.  Faisal immediately told Hassan, who 
would be named Imam following the announcement of his nephew al-Bar’s death, to 
fly straight to Saudi Arabia and appeal to King Saud for aid in defending in the 
Imamate.
46
  As members of the Hamid al-Din family began crossing the border into 
Saudi Arabia, King Saud and his brother Prince Faisal did not turn them away.  The 
official Saudi position was described as an adherence to the Muslim and Arabian 
honorable custom of sharaf, offering refuge to the deposed Imam’s family.  This 
response was further grounded in the historical tenets of both the Treaty of Ta’if and 
the Jeddah Pact.  Similar to Nasser’s legal approach, the Saudis claimed they were 
adhering to the military alliances stipulated in both agreements.  Nasser and the Saudis 
differed only in the identity of the legitimate Yemeni state, whether it was the YAR or 
the Imam.   
From a strategic perspective the Saudis could rely on two elements in their favor: the 
predominantly Zaydi Muslims of the northern highlands tribes were staunch advocates 
of the Yemeni Imam and the northern highlands themselves, difficult terrain for 
Nasser’s mechanized army, would serve as a partial buffer between Egyptian troops 
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and Saudi territory.
47
 Additionally, support of al-Badr helped the Saudis avoid domestic 
tensions in the border regions of ‘Asir, Najran, and Jizan where there was a sizable 
minority of Zaydi tribesmen tracing their ethnic origins to pre-1934 Yemen.  Avoiding 
internal tribal conflict was particularly important as the ruling structure was entering a 
two year succession crisis that would last from 1962-64.
48
 
In January 1963, Egyptian military commanders Field-Marshal ‘Abd al-Hakim 
Amer and General Ali Amer made an extended visit to Sana’a, where they discovered a 
failing republican military campaign.  Royalist forces were moving southwards, 
threatening republican positions.  Nasser responded with a bombing campaign on the 
Saudi border in spring 1963, in an attempt to destabilize royalist bases in Jizan, Khamis 
Mushayt, and Abha.  One of the bombs was reported to have been dropped on a 
hospital in Abha killing thirty-six patients.  Egyptian targeting of Saudi border regions 
caused further unease and alarm among the members of the Saudi royal family.
49
 
The Egyptian bombing campaign was accompanied by anti-Saudi propaganda.  
During the Aswan High Dam Celebrations in January 1963, Nasser shared embellished 
accusations, rivaling only Baydani’s fanciful tales.  According to Nasser, Saudis and 
royalist were being armed by Pakistan who was providing planes and daily shipments 
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of 500 guns to the Ta’if airport.  This marked the first months of Nasser’s anti-Saudi 
campaign, a theme that would continue through the war.
50
  
The Formation of an Opposition 
Following the precedence of his forefathers and his own actions after the 1948 and 
1955 coups, al-Badr fled north to rally the tribal militias.  In 1948 Ahmad had also fled 
north to the village of Hajjah where he rallied the tribal armies for an assault on Sana’a 
within three weeks of the coup.
51
  The northern tribes, particularly those of the Hashid 
and Bakil confederations were effective fighters and were Zaydi, therefore more likely 
to support the Zaydi Imam.
52
  Al-Badr’s northward journey took a somewhat different 
path as he was pursued by bands of republican supporters for the entire journey, an 
additional sign that Sallal and Baydani must have known he was not killed in the 
shelling of his palace.   
After lasting through a twenty-four hour siege of his royal palace, al-Badr slipped 
out of Sana’a to the village of Hamdan.  From there, he continued his journey with a 
dozen bodyguards to the walled town of ‘Amran around fifty kilometers northwest of 
Sana’a.  Continuously pursued by small republican bands, however, the Imam was 
forced to cross the Saudi border in search of refuge.  What made al-Badr’s retreat even 
more difficult was the animosity that local Sana’a sheikhs felt toward the Hamid al-Din 
family.  Many of them were ready to raise arms against al-Badr in response to the 
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grievances they held against his father’s strong-arm policies.53  Al-Badr did not make it 
to Saudi Arabia until October 8 by the earliest account.  In his absence, opposition to 
the YAR was already declared.  On October 6, the same day that the first official 
Egyptian troops arrived in Yemen, a royalist radio station operated by Hassan and his 
supporters on Saudi territory broadcast an announcement that members of the royal 
family had fled to Saudi Arabia and were organizing an armed opposition to Sallal and 
the YAR.
54
 
In forming the opposition, al-Badr convinced many of the northern Zaydi tribes to 
declare their support for his anti-Egyptian efforts.  He declared that “Yemen would be a 
graveyard for the Egyptians just as it was a graveyard for the Turkish.”55  Muhammad 
Sa’id al-Attar, a French-educated Yemeni who founded the Yemen Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development and served as the YAR Minister of Economics, 
explained the historical and political reasoning behind the formation of a northern 
opposition to the republic.  Historically, given the difficulty of their terrain, the 
northern highlands could not be conquered by a foreign army, whether Egyptian, 
Turkish, or Saudi.  Although the core of the allegiance to al-Badr was religious, as the 
number of Egyptian soldiers increased, the northern tribes fought for independence 
against what they perceived as a foreign invader.
56
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Al-Badr’s supporters were dubbed “royalists”, a designation that al-Badr did not 
agree with, as he made clear in a later interview: 
“Royalists…I do not like that word, because it causes false associations.  
We fight for our beliefs, for our tradition, for our home – not for the 
crown, but for a new world order.  Who can lead our people and our 
suffering people from his [Nasser’s] war to freedom?  Have a look at us, 
my brothers and I, we live with our people.”57  
 
 There is no consensus as to the origins of the term “royalists” although 
perhaps this may have been conceived by the British who had developed their 
own alliance with the ‘feudal’ sheikhs and sultans in South Arabia.58  The term 
“royalist” may have been an attempt by British media to link US support for 
Saudi monarchs (royalists) to their counterparts in Yemen.  Imam al-Badr’s 
supporters referred to themselves as “loyalists” and their territory as “Free 
Yemen.” 
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Fig. 3.4 The red flag of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of 
Yemen (royalist supporters) at the center of celebration 
in a public square in the northern city of Sa’dah.59 
 
Once al-Badr was confirmed alive, Sallal’s claim of legitimacy in the absence of a 
significant royalist opposition was no longer viable.  According to a report from the 
Soviet embassy in Yemen, the Yemeni revolution itself was in danger of being lost 
entirely and Sallal was trying desperately to go on the defensive: 
“Al-Sallal said that the goal of Saud, Hassan, and British imperialists 
was the restoration of the reactionary regime in Yemen…The Prime 
Minister had previously refuted the rumors that Prince Hassan was in 
Sa’dah and al-Badr of the Hamid al Din family was in Hajjah.  He said 
that the Yemeni revolution had already destroyed the reactionary Hamid 
al Din dynasty.”60 
 
 The initial momentum of al-Badr’s opposition and the relative weakness of Sallal’s 
military effort and political support drew an increasing number of Egyptian soldiers and 
resources into the conflict.  Despite Nasser’s increasing commitment of troops and 
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resources, he was confounded by Yemeni tribal politics.  In the first weeks and months 
of the civil war, tribal sheikhs were continuously switching alliances, accepting bribes 
from either the royalist or the republican camps, and forming their own inter-tribal 
truces.  Although fighting was at times intensified and casualties were exacerbated by 
the presence of the Egyptian army, certain necessities of life trumped all other political 
considerations.  For example, the Hajjah region village of al-Ahnum’s qat trade with 
the plateau continued unabated throughout the war, “under agreements guaranteed in 
common by men who on other grounds were at daggers drawn.”61 Much to Nasser’s 
chagrin, the success of the YAR began to symbolize the success of Nasser and his 
vision of Arab nationalism.  After having declared his public support for the YAR, 
Nasser could not forsake his powerless ally, even after al-Badr was discovered alive.  
Deffarge and Troeller argue that Sallal was a last minute addition to the 
revolutionary council that was led primarily by young officers without comparable 
revolutionary qualifications and history.  “His personality is not the decisive element of 
this revolution, for it was not intended that he be made the leader of the group …he was 
only a last minute choice.” Furthermore, with the Republic only a week old, Sallal had 
already been dubbed by foreign media with nicknames such as the “dictator”, 
“Moscow’s man”, or “Nasser’s agent”.62 To be fair, Deffarge and Troeller held 
similarly condescending opinions of al-Badr claiming: “Everyone knows that al-Badr is 
an idiot...Every time his father turned his back, he was going to the Egyptians.  Was it 
not he who appointed Sallal the commander in chief of the Yemeni army?”63 In the 
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years of conflict ahead, the two parties of the Yemen civil war would be dominated by 
ineffectual and unpopular leaders, who would in turn be dominated and overshadowed 
by the interests of regional and international powers. 
Soviet Relations with the YAR 
Prior to 1962, the Soviets had invested a great deal of political, economic, and 
industrial capital into cultivating a relationship with this impoverished state in South 
Arabia.  Soviet presence in Yemen was an important element in the USSR grand 
strategy for the Red Sea and the Middle East in general.  In an attempt to explain the 
Soviet vision for South Arabia the French journal Perspective printed a prophetic 
observation of Soviet efforts in Yemen and its place within their overall Middle East 
strategy: 
“Since the North African phase of Soviet expansion was completed, now 
begins the new stage which will lie in the complete subjugation of the 
entire Arabian Peninsula and especially out towards the Indian Ocean 
and the Persian Gulf.  This is a much more reasonable goal than 
Cuba.”64 
 
The historian P.J. Vatikiotis described Soviet relations with Egypt and by extension 
in Yemen in similar terms: 
“The Soviets throughout the sixties considered Egypt, whether under 
Nasser or his successor, the essential center of their hoped-for power 
position in the Mediterranean.  This, in turn, is linked to their emerging 
global naval strategy that encompasses the Indian Ocean.  It gives them 
not only a deterrent against the U.S. Sixth Fleet, but affords them also 
several potential political advantages, apart from the Middle East, in 
southern and western Europe and Africa.”65 
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As noted in the previous chapter, Crown Prince al-Badr was open to greater Soviet 
penetration and was an advocate of socialist reforms in Yemen.  While the French 
journal Perspective, might not have compared al-Badr (or Sallal for that matter) with 
Fidel Castro in the same fashion that Yemen was equated with Cuba, it is likely that the 
USSR would have maintained its relationship and support of al-Badr, had they known 
he was still alive.  For the entire month of October, both Izvestia and Pravda referred to 
al-Badr’s death in dozens of articles and do not entertain the notion that he might still 
be alive.  With the pronouncement of Badr’s death, the Soviets rushed to be the first 
(arguably the second behind Egypt, although this was a point of mutual contention) 
country to recognize the new republic.  While the continued cultivation of a 
relationship with the Yemeni people could potentially secure Soviet investment in the 
port of Hodeidah the speed and degree of the Soviet reversal in policy from supporting 
al-Badr to vilifying the Imamate was surprising.  
During 1961 and 1962 articles published in Izvestia and Pravda made every effort to 
praise Imam Ahmad and the blossoming relationship between the USSR and Yemen.  
Published letters between Khrushchev and Ahmad emphasize Soviet-Yemeni 
friendship, port Ahmad, and praise Ahmad's progress in fighting colonialism and 
advancing reforms.
66
  By October 10, 1962, however, Izvestia began portraying Prince 
Hassan, the Hamid al-Din family, and the royalists as a tool of the Saudis and Western 
oil companies like ARAMCO.
67
 Indeed from the ease with which Soviets switched 
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allegiances, it appears that their objectives in Yemen were opportunistic and pragmatic 
rather than guided by an overarching national ideology.
68
 
Soviet Premier Khrushchev’s initial telegram recognized the YAR on October 1, 
1962 and offered moral and political support, but was reluctant to include a military 
commitment.  The Soviets understood the important problems that could arise from the 
local war and the difficulties of achieving peace and complete disarmament.  According 
to a pre-revolutionary study, most Yemenis lived on less than $100/year, 95% of the 
populace was illiterate, and there were serious deficiencies in the national health care.
69
 
This concise description of severe problems in Yemeni society would become the 
Soviet “to-do-list” in order to garner the loyalty and appreciation of the local populace 
and the ruling class.   
Beginning in early 1961, teams of Soviet engineers and technicians undertook to 
open schools, factories, hospitals, and other vital infrastructure, garnering a great deal 
of fanfare at each stage.  In doing so, the Soviets treated Yemen as another of the 
politically neutral countries of Africa and Asia that participated in the 1955 Bandung 
Conference, focusing their aid on social-welfare, areas that would “win the hearts and 
minds” of the general populace.  The USSR staffed a large contingent of technological 
advisors and providing political, military and economic aid while funding these 
national projects.  When Sallal assumed the presidency of the YAR, he continuously 
maintained an outwardly positive view of the USSR in rhetoric as well as action.
70
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During his first trip to Cairo, Sallal spoke highly of peaceful Soviet initiatives and 
expressed support for Khrushchev’s state message.   
According to a CIA intelligence report, by October 19, 1962, the Soviets had in turn 
placed their full support behind the YAR calling the coup a “national liberation 
movement” rather than a “people’s revolution” as it had originally been termed.  A 
Soviet official described the Yemeni people to Sallal as “struggling selflessly for the 
freedom and independence of their motherland.” This semantic upgrade in Yemen’s 
status was a response to the “technical-aid agreement” concluded between the USSR 
and the YAR only two days earlier, and announced publicly by Sana’a radio.71  From 
the Soviet perspective, it seemed that Sallal might be able to, at least temporarily, fill 
al-Badr’s role in Yemen as an ally of the USSR. 
On November 8, 1962 a Yemeni delegation traveled to Moscow and returned 
without an official Soviet military commitment to the YAR as the USSR was in the 
midst of the Cuban missile crisis prior to the Yemeni visit.  Without an official 
guarantee from the USSR, Sallal signed a defense pact with UAR on November 10.  
The Soviets were initially reluctant to issue open aid package to YAR, preferring 
instead to “extend its long-range reconnaissance capacity.”  In as such, the Soviets 
invested in the construction of an airport near Sana’a, large enough to handle the 
Egyptian TU-16 bombers.
72
  At the time there did not seem to be a need for a major 
airport in Sana’a.  The Yemeni air force had been inaugurated less than one year before 
and there were only a minimal number of non-military flights.  The Soviets had 
conceived the new Yemeni airport as a significant strategic asset in South Arabia, 
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rather than simply a service to Yemeni civilian aviation.
73
 “The USSR could rest 
assured that they would have relatively unimpeded access to Hodeidah and Sana’a 
airport as long as the UAR was governing Yemen, and the UAR certainly remained the 
dominant force in that country.”74  
During the reign of Imam Ahmad, the USSR provided Yemen with economic and 
military aid, as detailed in the previous chapter.  Under Sallal, however, the direct 
Soviet military presence in Yemen receded to an advisory role after the Egyptian army 
intervened.  Although the weaponry continued to be supplied from Soviet sources, the 
Egyptian military infrastructure in Yemen acted as a middleman supplier and trainer of 
Yemeni troops.  There remained, however, a core group of seventy-five Soviet military 
advisors designated to train a modern Yemeni army and modern technological 
specialists and thirty two Soviet advisors for economic development.
75
 In March 1963, 
nine Soviet specialists in hydrology and agricultural specialists along with twenty 
doctors (fourteen to Hodeidah, four to Sana’a, and two to Ta’iz - mostly used for Soviet 
personnel) arrived in Hodeidah.  In addition, the USSR also sent specialists and 
teachers in higher education.  A total credit of around $60 million was granted to 
Yemen and the Soviets also agreed to delay the repayment of the credit for five years.  
During 1963 there were $9 million worth of Soviet export to Yemen (of technology, 
sugar, cement, soap, matches, oil products, machines, etc.) and $6 million rubles of 
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Yemeni export to the USSR (coffee, cotton, etc.).
76
 In essence, the post-coup saw a 
significant the expansion of Soviet-Yemeni relations. 
Komer’s War 
The US was a latecomer to the emerging international arena in Yemen.  President 
Kennedy and his foreign office had previously given little thought to this remote 
impoverished region and were perfectly content allowing a motley group oilmen and 
intelligence agents to represent American interests in Yemen.  Ironically, it was this 
lack of interest in Yemen that allowed US decision makers to forestall recognition of 
the regime, weighing both local factors and the interests of British and Saudi allies.  By 
the time the US was ready to recognize the regime, al-Badr was discovered alive, 
thereby complicating the Yemeni situation.  The uncommitted position of the US in 
Yemen, allowed its foreign office to act as a mediator between Egyptian, Saudi, and 
Yemeni interests during the first months of the conflict.  Peter Sommerville-Large, an 
Irish journalist present in Yemen during the civil war, observed that despite the official 
recognition of the YAR Americans were equally as popular with royalists because the 
tanks and military hardware used by Egyptians were all Russian, not American.  He 
explained that “because the American did not openly help the republicans it was 
assumed among the Royalists that they secretly supported the Imam, and had only 
recognized the new regime for devious diplomatic motives.”77 
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During the Yemen civil war, decision making on the Yemeni situation was moved 
from the State Department to the White House.  Concern regarding the possible 
repercussions of the Yemen civil war for US oil interests in Saudi Arabia gave this 
local conflict an inflated sense of importance for the Kennedy administration.  Kennedy 
soon became so heavily engaged in forming Middle East policy that senior staff 
member of the National Security Council Robert W. Komer, claimed that the President 
was functioning as his own Secretary of State. 
78
   
Robert Komer collected all the information disseminated from the Saudi and 
Egyptian foreign offices and local intelligence relating to the Yemeni crisis.  In this 
role, he formulated US policy with the full approval of JFK and sent the President 
summaries several times a week, detailing the events in Yemen and the implementation 
of US policy.  As nearly every piece of material that came in or out of the White House 
relating to Yemen had Komer’s RWK signature affixed to it, members of the Kennedy 
administration often referred to the Yemen civil war as Komer’s War.  Phillips Talbot, 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, gave his 
assessment of Komer and the extent of his influence and centrality in the Yemen civil 
war: “Komer is a tremendously vigorous man…He was the key man over in the White 
House on Middle East things.  Mac Bundy, I believe, worked basically from Komer’s 
analyses and recommendations, and these went to the President in that direction.”79 In 
his biography of Komer, Frank Leith Jones, explained that Komer was nicknamed 
“Blowtorch Bob”, because his “resolute determination to have the direction of his 
superiors carried out was akin to having a blowtorch aimed at the seat of one’s pants.”80 
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Komer himself admitted, however, that he was appointed to this position by sheer 
coincidence of being in the room when the conflict first broke out, having had no 
previous exposure or knowledge of Yemen.
81
  The fact that Komer was not an expert 
on Yemen specifically, but was rather “more a coordinator with a special eye for 
Kennedy,” underscores the broader scope of the Yemen civil war in the eyes of 
American policy makers in the 1960s.
82
 Komer’s lack of experience regarding Yemen 
was by no means the exception in the Kennedy administration.  Kennedy was very 
clear from the beginning of the civil war that from the US perspective, Yemen itself 
was not particularly significant.  Komer, in very illustrative terms, summed up how the 
President felt about Yemen, that is, once he was able to locate it on the map: 
 “If this place was on the moon or the center of Africa and the Russians 
or Egyptians or other people were not involved, we couldn’t care less 
what went on in Yemen.  It could be a head-hunter fight in the depths of 
New Guinea.  As long as it didn’t impinge on our interests, no 
problem.”83 
 
Although prominent American politicians did not give thought to Yemen prior to the 
revolution, Soviet machinations in Hodeidah were clearly noticed.  US policy 
throughout the Yemen civil war consisted of a single word: containment.  The only 
question was how best to prevent an escalation of the civil war that could potentially 
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engulf the entire region.  Official American aims in Yemen were outlined by Phillips 
Talbot: 
1. To keep the Yemeni conflict and its repercussions from spreading 
and endangering vital U.S. and Western interests in the Middle East, 
outside of Yemen, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. 
2. To prevent the development by the Soviet bloc of a predominant 
position in Yemen. 
3. To encourage the prospects for a relatively stable and independent 
Yemen.
84
 
 
Imams Ahmad and al-Badr did not have many fans in the Kennedy administration.  
The CIA had become concerned by the increasing number of arms shipments and the 
amount of economic aid arriving in Yemeni ports from Soviets and Communist 
Chinese sources during the 1950s.
85
  Sallal’s coup, on the other hand, seemed to have 
genuine intentions to modernize Yemen.  Robert Stookey, the U.S. Chargés d’Affaires 
ad interim to Yemen in 1962, was of the firm belief that the Yemeni imamate was 
“ignorant, bigoted, venal, and avaricious.”86 In a telegram to the Secretary of State’s 
office in October 1962, Stookey justified U.S. support for the revolutionaries: 
“If ever a country needed revolution, that country is Yemen.  Its new 
regime’s stated policies we cannot possibly quarrel with.  We have 
opportunity here [to] align ourselves only reluctantly with forces of 
justice, reform and progress.  Let us seize it.”87 
 
In isolation, the new regime would have been hailed as a great achievement.  The 
Egyptian support of the revolution, however, complicated the matter.  King Saud of 
Saudi Arabia justifiably believed that Nasser’s presence in the Gulf presented a direct 
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threat to the Saudi own seat of power.  On October 23, 1962 Cairo Radio warned 
Crown Prince Faisal: “the sons of all the Arabian Peninsula lie in wait for you and your 
family…Faisal nothing but death awaits you”.88  Additionally, Saud voiced fears that 
the success of Nasser’s revolution might inspire a similar Nasserist coup in Saudi 
Arabia, possibly orchestrated by the large Yemeni workforce in Saudi Arabia; a 
potential fifth column.  King Hussein of Jordan was equally concerned with the 
stability of his own regime and feared a Nasser-supported Palestinian revolution in his 
own country.
89
  Although the Saudi and Jordanian concerns may have been somewhat 
exaggerated, they managed to garner the attention of US policy makers in the Middle 
East. 
The Soviet recognition of the YAR, followed in turn by the rest of Eastern bloc, 
brought the question of recognizing the YAR to the forefront of US foreign policy.
90
  
The potential repercussions of U.S. recognition were summarized by McGeorge Bundy, 
Kennedy’s National Security Advisor: 
“Our immediate concern is less with what transpires inside Yemen than 
the prospect that our failure to recognize the new regime will lead to 
escalation of the conflict endangering the stability of the whole Arabian 
Peninsula.  Likewise, failure to recognize will result in termination of an 
American presence in Yemen and is likely to lead to a considerable 
increase in Soviet influence.”91 
 
Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Sayyid Umar al-Saqqaf expressed his personal 
concern for the repercussions of Saudi support for al-Badr to Parker Hart on October 
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25, 1962.   The deposed Imam lacked both the popular and military support to bring the 
civil war to an end
92
, and would only attract a more protracted Egyptian attack against 
the royalists and their Saudi backers.
93
  It was unlikely that Saudi Arabia’s poorly 
trained 15,000 troops would stand a chance against Nasser’s 13,000 troops who had 
arrived in Yemen within one month of the coup.
94
  Under these circumstances, it 
appeared that recognition of the YAR and a diplomatic agreement for the withdrawal of 
Saudi and Egyptian forces from Yemen would be instrumental in securing the Saudi 
regime.  Saudi Arabia needed an exit strategy that would allow King Saud and his 
brother Faisal to withdraw from the conflict without giving the perception of being 
defeated by Nasser.  As John Badeau recounted in his memoirs, lacking another 
realistic option, the Kennedy administration resigned to supporting Nasser after slightly 
ameliorating their perception of his communist leanings: 
“Nasser was not an ideologue.  He was a highly pragmatic man indeed; 
he took some things from the Communist system and some things from 
the capitalist.  At that time it was quite strongly represented in the 
Department that this was kind of a vaccination, if you will, against a real 
onslaught of a worse disease.”95 
 
It was determined that Nasser’s support for the revolutionary state would obviate 
Sallal’s need to turn to the Soviets.96  Mahmoud Riad, a prominent Egyptian diplomat 
and Egyptian ambassador to the UN from 1962-1964, noted that “during the Yemen 
Crisis, the Russians did not offer any opinions, and did not bargain with us [Egypt].  
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Their main goal was to find a foothold in Yemen.”97 Riad’s perspective, while certainly 
tinged with elements of self-interest, highlighted a disconnect between the Egyptian 
offensive and Soviet policy.  Although continuing to give Nasser a blank check in their 
support of the YAR, the Soviets did not seek to control the Egyptian policy.  Rather, 
they were waiting for the opportunity, presumably during the political instability which 
would follow Nasser’s withdrawal from Yemen, to assume a dominant role in the 
YAR.  Nasser “jealously guarded his clients, thereby preventing the Soviet Union from 
gaining any credit for their efforts” and shielding the Yemen civil war from Soviet 
dominance.
98
   
Nasser was accepted by the US as the lesser of two evils and even as a potential 
obstacle to a Soviet Republic of North Yemen.  While foreign offices and media outlets 
attempted to decipher the Egyptian rationale in Yemen, the French La Gazette made the 
observation less than two weeks after the start of the revolution that “[i]t may be that 
Gamal Abdel Nasser is fighting a battle at once in the vast distances of Saudi Arabia, 
England, and Russia”.99  While certainly not intending to fight a three-front battle, 
Nasser’s very presence in Yemen essentially discouraged Saudi Arabia, the British in 
Aden, and the Soviet Union from expanding their influence over South Arabia.   
Following the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, neither Kennedy nor the 
American public had much patience for further brinkmanship in the Middle East.  Both 
Nasser and Sallal managed to placate American foreign policy concerns by publicly 
announcing their intentions to adhere to the American vision for the resolution of the 
                                                          
97
 Badeeb, The Saudi-Egyptian Conflict, 60 
98
 Peterson, The Decline of Anglo-American Middle East, 33 and 43.  This “jealousy” was 
symptomatic of a general suspicion that Nasser had of any Arab leader whom he thought might 
be trying to build his own “Arab” credentials and perhaps force unity upon Egypt. 
99
 La Gazette.  October 10, 1962.   
116 
 
 
conflict.  On December 17, Sallal announced that the YAR intended to honor its 
international obligations and live in peace with its neighbors.  The following day, 
Nasser, made a pledge to withdraw Egyptian troops from Yemen gradually, but only 
once Saudi Arabia and Jordan withdrew their own support for royalists.
100
 
The December 19, 1962 US recognition of the YAR, not surprisingly, did not 
stabilize the conflict.  Although agreeing in theory to disengage Egyptian troops from 
Yemen in exchange for US recognition of the new regime, in January 1963, Nasser 
claimed that a “token force” of 30,000 troops was necessary to ensure the stability of 
the new regime.
101
 Jordanian officials were upset with US recognition and threatened to 
“reconsider the utility of dealing with Communist bloc nations…Jordan might accept 
Soviet aid missions as a prelude to the establishment of formal diplomatic relations 
with the USSR.”  While this scenario was unlikely, the Jordanians believed it was 
apparently essential to increase their ‘nuisance value’ to get the US to pay attention to 
their views.
102
 
In a summary to Kennedy, Komer optimistically suggested a continuation of the 
current course of diplomacy: “I conclude that a bird in the hand is worth two in the 
bush.  Advantages of trying to keep war from flaring up again in first place outweigh 
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those of getting out from under a faltering disengagement scheme.  More preventative 
diplomacy just looks better than risking another blow-up.”103 
Reports of Egyptian and YAR incursions into Saudi territory and British-
administered Aden Protectorate, continued to arrive at the State Department throughout 
the first few months of 1963,
104
 threatening to spread the conflict into neighboring 
territories.  Nasser began contingency military preparations which included placing 
naval units, including submarines, motor torpedo boats and destroyers in an advanced 
state of readiness.  The UAR was also continuously moving military equipment and 
personnel to Yemen in preparation for air and naval attacks on towns along the Saudi 
Red Sea Cost and the Saudi-Yemeni border.  The Egyptian airfield Rad Banas less than 
300 miles across Red Sea from Jeddah was modified to accommodate MIGs and IL-
28s.  The Saudis also prepared for a military confrontation by ordering troops to Red 
Sea coast positions, improving anti-aircraft defenses for towns and airfields and 
shifting national-guard positions to southern border area.
105
 
Internally, the YAR was in serious financial trouble, needing significant financial 
aid “until it can get house in order and begin to satisfy revolutionary promises”.106 The 
“house”, however, was in complete disarray.  A military stalemate necessitated 
additional Egyptian reinforcements, as Sallal’s regime was not able to subdue the 
royalist force in the north and northeast tribal areas.  The rising frequency of Egyptian 
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air raids on royalist strongholds had begun to foster virulent anti-Nasser sentiments 
among the northern tribes.  It seemed reasonable to conclude that Sallal’s regime could 
not survive without continual Egyptian military intervention.  According to a CIA 
estimate, with a premature UAR exit the Soviets were poised to gain unrestricted access 
to Yemeni airfields, setting up a staging ground for communist penetration in Africa.
107
 
The instability of Sallal’s regime cast further doubt on the ability of Yemenis to govern 
Yemen, leading some members of the Kennedy administration to advocate a permanent 
Saudi presence in Yemen as an obstacle to Soviet expansion.
108
 
Despite the bleak CIA assessment, Komer, representative of the minority opinion in 
the administration by that point, maintained a level of tepid optimism, declaring: “I’m 
convinced that if we can keep the Saudis turned off and the Egyptians from being 
stupid, we have a controllable situation which can be gradually damped down.”  US 
policy objectives were subsequently restated as: “preventing Yemen war from 
spreading into full-fledged intra-Arab conflict (with risk of overt US/USSR 
involvement), and protecting our Saudi clients from their own folly while still not 
compromising our overall UAR policy”.109 
The US mission to the UN at first suggested dispatching to Yemen the Italian 
diplomat Pier Pasquale Spinelli, former UN representative to the Middle East in 1958.  
UN Secretary General U Thant rejected the request because he did not want to seem too 
closely aligned with the US.  U Thant’s Third World proclivity and predilection for 
nations such as UAR and YAR would continue to serve as an impediment to UN 
operations during the Yemeni conflict.  He feared being accused by Soviets of 
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supporting his predecessor’s (Hammarskjöld) pro-American policy.  In as such, U 
Thant insisted that the entire Security Council (US and USSR included) agree to any 
UN action taken in Yemen.  Following the UN refusal to act, the US then sent its own 
mission led by James Terry Duce, the vice president of ARAMCO and a personal 
friend of Saudi Crown Prince Faisal.  Faisal refused to agree to a withdrawal of support 
for royalists, citing worries over Egyptian meddling.
110
 
From February through April 1963, Ellsworth Bunker, the seasoned American 
mediator, and Kennedy’s special emissary, dedicated an intense six weeks of “shuttle 
diplomacy” between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and New York, to negotiate a disengagement 
settlement.
111
  Diplomacy during this conflict was no easy task given the diverging 
Egyptian, Saudi, and Yemeni national policy goals.  Nasser wanted the Saudis to cease 
their aid to the royalists immediately and promised a gradual withdrawal at some time 
thereafter.  Nasser’s logic in forcing the Saudis to withdraw support first was to finish 
off pockets of royalist resistance prior to his own withdrawal, thereby securing the 
YAR.
112
 The Saudis demanded Nasser’s simultaneous withdrawal, specifically to avoid 
this scenario.   
Sallal, who had been consulted by UN representative Ralph Bunche, wished for the 
sky by asking for a complete Saudi withdrawal, the exile of the entire Hamid al-Din 
family from the Peninsula, firm assurance that Britain and Saudi Arabia would 
withdraw all “rebel” infiltrators from Yemen and recognize YAR, all which essentially 
amounted to winning the Yemen civil war on his behalf.  In return, Sallal would not 
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intervene in Saudi Arabia or Aden.
113
    Further negotiations avoided consulting with 
the YAR as a reaction to both Sallal’s audacious requests and the Saudi protests over 
the unwillingness of mediators to speak with the Imam al-Badr and the royalist 
opposition.  Bunche’s meetings in Yemen had gotten off to a bad start in February 1963 
when a qat-chewing crown of Yemenis began to rock his car in protest upon his entry 
to the city of Ta’iz.114 
Kennedy’s updated policy, outlined by National Security Memorandum 227 issued 
on February 27, 1963, called for a special presidential emissary to the region and the 
dispatch of a USAF squadron to Saudi Arabia.
115
  In an effort to placate Saudi security 
fears, Kennedy commissioned Operation Hard Surface, a squadron of eight US planes 
stationed in Dharan, a major oil administrative center in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern 
Province and the headquarters for ARAMCO.
116
  Komer explained that the presence of 
the US squadron, although under strict orders not to be used in combat, was meant to 
send a clear message to Nasser that the US would not tolerate continued incursions into 
Saudi territory.
117
 Although, Kennedy told Komer, “I don’t want the squadron out there 
                                                          
113
 Ibid, 17.  
114
 Brian Urquhart, Ralph Bunche: An American Life (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), 363. 
115
 Little, “The New Frontier on the Nile”, 520.  Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett, Facing 
the Brink: an intimate study of crisis diplomacy (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1967), 
43. 
116
 JFK Library, Box 209, Folder 5, 2, Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy.  February 28, 1963. 
Komer claims that Kennedy originally hoped to have the planes withdrawn within 60 days 
(Jones, Blowtorch, 68). 
117
 JFK Library, Box 209, Folder 5, 9, Komer to Kennedy.  March 11, 1963. 
Air Force Chief of Staff Curtis LeMay protested the mission as the Dharan airfield had been 
deactivated in April 1962.  The absence of a modern airfield not only ensured the inability of 
the Hard Surface planes to respond to Egyptian incursions, but also made them sitting ducks for 
enemy fire (Weintal and Bartlett, Facing the Brink, 45). 
121 
 
 
until after we are 99 percent certain it won’t have to be used.”118 Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk concurred when he told Bunker before he left to the Yemen mission: “Be 
sure to tell Faisal that we will not be dragged into his little war in the Yemen.”119 
During the first week of April 1963, during a meeting in Nasser’s home in 
Manshiyat al-Bakri, Badeau and Bunker secured Nasser’s commitment to gradually 
disengage the Egyptian military from Yemen in correspondence with a simultaneous 
Saudi cessation of aid to the royalists, although he insisted on leaving some remaining 
Egyptian “military advisors”.120 Bunker conferred the success of his diplomatic mission 
to U Thant, UN Secretary General, and stressed the importance of an immediate UN 
mission to oversee the disengagement process.
121
 Having secured Nasser’s commitment 
to the interim withdrawal agreement, Bunker flew to Riyadh where he received Faisal 
approval on an eight-point proposal.  This included the termination of support and 
territorial refuge to royalist troops in exchange for UAR simultaneously withdrawal of 
an undetermined number of troops.  The UAR would be barred from taking any 
punitive actions against remaining royalists as a punishment for previous resistance or 
UAR attacks on Saudi Arabia.  A demilitarized zone of 20 km would be established 
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along the Yemen-Saudi border with impartial observers on both sides.
122
 The Bunker 
agreements were signed on April 10 and were subsequently passed on to the UN for 
mediation. 
Robert Komer advocated continuing the slow-moving negotiations between the 
Saudis and the Egyptians saying that “while they’re talking they’ll at least be less 
inclined to start shooting”.123 George Ball, Kennedy’s Undersecretary of State for 
Economic Affairs and Averell Harriman, Kennedy’s Assistant Secretary of State for 
Far Eastern Affairs, both expressed concern that “forcing substantial UAR withdrawals 
would leave Yemen in chaos with Soviets waiting to fill the vacuum”.124 In fact, in 
March 1963, the Soviets signed an aid agreement with the YAR worth approximately 
$20 million and offered the Yemenis education grants to study in Russia.
 125
  The 
Italian Minister to Yemen claimed to have counted 147 Russian personnel and Russian 
sponsored agricultural and industrial projects in the port city of Hodeidah.
126
 
Nasser, himself, assessed that his premature departure would jeopardize Sallal’s 
government because 30,000 Egyptian troops alone could not completely subdue the 
royalist Imam supporters.
127
  Even a partial reduction in the number of Egyptian troops 
would have been interpreted as a withdrawal of UAR support for the revolutionary, 
presumably shifting Yemeni support to the royalists.
128
  Nasser’s adamant efforts to 
remain in full force in Yemen were sanctioned by US foreign policy.  Kennedy still 
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harbored visions of extending a hand in friendship to Nasser, although there were 
ulterior motives in keeping Nasser intensely involved in Yemen.  It appears evident 
from the exchanges in the Kennedy administration that no one actually thought they 
could negotiate the withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Yemen.  As will be discussed 
in Chapter 6, allowing Nasser to remain in full force in Yemen was in fact the 
underlying rationale behind US policy in Yemen.  Not only would the Yemeni conflict 
be confined to Yemen, but Nasser’s army and activities would be confined to Yemen as 
well, preventing him from undertaking concerted military effort elsewhere in the 
region. 
Robert Komer eloquently described Nasser’s plight in Yemen from the US 
perspective: 
“Nasser is trapped in Yemen.  It’s bleeding him, but he can’t afford 
either the sharp loss of face in letting go or the risk of confronting us by 
starting on the Saudis again…On top of this, Nasser has deep economic 
trouble at home, and now an open fight with the British.  Nasser 
cornered is a dangerous animal, and we want to be mighty careful how 
we handle him.”129 
 
Komer’s assessment of the Egyptian economy was not entirely accurate.  In 1963, 
Egypt was still in the midst of a five-year plan for rapid modernization.
130
  The cost of 
the Yemen civil war and the foreign service pay for 70,000 soldiers certainly 
contributed to the growing Egyptian deficit during a period that saw an increase in 
Egyptian GDP and overall higher living standards. Nonetheless, Yemen was only one 
of multiple aggressive Nasserite policies which included agricultural and industrial 
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expansion, a massive propaganda machine, and an expansive social welfare network.
131
   
Komer’s expertise as an economist aside, he explained his optimism about eventual 
resolving the Yemen crisis: “Let them all bleed to death.  Egyptian are having their 
forces bogged down, Saudis are spending their money, and the Yemenis are suffering.  
When worn out, they will finally reach a settlement.”132 
Conclusion 
 During the fog-of-war that characterized the first weeks of the Yemeni conflict, 
information was at a premium.  Sallal’s capture of the radio station allowed him to 
recover from his initial blunder of letting al-Badr escape Sana’a alive.  Sallal and 
Baydani proceeded to parade an international charade claiming al-Badr’s death and the 
imminent victory of the Yemeni republican forces.  Nasser and Khrushchev wasted 
little time in recognizing the YAR, assuming that their stalwart ally was dead.  The 
Saudis cited treaty agreements, tribal politics, Arabian sharaf, and strategic advantages 
in declaring their support for the Hamid al-Din family that showed up at their border.  
Al-Badr’s miraculous resurrection and the momentum of the royalist opposition 
movement, however, turned a domestic succession crisis into a global conflict.  Saudi 
and Jordanian alarm at Nasser’s intentions and their own domestic instability drew the 
US into the conflict as the mediator intent on pleasing all parties involved.   
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 Chapter 4: Local Hostilities and International Diplomacy 
During the first two and a half years of the conflict, Nasser followed military 
success with an appeal for international diplomacy and a ceasefire to secure the gains 
made by republican and Egyptian forces.  Significant efforts were made by the US and 
UN over that period to bring the UAR and Saudi Arabia to a diplomatic agreement and 
a withdrawal from Yemen.  Imam al-Badr and the royalists, on the other hand, were not 
recognized as a state and not included in international diplomatic negotiations.  As a 
non-state entity, the royalist tribal armies were able to continue military operations 
unabated and without fear of international sanctions or retribution.  Appeals to 
international diplomacy were followed by royalist counter-offensives that rolled back 
many of the YAR territorial gains and imperiled the sustainability of Sallal’s regime.  
Nasser’s ultimate about-face and refusal to withdrawal Egyptian troops according to 
international agreements at each juncture, was a response to the reality of the battle-
field rather than a premeditated diplomatic ploy to buy time for his troops.
1
 This 
depiction of events in Yemen runs counter to the narrative of the civil war from 
American, British, and UN perspectives, which accused Nasser of manipulating 
international parties with false promises of withdrawal.
2
 This chapter utilizes captured 
Egyptian military manuals from 1964 detailing the formation of strategy and 
deployment of forces from 1962 through the end of 1964. 
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The internationalization of the local Yemeni conflict was not limited to the military 
alone.  Bruce Condé, an American philatelist and longtime friend of al-Badr led his 
own “stamp war” against Nasser and the YAR, bringing recognition and triumph to 
royalist forces through the popularity of the royalist postal network.  Richard John, 
historian of the American postal system explains that beyond the ordinary functions of 
transferring information and commerce, the postal system has the ability to foster a 
unified national society out of a loose union of confederate states.
3
   The royalist postal 
network provided al-Badr’s non-state tribal alliance with a unifying national 
organization and international legitimacy. 
Mutual Limitations and the First Weeks of the War 
The first Egyptian soldiers to arrive in Yemen in October 1962 landed at the Red 
Sea port of Hodeidah with no maps, no previous military experience in mountainous 
terrain, and no understanding of the tribal opposition to the republic.  What Nasser did 
understand was that without Egyptian help the YAR army and tribal supporters of the 
republic would not even be able to secure the capital city for longer than a few weeks. 
On their arrival, the Egyptians validated the rumors of the decrepit state of Imam 
Ahmad’s weapons supplies and armed forces.  Yemen’s navy consisted of only two 
motor boats in Hodeidah.  A reported fifty Yemeni cadets were training in Italy as 
paratroopers or pilots, but at that point had not graduated into regular service in the 
Yemeni army.  Imam Ahmad had ordered the dismantling of the few Yemeni planes 
that had been shipped, and stored the various parts in caves around Sana’a.4  The 
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airports in Sana’a, Hodeidah, Ta’iz, and Sa’dah were little more than dirt runways and 
in need of serious modernization.
5
   
 
Fig. 4.1 Map of North and South Yemen.
6
 
 
 
Fearing they would be used against him, Imam Ahmad had ordered artillery shells 
hidden in practically inaccessible large caves on the top of Jabal Nuqum, the tallest 
mountain near Sana’a.  The only transfer options available were via camel, which could 
carry only two cases of ammunition on two round trips maximum per day down the 
mountain.
7
  Had the Egyptian not arrived with munitions, this would have been the 
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only method, albeit laborious and time consuming, to arm the republic’s armored units 
consisting of 31 tanks and 95 armored vehicles, which had already used much of their 
ammunition in the shelling of Imam al-Badr’s palace.  Egyptian technicians were 
equally surprised to discover that the spare parts for artillery pieces in Sana’a were 
stored in a warehouse 250 kilometers away in Ta’iz.  Large-scale UAR efforts were 
underway to locate, document, and repair these artillery pieces into working condition.  
Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Army, Field Marshall Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hakim Amer, 
founded artillery schools in Sana’a and Hodeidah to train Yemeni soldiers in artillery, 
as the majority of the YAR army had little experience with such weaponry.  The 
Yemeni army was deemed antiquated and far behind the rest of the Arab world needing 
significant Egyptian military aid, with the eventual goal of transferring security 
responsibilities to a modernized Yemeni republican military.
8
 
During the first phase of the war, urban areas were the focus of republican and 
Egyptian attention for multiple reasons.  The Free Yemeni Movement and the 1962 
coup were fomented and supported by a largely urban population.  Rural and village 
areas, on the other hand, tended to associate more readily with the religiously 
conservative allegiance to the Imam.  Cities in Yemen were built on mountaintops with 
outer houses built of stone with slots for firing, a defensive asset to Egyptian forces 
holding the city.   Large villages and cities were by nature located near significant 
sources of drinking water, of utmost importance to the increasing size of the Egyptian 
military presence.  In order to secure an urban network, road engineering projects were 
needed to connect the cities and villages and prepare them for motorized military 
transport, as most of the roads in Yemen were then only capable of supporting animal 
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transport.
9
  The three cities of Sana’a, Hodeidah, and Ta’iz constituted the “strategic 
triangle” at the crux of Egyptian military control and Sallal’s political and economic 
strength.  All other offensive and defensive strategies were centered on the security of 
this triangle and the defense and maintenance of its interconnection road network.   
Battle for Sa’dah 
The republican forces entered the first weeks of the revolution with a clear military 
plan in what would amount to a race against the clock until Imam al-Badr was able to 
gather a sufficiently organized tribal opposition to Sallal.  The northern cities of Sa’dah 
and Hajjah were traditionally the epicenters of the Imam’s support during times of 
political crisis.  Following the 1948 and 1955 coups, the Imam and his supporters 
established a strategic base in the Hajjah fortress and from there led a tribal army in an 
attack on the capital city of Sana’a.  Given the importance of these two cities to the 
counterrevolutionary movement, they became one of the first and most important 
targets of the first republican offensives and were essential to garnering early support 
for the YAR.  
With two weeks of the coup, Prince Hassan had already captured Sa’dah, Ma’rib, 
and other centers in al-Jawf.  Following numerous royalist military triumphs, additional 
tribes announced their opposition to the republic and their allegiance to the Imam.  
Hassan continued moving his troops southwards, preparing for an attack on Sana’a and 
on the republican ruling apparatus.  The Egyptian intervention, and the arrival of aerial 
support for republican troops turned the tide of the battle, stemming the royalist 
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advance on the capital.
10
  The most representative battle for the military significance of 
the Egyptian army occurred in Sa’dah in the second half of October 1962. 
 
Fig. 4.2 A view of the fortified city of Sa’dah with its surrounding hills. 
 
At the end of October 1962, a unit of Egyptian paratroopers arrived in Sa’dah to 
establish an airfield and secure roads for Egyptian troop movements to the northern 
city.  Part of the 18
th
 Egyptian paratrooper brigade arrived in Sa’dah without incident 
and established an Egyptian base in Sa’dah.   On the way back towards Sana’a to link 
up with Egyptian ground troops, the paratroopers were ambushed by tribesmen from 
the Hashid federation and were forced to return to the safety Sa’dah.  Within days, 
tribal militias loyal to the Imamate placed a siege around the Egyptians in the city. 
Paratroopers, aided by Sa’dah locals who had declared their support for the YAR, aided 
the Egyptians in pushing back numerous royalist attacks on the city.
11
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On November 8, 1962, the rest of the 18
th
 paratrooper brigade arrived from the coast 
to reinforce the Egyptian position in Sa’dah.  Royalist forces, however, took control of 
the main roads preventing reinforcements from reaching the city and concentrated 
artillery fire on the Sa’dah airport in an attempt to cut off Egyptian air supply as well.  
The royalist coordination and tactics were more organized than the paratroopers had 
anticipated causing one Egyptian officer to claim: "The enemy's tactics were based on 
sound military reasoning; evidence of foreign leadership behind it, planning its 
missions, providing it with funds, weapons, ammunition personnel, and specialists."
12
   
On November 27, the 18
th
 brigade, supported by an Egyptian armored division that 
arrived from Sana’a, launched an offensive to retake the main road into Sa’dah and 
break the siege.  The brigade was split into four groups equipped with three-ton trucks 
carrying 37mm cannons and 1.5-ton trucks equipped with machine guns.  The first 
group secured two shoulders of the main road in a nighttime raid that relied on heavy 
fire from 82mm mortars.  The group’s progress was halted when they found four 
barriers 200-300 meters apart with rows of anti-tank spikes in between.  Engineers 
attempted to disable the barriers, but when one armored 4x4 vehicle exploded from a 
roadside bomb, the air force was called in to strafe the road and destroy the barriers.  
By the afternoon, the group managed to secure a hilltop fortress overlooking the city, 
the furthest this Egyptian offensive would progress.  The second group was forced to 
halt midway in the evening of November 28, in the face of heavy fire from the royalist-
held pass of al-Amasiya, manned by 500 tribesmen armed with guns, cannons, mortars, 
and 75mm recoilless rifles.  Heavy Egyptian artillery fire forced tribesmen to retreat 
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from their position to the nearby mountains for refuge.  Egyptian troops made the error 
of chasing tribesmen into the mountains and were ambushed, suffering very heavy 
losses.  Egyptian commanders again blamed losses on foreigners serving the Imam, 
claiming to have found dead foreign soldiers, foreign papers, gold liras, and foreign 
currency; evidently proof that foreigners were behind royalist success.
13
  They were not 
willing to believe that Yemeni commoners could outdo the Egyptian army. 
The third and fourth groups were sent to subdue the estimated 1,500 royalist forces 
guarding the al-San’ara pass, a winding and narrow road that was the only approach to 
the city of Sa’dah from the south.  As the Egyptian scouts approached the pass, they 
came under heavy fire cutting off their wireless connection with the rest of the brigade.  
A second scouting unit was sent and suffered heavy casualties, losing several armored 
vehicles in the process.  Unable to establish a wireless connection with the two 
frontline scout units, the Egyptian officers were, in an act of great fortune, able to make 
contact with the besieged paratroopers in Sa’dah, who described the location and 
strength of the tribesmen from behind enemy lines.  With this timely positioning 
information, Egyptians bombarded enemy positions with artillery fire, forcing them to 
retreat and open the pass.
14
 With the al-San’ara pass open, Egyptian heavy artillery was 
transported to frontline positions, overwhelming the southern remnants of the Sa’dah 
siege and delivering a blow to the royalist attempt at securing a northern capital.  On 
the morning of November 30, UAR troops entered Sa’dah and established a defensive 
perimeter.
15
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The battle of Sa’dah ended in a virtual stalemate.  Egyptian troops held a garrison in 
the city itself and on an overlooking hilltop, if only for a few weeks.  Royalist 
tribesmen held several other overlooking hills, with neither side able to drive the other 
from their defensive positions.  At this early stage in the war, the royalist tribes were 
able to confront the Egyptian army directly in the battlefield as both sides had access to 
heavy artillery and munitions.  For the Egyptian army, it became clear that success on 
the battlefield in Yemen was contingent upon their ability to amass a greater advantage 
in munitions and to utilize air cover as often as possible.  The lessons learned in the 
Sa’dah battlefield would factor into a more concentrated Egyptian attack as part of the 
Ramadan Offensive in 1963. 
From the perspective of the US and Western European nations, the initial gains 
made by republican and Egyptian forces were sufficient to recognize the new Yemeni 
republic on December 19, 1962, as it seemed that the YAR was in control of the 
majority of the country with the exception of a few border areas.  Following US 
recognition, British Prime Minister Macmillan likened President Kennedy’s interaction 
with Nasser to Neville Chamberlain’s “I have Herr Hitler’s word” dupe.  Nasser agreed 
in theory to disengage Egyptian troops from Yemen in exchange for US recognition of 
the new regime, yet in January 1963, Nasser claimed that 30,000 troops were necessary 
to ensure the stability of the new regime.
16
 Although Nasser was accused of deluding 
the US with promises of withdrawal, a simple analysis of the map of Yemen in the 
beginning of December 1962, may have led Nasser to conclude that the civil war was 
indeed over and that the YAR could survive without heavy Egyptian military presence.  
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The strength and organization of al-Badr’s opposition was, however, greatly 
underestimated. 
Royalist Counteroffensive: December 1962-January 1963 
The main Hamid al-Din royalist generals were uncles and first cousins to al-Badr.  
Hussein, one of former Imam Yahya’s sons had six sons of his own: Muhammad, 
Abdullah, Hassan, Ahmad, Ali and Yahya, all referred to as “al-Hussein”.  Abdullah, 
who was a third year student at the American University of Beirut (AUB) in 1962, led 
battle in Jawf.  His brothers Ahmad, who trained in an Egyptian military school, and 
Ali, who was studying political science in AUB and later drafted al-Badr’s constitution, 
were killed in action.  Hassan, another son of Imam Yahya, who had assumed the role 
of Imam in al-Badr’s absence had two sons of his own: Abdullah and Hassan, both 
taking leadership roles in the royalist army.
17
 Prince Hassam, al-Badr’s uncle controlled 
the royalist army in Yemen’s northeast, while al-Badr himself controlled the other half 
in Yemen’s northwestern regions.  The hereditary Slave Guards of the Royal 
Household, supposed descendants of Christian Ethiopians who were cut off from 
retreat across the Red Sea after the failed 5
th
 and 6
th
 Century occupation of Yemen, 
were the most trustworthy supporters of Imam.  They were all in charge of the “Royal 
Motor Pool” and transporting supplies and soldiers to front lines.18   
Two battles marked a shift in the momentum of the battlefield in the Imam’s favor 
from the end of 1962 through the beginning of 1963.  In Sirwah, located twenty-five 
miles west of Ma’rib, royalist eyewitnesses describe the slaughter of the 180-man 
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Egyptian parachute jump (three planes of sixty each) near the Sirwah battlefield.  Many 
paratroopers missed their mark entirely while others were shot in midair by royalist 
tribesmen on the ground.
19
  In Arhab, twenty miles north of Sana’a, twelve Egyptian 
tanks advanced against the royalist lines of communication in Arhab.  The Egyptian 
armor units did not protect their tanks with accompanying infantry, leaving the tanks’ 
blind-side open to attack.  Royalist tribal Arhabi volunteers approached the unguarded 
tanks and physically overturned them with tree trunk levers, burning them and the 
soldiers inside.  The accompanying soldiers fled in terror back to Sana’a, cutting the 
assault short.
20
 The royalist offensive demonstrated to Nasser that the war was far from 
over. 
In some instances, Turkish era cannons were brought out of storage in a last ditch 
efforts to repel an Egyptian offensive.  Shaharah, a large mountaintop village in the 
northern district of ‘Amran, was the location of an early clash with Egyptian soldiers.  
The hilltop town was armed only with Turkish era weaponry captured by Imam Yahya 
after destroying a Turkish army of 15,000 led by General Faidhi Pasha in 1926.  The 
1904 Turkish large field gun known as “al-Bisbas” (“The Pepper”) had a large supply 
of Turkish shells stored in the village.  Al-Bisbas was brought out of retirement to repel 
an Egyptian attack in December 1962.  Observers remarked on the historical 
significance of using a Turkish-era gun against a modern enemy: “The Turks were the 
best soldiers in the world, and the Egyptians are about the worst.”21 Foreign observers 
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described Egyptians as “inept, and helpless to cope with guerilla mountain warfare 
conditions, suffering losses of ten to one man-to-man infantry engagements.”22 
Egyptian Strategy and the Ramadan Offensive 
In order to raise the moral of Egyptian troops fighting in Yemen, Nasser and Amer 
offered higher compensation for service and the ability to purchase products through 
the tariff-free Aden port and transport them to their families in Egypt duty-free.  
Soldiers and officers returning from Yemen would often bring refrigerators, gas ranges, 
and televisions along with them. Upon returning, those soldiers who had served in 
Yemen would be given privileged positions in the government for themselves and their 
relatives.
23
 New hotels, upscale accommodations, and grandiose shopping centers were 
constructed in Hodeidah to accommodate Egyptian officers.
24
 Nasser claimed on 
numerous occasions to have received letters from military officers, requesting a transfer 
to Yemen, purportedly “for the sake of fighting for Arab nationalism in Yemen.”25  
Chief of Staff of the Egyptian Army, Field Marshall ‘Abd al-Hakim Amer, 
envisioned Yemen as his own “military fiefdom” away from Nasser’s oversight in 
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Egypt.
26
  Service in Yemen among senior officers became a rite of passage to higher 
echelons in the Egyptian government.  Anwar Sadat, President of Egypt from 1970-
1981, was a central planner of the Egyptian occupation of Yemen from the first days of 
the republic through his connections with Baydani.  Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt 
from 1981-2011, headed an air force squadron with troop transport and long-range 
bombing responsibilities in Yemen. Omar Suleiman, Mubarak’s short-lived vice 
president in 2011, also served as a senior officer during the Yemen civil war. General 
Anwar al-Qadi, the Director of Operations during the 1967 War, first commanded 
Egyptian forces in Yemen from October 1962 through November 1963 and was 
instrumental in conceiving the Ramadan Offensive.
27
 Al-Qadi had originally 
envisioned a five-year mission to Yemen intended to secure the revolution and create a 
stable Yemeni national army.
28
 
Over a two month period, from February through March 1963, the Egyptian army 
began to construct a counter-guerilla strategy, through trial and error, aimed at securing 
the strategic urban triangle of Sana’a, Ta’iz, and Hodeidah.  In what was known as the 
Ramadan Offensive, the Egyptian army increased the troop numbers to over 30,000 and 
embarked on a bold offensive campaign to regain areas ceded to the Imam in the 
previous weeks.  Royalist positions were to be pushed further north and east of the 
triangle, specifically targeting the Imam’s supply lines and mountainous strongholds.  
The tactics, supply-lines, and overwhelming artillery and aerial power made the 
Ramadan Offensive the most successful of the Egyptian occupation and a model for 
international counterinsurgency operations. 
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 The first examples of this battle strategy occurred in al-Jawf, a neighboring region 
northwest of Sana’a.  Al-Jawf had traditionally been a refuge for mercenaries and 
brigands and in December 1962 became a source of munitions for royalist troops.  
UAR troops centralized in al-Hamidah, a village north of Sana’a in preparation for an 
attack on al-Jawf with three battalions and one armored unit.  The first attempt at 
conquering the al-Fajra pass into the al-Jawf region was a disaster, as the secondary 
forces lost their way.  Subsequent over-flights pinpointed the enemy location and the 
night was spent bombarding the enemy by air and with heavy artillery.  The next 
morning tanks and troops with flamethrowers followed behind to extract enemy troops 
from cave hideouts.  The Egyptian offensive continued south of al-Jawf, conquering the 
city of Ma’rib as well, intimidating local tribes into submission with a display of heavy 
artillery along the way.  In the process the Imam’s army learned quickly the degree of 
inadequacy in their artillery pieces.  
29
  
Part of the Egyptian strategy involved deceiving royalist units into exposing their 
hidden location.   For example, Egyptians soldiers lit fires two kilometers from a 
royalist mountain outpost near Ma’rib and shined lights as if there was a full assault on 
their position from that direction.  The royalist unit began feverishly firing their 
cannons and mortars in the direction of the oncoming “assault”, thereby divulging the 
location of their artillery and subjecting themselves to subsequent Egyptian 
bombardment.  In the capture of al-Hazm, the capital of Jawf, the Egyptians even 
managed a successful 1,000-man parachute drop to capture the city in February 1963.
30
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This successful parachute mission was vastly different in organization and scale than 
the failed Sirwah mission only a few weeks earlier. 
Even with the advantage of aerial reconnaissance, pinpointing the exact location of 
these outposts was difficult. As a result, Egyptian artillery teams were instructed to 
excessively bomb a wide area with long range artillery and smoke grenades.
31
 
Collateral damage was not a consideration and was often the secondary intention of 
such heavy bombing under the assumption that this would have a demoralizing effect 
on the local tribal population.   In order to avoid excessive transport over unfriendly 
terrain, the Egyptian army adopted a policy of decentralization of arms depots in order 
to insure supply and independence of action by local commanders.
32
 
Fig. 4.3 
While large-scale bombing certainly had a demoralizing effect on enemy troops, the 
real and tangible utility of the artillery fire was actually hitting the target.  The key, 
according to the Egyptian strategy was to draw premature fire from royalist positions, 
noting the coordinates, and communicating the positions to supporting aircraft and 
artillery positions.   In February 1963, for example, Egyptian intelligence received 
word that the Imam’s forces had received shipments of 75mm cannons and mortars to 
Arhab in preparation for an assault on a major Sana’a corridor.  Two companies of 
paratroopers armed with sizeable artillery units were sent to verify the approximate 
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location and destroy the enemy position.  During the first night, a small group of scouts 
detached two headlights from a truck, attached them to batteries, and placed the lights 
in a wooden box half a mile from the approximate enemy base.  The scout group, 
standing under cover a fare distance from the headlights, flashed them on and off 
intermittently, giving the impression that there was an approaching vehicle.  Surprised 
to see the vehicle, the enemy bombed the area of the "vehicle", revealing to Egyptians a 
count of at least four 81 mm mortars and one cannon.  When the royalists sent a patrol 
party to investigate, the Egyptians quickly left the area having noted the approximate 
location of the artillery.   
The following night, scouts planted four diversionary sets of vehicle headlights light 
as they had the previous nights.  This time, however, four armored vehicles, with 
headlights off, were to approach from a different direction.   A second group 
established position one mile from Arhab with two 120mm mortars that had a 
maximum range of 7200 meters.  Once the location was reestablished using the 
headlight deception tactic, Egyptian artillery bombarded the royalist artillery location 
and the four armored cars approach Arhab with their lights off.  As enemy fire began to 
subside, perhaps after one or two artillery units were damaged, Egyptian 120mm 
mortars began firing beyond the enemy position, giving the impression that they were 
missing the location while also covering the movement of the four vehicles.  Assuming 
it was safe to emerge momentarily, the royalist artillery unit exposed themselves and 
were captured or killed by the armored vehicles that had by that point reached the 
royalist defensive position in Arhab.
33
 
This developing strategy of heavy artillery was not without its difficulties and 
inadequacies.  Moving the artillery between stations was a challenge and there was a 
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preference for artillery with greater range, albeit inferior accuracy.  Heavy artillery, for 
instance, would often get stuck in the road to Sa’dah where the 25mm cannons needed 
to be pulled by rope.   Even when the Egyptians were able to move the cannons along 
the road, the shaking was so incredible that it would cause damage to the artillery 
pieces.  The forward progress of artillery shipment was therefore limited to 6-9mph, 
leaving the slow-moving units vulnerable to sniper fire and ambush.  The 120mm 
mortar could only ride on the back of a truck for this reason.  At least half the artillery 
movement was dependent upon air travel and trucks, increasing the expense and 
difficulty of transport, especially when considering the difficult terrain.
34
 
Tribal collaborators of the republic could not be counted on to support Egyptian 
military plans.  Although local tribes were given bribes in exchange for their continued 
allegiance to the republic and small arms in exchange for their military service, few of 
tribesmen or arms ever made it onto the battlefield, and when they did were 
disorganized and hardly considered an asset.
35
 Tribal sheikhs and militia preferred to 
hoard the weapons for their own use and under their own terms of engagement.  For 
example, during a February 1963 campaign to uproot a royalist position along the 
Sana’a-Hodeidah road, a group of 1,000 Hashid tribesmen under the command of 
Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar, along with the 35 Egyptian soldiers were given the 
responsibility of capturing an outpost on Jabal Masur.  Even after aerial bombardment 
and artillery fire on the position for an entire week, the republican tribesmen were 
reluctant to attack the weakened royalist position.  Rather than follow the Egyptian-led 
battle plan, they were more interested in attacking one house at a time and pillaging the 
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local population.  The UAR army was forced to assume the sole responsibility of 
reconquering Jabal Masur and its environs.
36
  
While royalists paid tribesmen $1 per day of fighting, the Egyptians expended a 
great deal more to secure the tenuous alliances with profiteering sheikhs who often 
collect bribes from both sides.  One tribe was reported to have collected $2 million 
from Egyptian authorities for their military assistance, yet “before every battle sent 
messages assuring the Imam they would shoot to miss.”  An Egyptian officer was 
quoted as complaining that “we can never trust the Yemenis who come to fight on our 
side…[t]hey’re always likely to turn their fire suddenly against us.”37 
Patrick Seale, a correspondent for The New Republic shared a description of the 
tribal stance towards the war that helps explain the difference between tribal loyalties to 
the Imam and those to Egypt: 
“Whereas the Egyptian seem uncertain why they are there, the Yemeni 
tribes are...enjoying opportunities for loot on a scale probably 
unparalleled since the incense caravans of Sheba.  I met a man who had 
acquired 80 Egyptian blankets; another had a couple of hundred cans of 
excellent Egyptian beans; children were dressed in rags of parachute silk 
and every royalist camp was littered with captured weapons, bazooka 
bombs, boxes of grenades and Egyptian cigarettes.”38  
 
 
While Yemen’s mountainous terrain was an obstacle for the Egyptian army of heavy 
transport, it was an asset for the Imam’s army who spread themselves thin in hidden 
outposts situated strategically in caves along the side of the transport arteries.  Stone 
barrier 50-70 centimeters wide were constructed in circular form on mountaintops or as 
a straight wall in open fields surrounding pits that were dug to avoid shrapnel.
39
    The 
                                                          
36
 ITIC, Battlefield: Sana’a-Hodeidah, 53 
37
 George de Carvalho, “Yemen’s Desert Fox,” Life Magazine, February 19, 1965, 103. 
38
 Patrick Seale, “The War in Yemen,” The New Republic, January 26, 1963. 
39
 ITIC, Artillery Lessons, 8. 
143 
 
 
 
royalists moved the artillery pieces and cannons out of hidden locations and caves only 
for a short period of time to fire and then hid them away again, moving the weaponry 
freely from place to place making them very hard to target with direct Egyptian fire.
40
   
The UAR planned nightly sporadic bombardments with incendiary munitions, 
phosphorous shells, and flare launchers to frighten locals, draw groups of fighters from 
hiding, and deprive enemy troops of rest before a major confrontation.
 41
 
The indiscriminant use of artillery shells and the transport needs of the Egyptian 
army required endless shipping and transport of munitions and fuel from bases 1,200 
miles away in Egypt.  The main port of entry for the country was in Hodeidah where 
large cranes, storage facilities, and a capacity of 4,500 tons of fuel were used 
continuously by the Egyptian military.  Two to three weekly shipments carrying 3,000-
8,000 tons of supplies set out from al-Adabiya port in Egypt port to Hodeidah.  Aerial 
transport by Ukrainian Antonov planes carrying five-seven tons (aside from weight of 
fuel) arrived in Yemen twice a day in addition to periodic Ilyushin-14 shipments.  Once 
unloaded at the port or the airport, a large number of trucks and pack animals carried 
the supplies to area north and east of Hodeidah and Sana’a.   Supplies were delivered to 
inaccessible areas by helicopters, parachute, or small aircraft.  During the first year of 
the war, eighteen Egyptian vessels (aside from fuel tankers) conducted 122 shipments 
with an average of 2.34 per week.   
The Hodeidah port entrance could accommodate only one ship at a time while the 
pier had room for four small ships or three medium-sized ships with a separate area for 
fuel shipment.  The Hodeidah port had three cranes with a five ton capacity.  Smaller 
25-30 ton ships carried supplies from the larger vessels to the smaller ports north of 
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Hodeidah.  Truck deliveries from Hodeidah to Sana’a consisted of forty trucks 
operating on a three day cycle - two day for a roundtrip and one day rest and repair.  
Forty trucks, carrying forty-five tons average over thirty days translates into an average 
of 50,000 tons per month being transported from Hodeidah to Sana’a.  Twenty three-
ton trucks made daily trips to other secondary outposts from Hodeidah in the same 
manner.
42
 
Heavy use of Red Sea transport necessitated a sizeable navy to patrol the 1,200 
nautical miles from the al-Adabiya Egyptian naval base to Hodeidah port and the 200 
nautical miles of YAR coastline from Bab al-Mandeb northwards.  Naval 
responsibilities included patrolling shipping lanes, monitoring coastal security in 
Yemen, particularly in the north where royalists tried running supplies along the shore, 
and maintaining a security perimeter around the Hodeidah port.  In essence, the 
Egyptian position in Yemen extended the Suez Canal security zone over 1,200 miles 
south to the Gulf of Aden.  Large number of patrols around port area and up and down 
Red Sea coast and the required naval escort for each military and commercial vessel 
constituted a substantial number of ships in the Hodeidah port.  The Hodeidah port, 
however, had a limited capacity of three large ships, thus creating long lines of military 
and civilian ships. 
43
 The Hodeidah radar base monitored approaching aircraft and 
coordinated sea traffic.  Major hydrographic surveys of the Yemeni coastline provided 
the first modern detailed maps and of sea lanes along the Red Sea coast, thereby 
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facilitating smaller-scale naval operations in the ports of Al-Mokha, Midi in Hajjah 
province, and al-Luhayyah.
44
   
Importance of Air Force 
Most UAR missions used Russian MiGs out of airfield initially based in Hodeidah 
and then moved to Sana’a by 1964.  Russian-manufactured Tupolev Tu-16 bombers 
flew 1,200 miles from bases in Egypt to bomb buildings and fortifications ahead of 
UAR offensives.  Several Ilyushin-28 jet bomber aircraft stationed in a small airport 
nine miles north of Sa’dah with a 1.5 mile runway, but were forced to relocate to 
Hodeidah because of constant danger of attack near Sa’dah.  The Egyptian air force 
dropped time bombs, as the delayed detonation frightened the locals who understood 
this only as random explosions without planes in vicinity.
45
 Taking further advantage of 
the tribal unfamiliarity with planes, Egyptians equipped twelve Yak-11 single engine 
planes with the standard four rockets and two additional .303 caliber machine guns.  
Tribesmen would count the rockets and unknowingly assume the danger had passed 
after the fourth bomb was dropped.  The planes would then make a second turn strafing 
the enemy tribesmen who had come out to inspect the damage with a barrage of gunfire 
significantly increasing the effectiveness of air raids in Yemen.
46
   
Antonov An-12 four-engine transport aircraft served as an "aerial bridge" between 
Egypt and Yemen.  The planes originally shipped to the Sana’a civilian airport before 
shifting direction and transporting supplies directly to the Sa’dah airport.  Given the 
tenacity of the intense fighting in the Sa’dah region, the airport would need to be 
“reconquered” every night in order to secure the landing strip for morning shipments.  
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The fuel supply in Sa’dah was low and the Antonovs were required to carry their own 
refuel supplies for roundtrip flight from Aswan, in order not to deplete the local supply 
in Sa’dah.47  
During the first months of the war, four temporary airport facilitates and seven 
heliports were constructed.  Given the dearth of proper maps and unfamiliarity with the 
terrain, pilots were reliant on navigational equipment and radio communication.  In 
order to accommodate the increasing number of aircraft in Yemen, a massive effort was 
undertaken to pave new runways and light them to facilitate use in day and night and 
even after rain storm.  In addition to the main airports in Sana’a, Hodeidah, Ta’iz, and 
Sa’dah, eight additional airports of smaller size were placed strategically within range 
of contentious fronts.  Helicopters with 12.7mm machine guns were stationed at each 
landing strip and airport and proved decisive on many battlefronts.  The air force 
launched a campaign to map and survey the Yemeni terrain using single-engine 
Yakovlev (Yak) and Ilyushin-14 planes.   A meteorological station was established near 
Hodeidah to predict flying conditions and a combination of radar and outlook points 
were erected to monitor the air border.
48
 
Following the battlefield successes of the Ramadan Offensive, Nasser agreed to the 
Bunker agreements in April 1964, only to see most of the YAR gains lost during Saudi-
aided royalist offensives in the subsequent months, forcing Nasser to maintain troop 
levels despite the commitments to the US and UN.  Lieutenant General Anwar al-Qadi 
approached Nasser in May 1963 after seeing many of the territorial gains of the 
Ramadan Offensive lost during the royalist counterattack and recommended that Egypt 
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withdraw from Yemen.
49
 Nasser dismissed the suggestion and al-Qadi did not have 
much of a chance to respond for in the end of 1963 he was injured during an ambush on 
his convoy in northeast Yemen and was evacuated to Egypt for treatment.
50
 General 
‘Abd al-Muhsin Kamil Murtaji took over for al-Qadi in Yemen and would later 
command the Sinai front during the 1967 War. 
Modified Royalist Tactics and the 1964 Hunt for al-Badr 
The Egyptian army was trained to fight in an open desert war with Israel, rather than 
a mountainous guerilla war with an elusive enemy.  Heavy artillery and aerial 
bombardment may have scattered the enemy, but upon Egyptian withdrawal, royalist 
forces would emerge from hiding and retake the lost territory.
51
  The Ramadan 
Offensive forced the royalist tribesmen to modify their tactics, particularly in 
mountainous regions, and avoid structured military assaults against an enemy with far 
superior aerial and artillery firepower.  The Imam’s army preferred to cut Egyptian 
communications and ambush convoys, saving frontal assaults for advantageous terrain 
and superior numbers.   
The base in Qarah was named Camp Mansur and the “Free Yemen Loyalists” 
(royalist) armies were named “Mansur Armies”, which matched al-Badr’s adopted title 
of “al-Mansur Billlah” (Victorious Through God).   From Camp Mansur, al-Badr 
communicated with troops on the frontlines through coded radio messages from his 
bomb-proof bunkers.
52
 The tribesmen’s diet had been conditioned to subsist on barley 
and raisins for extended periods of time.  Many of them were trained as snipers and 
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marksmen and preferred small arms to heavy artillery.
53
   Farm-boy tribal volunteers 
learned to use Degtyarev-Shpagin 12.7mm Soviet anti-aircraft (50-calibre) machine 
guns either captured from massacred Egyptian forces, bought from republican soldiers, 
or received as gifts from “defector elite units of Sallal’s ‘National Guard’.”54 Yemeni 
tribal-sharpshooters were rumored to have “picked off fifty Egyptians with fifty 
rationed bullets in a single day.”55 They were stationed in small groups of six, 
occupying outposts along the road and communicated by lighting bonfires, drumming 
sounds, or gunfire.
56
 Their small units, meager rations, and light munitions needs 
allowed royalist commanders to maintain a mobile and barely discernible armed force 
with the ability to inflict heavy casualties on Egyptian armed forces.  The impact of 
aerial bombing on royalist positions was not as potent as the Egyptians might have 
intended.  Given the disperse nature of the royalist base and their ability to hide in a 
vast network of mountainous caves, made the Imam’s tribesmen difficult targets for the 
UAR air force.  For example, the Egyptian bombing of al-Qarah in the Jawf region, 
never came closer than one kilometer of hitting the Imam’s base and cave, despite 
dropping a reported sixty-five bombs.  Royalist witnesses claimed the total damage was 
only “one stray dog killed and one farm wall knocked down”.   The inaccuracy of 
Egyptian bombing campaigns can be attributed to the 3,000 feet altitude practiced by 
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most planes, for fear of anti-aircraft ground fire.  Royalists have derisively referred to 
the Egyptian bombing raids as the “milk-run” daily.57  
As the Egyptians began to secure urban areas and the road networks connecting 
them, al-Badr envisioned a strategy that would place a virtual siege on every 
republican-held city.  Al-Badr planned to starve the inhabitants into submission by 
attacking road shipments into and out of the city and conquering agricultural region that 
had acted as a vital supply of food for urban dwellers.  In June 1963, following the 
Imam’s conquest of the Wadi Dahr grape-growing region to the north-northwest of 
Sana’a under Prince Yahya al-Hussein (5th army), there was a shortage of raisins and 
almonds which “rank[ed] next to sorghum as Yemenite food staples.”  Jabal al-Loz (the 
“Almond Mountain”) and the surrounding almond-growing region directly east of 
Sana’a had long been held by Prince Abdullah al-Hassan, further exacerbating the food 
shortage in Sana’a and elsewhere.  In addition, Egyptian bombing in royalist areas had 
destroyed dwellings, crops, orchards, herds, and flocks by machine gun fire and 
incendiary bombs resulting in a widespread loss of food supplies in a country that 
scarcely has enough for basic nutrition.  Imam al-Badr’s Yemen was not a UN 
recognized country and was therefore not eligible for food aid, relying instead on their 
own hoarded supplies, a camel caravan trail from Saudi Arabia and proceeds from 
stamp sales and elsewhere to purchase food.
58
 The YAR, on the other hand, was 
eligible for US PL-480 wheat sales and became further reliant on the UAR and the 
USSR for their daily sustenance. 
                                                          
57
 Bruce Condé, "Free Yemen's First Definitives In Pictorial Theme Appear In Perf, Imperf, and 
Sheet Form," Linn's Weekly Stamp News, June 15, 1964, 12. 
58
Bruce Condé, "Story Of Free Yemen's FFH Set In Tragedy of 'Chickens That Stay At Home 
To Roost'," Linn's Weekly Stamp News, October 14, 1963, 29. 
150 
 
 
 
Haradh Offensive 
 The royalist offensives in early 1964 forced the retreat of republican positions to the 
extent that the vital Sana’a-Hodeidah road was cut off, besieging the capital city.  
Although heavy Egyptian military expenditure opened the road in March 1964, periodic 
royalist ambushes threatened supply lines.  As the situation grew more desperate, 
Nasser made his first impromptu visit to Yemen on April 23, 1964 announcing an 
increase in the size of the Egyptian garrison to over 36,000 in preparation for a massive 
offensive in the summer.
59
 
On August 14, 1964, Nasser launched a determined push on the Imam’s base in al-
Qarah with a massive bombing campaign emanating from the new al-Rahaba airport in 
Sana’a.   The Egyptian pincer movement on al-Qarah consisted of troops moving south 
from Sa’dah and north from Sana’a and converging on the Imam’s stronghold.  Merjan 
bin Yasser, a member of the “Royal Motorized Pool” drove Imam al-Badr in his Dodge 
“Power Wagon” to the furthest northern point on Harad-Mushaf front where the Imam 
proceeded on foot to al-Mushaf.  From there al-Badr split his force of 1,500 tribesmen, 
sending to the Harad front to join Royal Guards and half northeast Jabal Razih.  Al-
Badr managed to hold back the Egyptian advance until the end of UNYOM on 
September 4, after which supplies began to cross the Saudi border once again.  By the 
end of September, tribal soldiers were rearmed and sent into battle moving to within 
thirty mile west of Sana’a.  Tribal levies (14,000 in total) claimed to have massacred 
Sallal’s troops, destroyed twenty Soviet tanks, twenty armored cars, shot down three 
planes and sent six hundred wounded Egyptian soldiers packing for Port Said.
60
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Aside from hunting al-Badr, Egyptian and republican forces endeavored to close the 
border with Saudi Arabia.  The main pass from Saudi Arabia into royalist territory was 
through the Ma’jaz pass flanked on either side by the mountains of Jabal Razih and 
Jabal Sha’ar.  The Egyptian offensive targeted each mountain stronghold separately 
before taking control of the pass.  The unique part of the offensive was that republican 
soldiers constituted the majority of the soldiers for one of the first times since the first 
days of the Yemeni civil war.
61
 
 
Fig. 4.4 The Haradh Offenssive, 1964 
 
Following the summer Haradh offensive of 1964 Nasser was again willing to 
compromise and call for a ceasefire.  Although al-Badr remained at large, royalist 
forces had been pushed back to the border with Saudi Arabia and Nasser approached 
King Faisal during the Arab Summit in September proposing a ceasefire and a 
resolution to the Yemeni conflict.  The failure of the subsequent 1964 conferences for 
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reconciliation had as much to do with subsequent royalist offenses as it did with 
international pressure on Nasser to remain in Yemen, which will be addressed in the 
next chapters. 
Postal Wars in Yemen 
 Beyond the military maneuvers, guerilla tactics, and counterinsurgency strategies, 
battles between Nasser and Imam al-Badr were being waged through other non-
traditional means.  Radio Cairo and the “Voice of the Arabs” radio program had by far 
the farthest reach and greatest impact on local population, Arabs across the Middle 
East, and global listeners.
62
  Attempts by Saudi Arabia and Israel to broadcast their own 
radio programs paled in comparison with Nasser’s propaganda initiatives.  Admittedly, 
it was difficult to top a radio program that featured famed Egyptian singer Umm 
Kulthum, even if it was followed by Nasser’s propaganda speeches.  Thousands of free 
radios were given to Yemeni locals, along with medical care from army doctors, 
education from Egyptian teachers, and improvements in infrastructure  in an attempt to 
win the “hearts and minds” of Yemeni civilians. In May 1963, a soccer match between 
Egyptian pilots and the marines in a sports facility in Ta’iz was open to Yemeni 
spectators at great fanfare.
63
 The next month, Egyptian authorities founded a cultural 
center with activities that included chess, checkers, and other hobbies.
64
  Although 
there are no available statistics on how many Yemenis took up chess or other hobbies 
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in the cultural center, the available program, which included several lectures a week, 
gave Yemenis a leisure venue to escape from their nationalist problems and the 
dangerous security situation.   
 What received less attention, however, were the “stamp wars” waged between Imam 
al-Badr and the Sallal-Nasser alliance.  Stamps were not merely a source of income for 
al-Badr’s Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen, but were a source of legitimacy and pride 
for an opposition movement that received very little global recognition.
65
  In the eyes of 
the philatelic stamp-collecting community, al-Badr’s royalist Yemen was legitimate, 
heroic, and worthy of their admiration.  Nor were stamp collectors the only Westerners 
to become enamored by the royalist cause.  American and European media depicted 
Imam al-Badr and his northern tribesmen as romanticized anti-imperialists fighting for 
their country’s independence.  Photographs, interviews, and press feeds from the 
northern highlands of Yemen were popular fodder for the Western news media, owing 
both to the royalist lobbyists and supporters and to the human interest stories of the 
“simple” farmer taking up arms against the Egyptian invaders.  While many Yemeni 
princes became avid stamp enthusiasts during the 1960s, al-Badr’s stamp victory 
against Nasser and the YAR can be attributed mainly to the role played by Bruce 
Condé: the first and presumably only American to have aspired to be the Yemeni 
Cultural Minister and Postmaster General. 
 Born in California in 1913, Bruce Chalmers Condé served in the US Army 
counterintelligence service during WWII and studied Arabic at the American 
University of Beirut on a ‘GI Bill’ scholarship.  One of Condé’s greatest passions in 
life was collecting stamps, particularly from Middle Eastern countries.  He became 
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obsessed with Yemen after reading the travelogues of the Lebanese Arab-American 
Ameen Rihani.
66
  In the 1940s, Condé became a pen pal to none other than Prince al-
Badr who was himself a philatelist.  In 1953, at the invitation of al-Badr, Condé moved 
to Sana’a and started a business exporting Yemeni stamps abroad to collectors.  In 
1958, he converted to Islam and changed his name to Abdul Rahman Condé and gave 
up his American citizenship.  In 1960, however, he fell out of favor with Imam Ahmad 
and the Yemeni Ministry of Communications, was accused of being a spy and expelled 
from the country as a stateless citizen.  Condé then settled in Beirut and was hired as a 
Middle East correspondent for Linn’s Wee ly Stamp News where he would work for the 
next two decades sharing detailed description of events unfolding in Yemen.  When his 
old pen pal al-Badr was overthrown, he saw this as an opportunity to find favor with 
the Hamid al-Din family once again, and made the trip to Najran to meet up with the 
Yemeni princes and their tribal army.
67
   
Condé would eventually rise to the rank of General in the Imam’s army and acquired 
the official title of “Adviser to the Ministry of Communications of the Mutawakkilite 
Kingdom.”  He served as a guide and host for American and British officials, reporters, 
or tourists visiting the royalist frontline.  David Holden, the Middle East correspondent 
for The Guardian, observed that Condé was “an ardent Yemenophile seeking, it 
seemed, to ingratiate himself with the Government by acting as their self-appointed 
public relations man…He was an odd and slightly pathetic figure, somewhat out of 
both his time and his depth…he seemed to belong nowhere, and to be yearning 
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romantically for the impossible…”68 Popular media in America referred to him as the 
American version of Lawrence of Arabia, who dreamed of “worldwide control for 
Yemeni stamps.”  Condé would often meet with foreigners while dressed in traditional 
Yemeni dress, trying his utmost to look and act native.  The New York Herald Tribune 
wrote of Condé: “He may not be Peter O’Toole, but his situation is melodramatic 
enough to throw, say, Malcolm X or Cassius Clay into transports of jealousy.”69 
To add to his already mystifying persona, Condé adopted multiple aliases such 
Alfonso Yorba, Hajji Abdurrahman and General Bruce Alfonso de Bourbon, and Prince 
of Condé, claiming that he was a direct descendent of French royalty.  Following Imam 
al-Badr into exile in 1970, Condé would settle in Spain and later Tangiers, Morocco 
where he adopted Alexis Dolgorouky, an alleged prince and author of a controversial 
and fanciful book, Moi Petit-Arriere-Fils du Tsar. Condé had married Alexis' mother, 
an equally outlandish royalist pretender who adopted the name Princess Olga Beatrice 
Nikolaevna Romanovskaya Dolgoroukaya, Princess of the Ukraine, daughter of king of 
Ukraine and great granddaughter to Nicholas II of Russia.
70
 
“The philatelic sideline war,” as Bruce Condé referred to the competitive publication 
of stamps by the Imam’s Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen and the YAR, would 
become his obsession and according to Condé, his only source of sanity in the midst of 
a depressing battlefield.  The printed stamps themselves were a manifestation of local 
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religious and political identity and an appeal to international organizations and 
countries for aid and recognition.
71
 
The value listed on Condé’s stamps is in buqsha, where 40 buqshas make one of the 
Imam-era riyals.  Amongst royalist tribes, the Imadi riyal (from Imam Yahya’s reign), 
the Ahmadi riyal (from Imam Ahmad’s reign), and the silver Maria Theresa Dollar 
were used interchangeably.  The YAR introduced the “Yemeni riyal” worth an 
equivalent amount of 40 buqshas as part of a broader effort to modernize the 
economy.
72
 The Egyptian occupation forces exhibited a large degree of control over the 
issuance of currency, replacing the state emblem of arms used under the Imam with the 
Egyptian emblem of Saladin’s eagle.73 This emblem was used on the first paper 
currency issued in the YAR in February 1964, as part of the broader effort to replace 
the Imam-era currency with a republican alternative.  The new bank notes, printed in 
Egypt, were received reluctantly by republican merchants, yet were completely 
worthless among royalists who believed the notes would be useless after the republic’s 
defeat.
74
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The proliferation of slogans such as “Loyalist Free Yemen” 75 and “Free Yemen for 
God, Imam and Country” figured prominently in Mutawakkilite stamps in a self-
identification of the divine-right of the Imam’s Yemen.76  Condé described the 
“romance of the Free Yemen mails,” travelling to the war zone in Yemen from Jeddah 
by truck where it was in danger of land mines in the desert, enemy helicopters and Yak 
fighters, or being captured by an airborne and armored columns raiding party.
77
 Most of 
the mail passing through royalist territory was stamped with the phrase: “Delayed in 
transit through enemy lines.”78  The imagery used on the stamp was also a criticism of 
the Egyptian occupation as seen below in the “Tank” set of royalist stamps.79 The 
capture of an Egyptian T-34 in the Jawf battlefield located 117 miles northeast of 
Sana’a and the halting of Egyptian forces 75 miles short of Field Marshal ‘Abd al-
Hakim Amr’s goal of reaching the Najran frontier, was the inspiration for the “Tank” 
stamp.
80
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Imam al-Badr retained the red flag of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom, decorated with a 
sword and five stars representing the five natural geographical divisions of Yemen, the 
five pillars of Islam and the five daily prayers.  The republican flag, on the other hand, 
was a copy of the UAR version, with red, black and white stripes, albeit with only one 
star in the middle rather than two.  The flag design was another demonstration of the 
profound Egyptian influence on state formation and identity in the YAR.
81
 
 
Fig. 4.5 The two-star UAR flag is shown being torn 
down by a royalist soldier while another raises the Free 
Yemen battle flag over the turret, from which is hanging 
the body of one of the tank crew.  Other dead crew 
members are on and beside the T-34 tank with the Soviet 
sickle and hammer on the turret, while an Egyptian 
infantryman is falling to the right of the tank and another 
is being pursued and bayonetted beside it.  On the 
ground are Soviet Kalashnikov sub-machine gun and 
overhead is a Soviet plane is falling in flames. 
 
Condé criticized the many typographical and factual errors in the YAR-issued 
stamps and deemed them mere copies of Egyptian nationalist stamps.  The YAR 
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“Freedom from Hunger” stamps, for instance, were close duplicates of Egyptian design, 
having only changed the country name, indicative of the political reality.  According to 
Condé, “the virtual ‘carbon copying’ of Cairo by the Sallal regime in Yemen, 
philatelically as well as politically, has long been one of the charges leveled against the 
YAR by Yemenites loyal to the Imam.”82  When royalists “liberate” towns and 
provinces from UAR, they cease using YAR stamps and convert all mail to 
Mutawakkilite stamps.
83
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 In reality, YAR stamp production was more robust and predictably supplied than the 
Mutawakkilite alternative.  Although most of the YAR stamps were Yemeni versions 
of the Egyptian original, some of the stamps issued also served as a reflection of 
national identity and the achievements of the new Yemeni republic.  For example some 
1963 stamps commemorated the founding of the republic and some 1964 stamps 
celebrated the opening of spinning and weaving factories and the international airport 
in Sana’a.  In addition to annual commemorations of the revolution, the YAR also used 
its stamps to appeal to the international community by memorializing President 
Kennedy and celebrating Soviet space travel achievements.
84
 While the variety and 
number of stamps issued by the YAR and accepted by the international community was 
significantly larger than those printed by Condé and his Mutawakkilite postal team, 
greater attention and fanfare was given to the royalist stamps as they were designed and 
distributed by the romanticized cave outposts of northern Yemen.  Condé took personal 
initiative to popularize the royalist stamps, utilizing his network of connections in the 
Middle East, Europe, and the US and acting as a self-appointed philatelic lobbyist.  In 
addition to dozens of philatelic articles, Condé sent collectors copies of the royalist 
stamps to many locations including for example Poul Juel Jensen, Denmark’s 
ambassador to Iraq and to Condé’s friends in the International Red Cross, with both 
taking a favorable stance to the royalist cause.
85
 
   Condé described the Yemeni battlefield as a war over stamp sovereignty, implying 
that Egyptian military figures were specifically targeting his stamp project and that the 
Imam was sincerely interested in securing strategic postal areas.  For example, Condé 
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described the Imam’s capture of the republican post office towns of Barat and Hajjah 
and stocks of republican stamps in June 1963 as part of the Imam’s “philatelic war” 
against the YAR.
86
  Condé convinced top royalist military commanders to take 
responsibility for local postal service, a sign that at least some top royalists took 
Condé’s postal effort very seriously.  For example, Sayed Muhammad al-Daylami one 
of the Imam’s officers, was appointed as the first army postmaster.  Prince Abdullah al-
Hassan, who served as UN delegate 1955-62, knew English well and processed foreign 
mail for the second army.
87
  Condé’s efforts to recruit the support of top officials were 
not limited to Yemeni royalists.  Members of the Saudi Royal family, in addition to 
being supporters of the Imam’s war against Nasser, were also avid stamp collectors.  
Saudi King Faisal’s son, Prince Muhammad, for example, was both a gun collector and 
a stamp enthusiast.  He developed a close working relationship with Condé and was 
instrumental in facilitating the transit of Mutawakkilite post through Jeddah.  As an act 
of appreciation, he gave Condé a German Mauser pistol as a gift.
88
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Fig 4.8 Bruce Condé (on left) standing next to Tony “Abu 
Yusef” Mu’awwad, his postal assistant, who is holding the 
Mauser pistol given to Condé as a gift. (Linn’s Wee ly Stamp 
News, February 1, 1965, 36)  
 
 Condé used the stamps to express appreciation to international organizations that 
had come to the aid of the Imam’s supporters.  In December 1964, the Imam signed off 
on a set of stamps honoring the Swiss Red Cross and its northern field hospital in 
Uqd.
89
 The Uqd hospital, run by Dr. J. de Puoz, was equipped with a “hermetically-
sealed pre-fab operating room”, well-stocked pharmacy, diet kitchen, a mess for staff 
including its own radio station for contact with Jeddah and beyond and a staff working 
on three month shifts.  Dr. de Puoz himself was also a stamp collector and developed a 
friendly relationship with Condé and his assistant Said Ismail al-Daylami, procuring 
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Yemeni collectable stamps from them.  Condé occasionally shared with the staff a meal 
of “soup, salad with mayonnaise, meat, vegetables, fresh baked bread and butter, and 
dessert plus fruit, washed down with soft drinks and followed by cheese and crackers 
and coffee,” or what “amounted to manna from heaven, as we had been subsisting on 
boiled mutton, flaps of Arab bread, and a sort of sorghum mush called ‘harish’.”  It 
turned out that, not only was Dr. de Puoz a stamp collector, but nearly the entire Swiss 
hospital staff were avid philatelists who developed an interest in the royalist stamp 
collections.
90
 
 
 
Fig. 4.9 and 4.10 Bruce Conde standing in front of IRC hospital in ‘Uqd (1964) 
 
 
A second set of stamps “Honouring British Red Cross Surgical Team, 1963-64,” 
expressed an appreciation to Doctor Bartlett (American working with the British), 
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Doctor Wilson-Pepper and Field Officer Arnold Plummer (40 year male veteran nurse 
for Red Cross) who treated wounded royalists only twenty-five miles from Sana.  This 
presence so close to Sana’a demonstrated to the Red Cross the extent to which the 
royalist armies had the ability to challenge the YAR.  The presence of the Red Cross in 
the royalist camp was no small achievement, especially when considering the threats 
issued by YAR vice president Lieutenant-General Hassan al-‘Amri to bomb the Red 
Cross location, because he claimed that “anyone opposing the Yemen Arab Republic 
was a criminal and had no right to medical attention.”  He specifically threatened 
members of the Red Cross, saying: “If you establish any kind of hospital or medical 
attention in the rebel zone, I shall personally order you to be executed.”  The UAR 
occupation zone commander Lieutenant-General ‘Abd al-Majid Kamal Murtaji, 
understood the Geneva Convention and personally assured Red Cross that they would 
not be bombed.
91
 
The Red Cross hospital in Uqd served an important role in the health of the 
surrounding tribal population.  In the winter of 1964, for example, teams of doctors 
traveled to the surrounding areas treating the wounded and teaching general principles 
of hygiene and first aid.  According to their testimonies, local Yemenis regarded them 
with great respect, assuming that they had some religiously divined power.  According 
to some accounts, locals brought transistors and other car parts to the hospital, 
assuming that those who could repair a human-being could surely repair a car as well!
92
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Fig. 4.11 
The royalist memorial stamps for President Kennedy in 1965 were a direct appeal to 
the American people, during a pivotal congressional debate over renewing PL 480 
wheat sales to Egypt.
93
 Other stamps celebrated Saudi support for the Imam and Yemen 
by featuring pictures of al-Badr and King Faisal.
94
 The “Jordan Relief Fund” stamps in 
1967 honored Jordan’s early support for the Imam and the Jordanian army’s role in 
training for the use of heavy artillery, and were  used to raise money for Jordanian and 
Palestinian refugees after the 1967 war.
95
 Although Jordan recognized the YAR in 
1965, withdrawing its support for al-Badr, these stamps seemed aimed at reconciliation.  
Even after the Egyptians withdrew, Condé continued issuing royalist stamps in an 
effort to garner world support for the royalist cause.  A variety of twenty-five stamps 
were dedicated to the   “Poison Gas Victims’ Relief Fund,” to support the victims of 
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Egyptian gas chemical warfare
96
 in Yemen, a topic to be discussed in detail next 
chapter. 
 
Fig. 4.12 Commemorative postage celebrating Mutawakkilite-Saudi alliance  
(September 16, 1965) 
 
 
Nasser was not oblivious to the significance of al-Badr’s issuance of royalist stamps.  
In December 1964, the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen printed their last set of 
stamps with Saikali Press in Beirut, as the printing house was later pressured by Egypt 
into imposing a ban on the printing of stamps issued by the Imam.
97
 Condé contacted 
the Harrison and Sons printing and postal company in London, commissioning them to 
print an order of Mutawakkilite aerograms.  A significant delay in the London-based 
company, forced Condé to turn to the Dar al-Asfahani Press Company in Jeddah to fill 
a provisional order of 5,000 copies.   Condé deemed the product “one of the world’s 
most attractive aerogrammes.” Dar al-Asfhani, the former stamp printers of the Saudi 
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government, later assumed responsibility for printing most Mutawakkilite stamp 
orders.
98
    
After Jordan recognized the YAR on January 22, 1965, Condé claimed to have been 
afraid of being arrested in Jordan because the Arab Postal Union issued warrant against 
him for printing Free Yemen stamps “offensive to President Gamal Abdel Nasser.”  
Furthermore, all Arab states had been warned by Egypt not to carry mail affixed with 
“Free Yemen” stamps.99 Understanding the importance, at least to Condé, of the 
royalist postal network, Prince Muhammad al-Hussein designated “a bomb-proof 
cavern, under an enormous boulder, which would be a tourist attraction in Yosemite 
National Park (it is perched on top of a sheer granite cliff)” as the Ministry of 
Communications office and Jawf General Post Office.
100
  
Al-Badr commissioned “All-Yemen” stamps to be printed on November 8, 1964, as 
a prelude to the Yemen national congress in Sa’dah to give Yemenis the independence 
to choose their own government without Egyptian intervention.
101
 Condé prepared 
royalist-republican “All-Yemen” stamps for the Haradh Conference on November 23, 
1964 for the purpose of establishing a provisional government including representatives 
from both royalists and republicans.
102
  The existence of these stamps underscored the 
Imam’s intentions of reuniting the country through compromise, certainly a public 
relations victory by any measure. 
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Al-Badr used stamps to memorialize fallen commanders and royalist of importance.  
The first memorial stamp was for Prince Ali al-Hussein, the first of the “Fighting 
Princes” to be killed in battle.  Ali, who had previously met with UNYOM officials on 
royalist territory, was also known as the “Father of the Constitution” as he coordinated 
draft proposals of the Kingdom’s constitution based on British and American principles 
that he studied at the American University of Beirut.  The finished constitution was 
known as “National Charter of the Yemeni People” and was signed on December 25, 
1964 in Imam’s GHQ in Qarah.   Ali was killed on June 15, 1964 near ‘Uqlah under 
command of his uncle Prime Minister Hassan.  Other memorial stamps included Qadi 
Ahmad as-Sayaghi, former Deputy Premier of the Yemen Kingdom, killed in Jawf in 
1964, Sayed Mahammad Abu Munassir, deputy commander killed in Jawf, and Sheikh 
Ahmad al-Zayidi of the Jaham tribe of Sirwah.  The term “martyr” was used rather than 
“war hero” as Yemeni religious authorities had declared jihad on Nasser in reaction to 
the killing of Muslim civilians.
103
 
The postal routes themselves functioned clandestinely as a cover for arms and 
supplies shipments for northern royalist positions.  Sharif Muhammad ibn Hussein, the 
nephew of the Emir of Ma’rib, acted as the local postmaster in his uncle’s farmhouse.  
He sent royalist mail via the Sharif of Bayhan, located just south of the North Yemen 
border in the Federation of South Arabia.  The Sharif of Bayhan was a staunch ally of 
al-Badr and provided transport of mail onwards to Aden.  In addition to royalist post, 
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the Bayhan territory was a source of munitions, essential supplies, and traveling 
mercenaries in aid of the Imam’s forces.104 
These five and a half years witnessed the reconstruction of the Mutawakkilite 
Kingdom’s postal system from two or three tiny post offices in war torn Jawf and the 
Mashriq eastern provinces in November 1962 to sixty-five post offices and General 
Post Offices sites servicing 6,000-7,000 first-class inland letters daily and 25,000 
pieces of outgoing overseas mail monthly.  Condé claimed that royalist mail was 
sometimes faster than Saudi post because “our registry lists are always in correct 
geographical order.”  Barring war-related delays, a letter could leave the Yemen border 
one day and arrive in London three days later via Jizan, Saudi Arabia.
105
 Even years 
after the demise of the royalist opposition, Condé continued to appeal for historical 
recognition of the royalist stamps as official state-issued postage in the official 
philatelist postal registries.
106
  The popularity of Mutawakkilite stamps continued to be 
a major topic of the Yemen Philatelic Society under the leadership of the group’s 
Canadian president Blair Stannard.
107
  The real victory, however, was Condé’s ability 
to turn the Mutawakkilite stamps and postal system into Western propaganda to attract 
attention, sympathy, and support for the royalist cause.  During a time of tribal 
tensions, Condé singlehandedly created a national institution that symbolically granted 
legitimacy to the royalist non-state actor. 
                                                          
104
 Bruce Condé, "Free Yemen POD Carries On, Resumes Operations In West, North and East 
As Loyalists Repel Rebels In These Areas," Linn's Weekly Stamp News, April 1, 1963, 26. 
105
 Bruce Condé, "The Matter of Yemen Postal Use Vs. The Stolow Criteria; Detailed Report 
From Abroad," Linn's Weekly Stamp News, June 17, 1968, 1.  
106
 Linn’s Weekly Stamp News Archive.  Bruce Conde letter to Charles W. Prichett (Linn’s 
Weekly), April 24, 1985. 
107
 Blair Stannard, “Yemen: Booklet Panes,” The Arab World Philatelist 4 (1979), 35. 
170 
 
Chapter 5: The UN Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM) 
 Imam al-Badr’s “resurrection” in November 1962 inspired northern Yemeni tribes to 
contribute to a royalist offensive against Egyptian troops.  Al-Badr’s uncle, Prince 
Hassan, along with other members of the Hamid al-Din family led tribal militias in 
recapturing Ma’rib and Harib pushing the frontlines westwards towards Sana’a.  The 
royalist military effort was supported by monetary aid and arms shipments over the 
Saudi border to the north.  Both republican and royalist forces hunkered down in 
respective hilltop defensive positions from December 1962 through February 1963 
during the rainy winter season.  Even as Ralph Bunche, Undersecretary of the UN and 
US diplomat Ellsworth Bunker embarked on diplomatic missions to Cairo, Riyadh, and 
Sana’a, Nasser commissioned a total of 20,000 UAR troops to Yemen for the start of 
what became known as the “Ramadan Offensive”.  For the next year, the Egyptian 
army endeavored to regain control of roads leading north, east, and west of Sana’a and 
the major cities of Sa’dah and Ma’rib.   
Ellsworth Bunker’s agreements between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and the 
subsequent fifteen-month UN Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM), spoke to 
promoting an end to the internationalization of the Yemeni conflict.  International 
diplomacy, however, appeared to have been disconnected from the reality of events on 
the ground both in stated goals and the implementation of UNYOM.  UN Secretary-
General U Thant was more concerned with the international implications of UN actions 
in Yemen than on the organization’s ability to mediate regional hostilities.   
Contemporary and historical accounts of the UN mission have described it as a 
failure from a diplomatic, political, and tactical perspective.
1
  Other accounts have 
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minimized the importance of the mission in the overall narrative of the Yemeni civil 
war by relegating it to a few paragraphs or a footnote at most.
2
  From July 1963 – 
September 1964, there was a notable increase in the size of the Egyptian military 
presence and Saudi military aid continued to arrive, albeit through more clandestine 
and varied geographical locations.  The supply and hygiene of UN quarters were 
deemed dangerously inadequate contributing to the low morale of personnel.  Many of 
the journalist accounts of the mission were skewed by the negative American and 
British opinions of the UN.  Michael Crouch, the British Resident Adviser in Aden 
summed up the way his cohort felt about the UN mission in Yemen describing as "the 
mission from the UN anti-colonialist committee … sitting on the other side of the 
border making mischief."
3
 
Recently available UN and Canadian archives challenge the perceived “failure” of 
UNYOM.  The stated goal of the mission was to “observe” the withdrawals of Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia.  Simply stated, at a certain point in the mission, there were no 
withdrawals to observe, a failure on the part of the two belligerent countries rather than 
the UN mission.  The actual purpose of the mission was not to enforce an end to 
hostilities, but rather to maintain a symbolic presence in the region, the fruits of which 
would not become clear until the series of peace conferences following the mission’s 
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termination.  Furthermore, UNYOM was the beginning of a new era of UN missions 
during the 1960s and 1970s that were hampered by diplomatic and financial obstacles.  
In structuring UNYOM, Thant endeavored to create a mission that was both 
uncontroversial and low-cost, a clear departure from previous UN operations of lavish 
expenditure.  Reports and complaints about inadequate supplies and low morale were 
more a protest against Thant’s attempts to redefine the place of peacekeeping in the UN 
rather than an objective testament to reality on the ground.  UNYOM was in fact a 
valiant effort to maintain a benign and limited international presence in the midst of an 
intractable internationalized conflict, thereby confining the global repercussions of the 
civil war and laying the foundations for subsequent efforts at reconciliation. 
The Emergence of Regionalism and a Financing Crisis in the UN 
 When Swedish UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld died in a plane crash on 
September 18, 1961, he marked the end to a “heyday era of a freewheeling secretary-
general” and an aggressive UN peacekeeping policy.4  From 1946, Hammarskjöld and 
his Norwegian predecessor Trygve Lie had exercised an agenda dominated by the US 
and Western Europe and the priorities of the emerging Cold War global conflict.   The 
UN peacekeeping agenda was dominated by a collection of mid-level countries 
including Canada, Sweden, and Denmark in what Canadian Secretary of State Howard 
Charles Green termed the “Scandi-Canadian axis in the UN”.  Lester Pearson, who 
served as Canadian Prime Minister during the Yemen civil war, is known by historians 
as the “Father of Peacekeeping” and the public face of Canadian international 
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diplomacy.  His championing of peacekeeping encouraged the Canadian contingent of 
pilots to join the UN mission in Yemen.
5
 
By the end of 1960, however, following a period of rapid post-colonial 
independence in Africa, non-Western countries came to constitute the large majority of 
the General Assembly.  This new Asian-African regional bloc called for a 
decentralization of the UN leadership and a shift in focus from the East-West conflict to 
the regional economic development of the Southern Hemisphere.
6
 Brian Urquhart, a 
former Undersecretary of the UN, explained that the emergence of the third world in 
the UN transferred discussion and significance from the Security Council to the 
General Assembly, a situation with which neither the West nor the USSR was 
comfortable.
7
 
This regional movement gained a voice in 1955 at the Asia-African Conference held 
in Bandung, Indonesia, bringing together twenty-nine regional states to formulate joint 
principles of economic development and international relations.  The Non-Aligned 
Movement, the group’s official title, met in Belgrade in September 1961, in the First 
Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State to formalize their commitment to avoiding 
military agreements with the superpowers while supporting national independence 
movements.  Nasser was an integral part of the Movement’s leadership and would later 
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use this context to justify support for Egyptian intervention in Yemen.
8
 In June 1964, 
the “Group of 77” added to these initial non-aligned nations in forming the largest 
intergovernmental organization of developing countries in the UN, under the pretext of 
promoting their collective economic interests.
9
  The regional politicization of UN 
power dynamics during UNYOM’s mandate had a profound effect on the limited 
diplomatic latitude offered to planners of the mission and observers on the ground. 
 In the search for a new secretary-general following Hammarskjöld’s death, the 
impetus was to choose a candidate from the Afro-Asian bloc of nations.  U Thant, 
ambassador to the UN from Burma, perceived as a third world country not involved “in 
a festering conflict that could alienate any of the great powers,” was appointed for the 
position and served his first term until April 1963.
10
  Thant was sensitive to Soviet 
charges levied against Hammarskjöld’s western subjectivity and sought to develop a 
persona of “neutrality” and “impartiality”.  This philosophy did have its limits, 
particularly in relation to what Thant perceived as the “historic injustices perpetrated 
against third world nations.”11 During his tenure as secretary-general, he would oversee 
the transition of the UN from an East-West Cold War arena, to an institution forced to 
grapple with the priorities and concerns of the third world. The mission to Yemen and 
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the UN stance towards the conflict were greatly influenced by Thant’s preferences for 
the developing countries of the UAR and YAR, his desire to appease the Soviet foreign 
office, and perhaps an effort to secure support for a second term as secretary-general 
after April 1963. 
In the midst of this geographic transition in the UN, a crisis broke out in newly-
independent Congo drawing the intervention of a UN peacekeeping mission, known as 
the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC), which would eventually amount to 20,000 
troops over a period from July 1960 to June 1964.  UN forces racked up exorbitant bills 
and suffered many casualties, including Hammarskjöld himself whose plane crashed on 
the way to a ceasefire conference.  The chaos of the emerging civil war in Congo 
embroiled ONUC in a complex domestic conflict that went beyond normal 
peacekeeping duties.  ONUC was forced to take sides in a country divided into four 
rival camps and was accused of having facilitated the overthrow of Congolese Prime 
Minister Patrice Lumumba.
12
 
 ONUC’s mandate was established nearly four years after the beginning of the UN 
Emergency Force (UNEF), a peacekeeping mission stationed along the Armistice 
Demarcation Lines in Sinai between Israel and Egypt.  The financing of these two 
operations and of peacekeeping missions in general was a contested issue in the UN, 
with four distinct opinions disagreeing over the responsibility for financing UN 
peacekeeping.  Soviet Union Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov argued that the 
aggressor nations should be responsible to maintain their own international 
peacekeepers.  Representatives from Latin America argued that the permanent 
members of the Security Council should fund the missions because “they have a 
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primary obligation for the maintenance of peace and security under the charter.”  Latin 
American and Asian delegates also offered the opinion that either wealthy nations or 
the countries with the greatest economic interests in the region should pay the bills.  
The Canadian delegates, one of the largest contributors of peacekeeping forces, 
advocated a “compulsory payment principle”, as they envisioned peace and security as 
a collective responsibility borne equally by all UN members.
13
  Lacking consensus on 
the responsibility for financing the missions, Hammarskjöld established separate 
budgets for each mission to be funded by voluntary contributions from all UN 
members. 
1963, the year UNYOM was approved by the Security Council, was the most 
expensive year for UN peacekeeping costs with the continued administration of UNEF, 
ONUC, and the annual peacekeeping budget exceeding $195 million, an amount ten 
times larger than the UN’s first annual budget in 1946.  This contributed to the overall 
UN financial shortfall of $110 million in 1963.
14
  Members of these two missions 
would later be sent to Yemen to fill administrative roles in UNYOM, bringing along 
with them their grudges and political tensions from Congo and Sinai. The deficits 
incurred as a consequence of financing ONEF and ONUC placed further pressure on U 
Thant to run the mission to Yemen frugally and to secure funds from the aggressor 
nations themselves, rather than from UN resources.  To make matters worse, the Soviet 
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Union and France refused to pay their share of assessments for UNEF and ONUC 
deepening the financial crisis of UN peacekeeping missions.
15
 
Ralph Bunche compared the crisis in Yemen to Congo and stressed patience in 
bringing about results.
16
  He would later term this approach as “tin cup” peacekeeping, 
a sure recipe for futility, as demonstrated by the UN mission to Yemen.
17
 Beyond the 
financial constraints imposed on the proposed UN mission to Yemen, U Thant had “to 
ensure that each new mission was sufficiently uncontroversial that no state would use 
its existence to justify further attacks on the UN.”18   
A Rough Beginning 
 Conscious of the need to both keep costs down and propose an uncontroversial 
mission to Yemen, U Thant sent Swedish Lieutenant-General Carl von Horn, then 
serving as the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization 
(UNTSO), to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen to ascertain the potential needs of a 
group of UN observers.  Von Horn, described as “prestigious but stormy,” was to join 
UNYOM after having served in Congo for six months in 1960 and almost two years in 
Jerusalem.
19
 Following a long illustrious UN career highlighted by comfortable office 
positions, the more rustic field mission to Yemen was seen by von Horn as a personal 
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offense bestowed upon him by U Thant.
20
  In 1962, von Horn’s wife Scarlett died in 
Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem, leaving von Horn alone with their fourteen year old 
son Johan.  His personal tragedy was confounded by his disdain for U Thant and the 
new African states that had recently joined the UN.  Upon arriving in New York to 
accept his Yemen assignment, von Horn noted: “The old ambience was gone.  The new 
states were reveling in the politically inspired largesse of the great powers, and had 
discovered how well it paid to shout and snarl and be abusive.” In condescendingly 
terms, he described members of the non-aligned nations as “enjoying influence without 
responsibility…using their inflated importance to band together to become a pressure 
group.”  Von Horn felt that the Americans and Russians must have regretted allowing 
their rivalry to open the door to these countries, as he believed they were a “great 
embarrassment to themselves in the United Nations where the balance of power had 
been seriously upset…contributing to the organization’s eventual decline.”21 Von Horn 
had great respect, admiration, and friendship with former Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjöld, feelings that he did not share with U Thant, a matter that would impact 
von Horn’s stance towards UNYOM.  He would later accuse Thant of seeming “almost 
entirely preoccupied with the political implications of virtually every step which 
peacekeepers took in the field.”22 
Thant had originally conceived the mission in terms of “not more than 50 observers, 
with suitable transportation, aerial and ground, for patrol purposes.”23 In May 1963, 
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von Horn returned from a trip to Yemen with his report asking for 200 personnel, a $1 
million budget, and four months in which to oversee the agreement.
24
 This divergence 
in opinion on the size of the UN mission marked the beginning of a stormy relationship 
between von Horn and Thant that would end in von Horn’s premature resignation in 
August 1963.  The Soviet Union insisted that a UN mission should not be sent to 
Yemen without explicit approval from the Security Council, setting the timetable for 
the mission even further behind schedule.
25
 As if to reiterate his disdain for Thant, 
before the official start of the mission, von Horn had already submitted a request for 
two week personal leave in July 1963.
26
 
 On June 11, 1963, the UN Security Council issued Resolution 179, calling for the 
formation of UNYOM with the limited function of observing the disengagement and 
reporting back to the UN Security Council via the Secretary General: 
The Security Council requests the Secretary-General to establish the 
observation operation as defined by him; urges the parties concerned to 
observe fully the terms of disengagement set out…and to refrain from 
any action which would increase tension in the area. 
 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt agreed to split the cost of the initial two months of the 
observer mission, an effort that would eventually cost a total of $1.8 million.
27
  The 
YAR refused to contribute to the mission, claiming that they were the “injured party.”28  
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The initial outlay amounted to a $200,000 contribution by each country for a two 
month observer mission.
29
 A speech by Saudi Ambassador Rashad Pharaon, explained 
Saudi Arabia’s willingness to support the UN mission to Yemen: 
“The United Nations has justified its existence and shown the value of 
its work on various occasions of international conflict recently in 
Yemen. The conflict in Yemen is one between brothers, and it should be 
settled, as Saudi Arabia has suggested from the outset, in accordance 
with the aspirations and desires of the Yemeni people, for my country is 
convinced that ultimately it is they who will decide their own future.  In 
view of the traditional friendly relations and spiritual ties between the 
Yemeni and Saudi Arabian peoples, my Government, which has 
sincerely collaborated with the United Nations, is prepared to give its 
honest and loyal support to any effort designed to produce a peaceful, 
just and equitable solution to this problem. We are sure that the efforts 
made by the Secretary General of the United Nations will help to put an 
end to this conflict and to similar conflicts which might threaten peace 
in different parts of the world.”30 
 
Under the terms of the agreement, the Saudis would cease aid to the royalists and the 
Egyptians would begin a withdrawal of its forces from Yemen.  A twenty kilometer 
demilitarized zone would be established on either side of the YAR border with Saudi 
Arabia, within which UN observers would be stationed to ensure the implementation of 
the Bunker agreement.  Another group of UN observers would keep track of the 
Egyptian military withdrawal from the airfield in Sana’a and the port in Hodeidah.  The 
purpose of the mission was to “check and certify on the observance by the two parties 
of the terms of the disengagement agreement (S/5298)”.  In as such, the mission had no 
official peacekeeping role. 
At maximum strength the mission had 189 military personnel, including 25 military 
observers, 114 military officers, 50 members of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF); 
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supported by international and local civilian staff.   The majority of the staff was from 
Canada and Yugoslavia, but others hailed from Australia, Denmark, Ghana, India, 
Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, and Sweden.  The troops were placed in Jizan 
and Najran, Saudi Arabia and Sa’dah, Yemen.  The air unit consisted of 50 RCAF 
officers and pilots employing Caribou and Otter aircraft based out of Sana’a, Jizan, and 
Najran.
31
 It was presumed that royalist arms arrived in Yemen by sea via the Red Sea 
shores of Jizan and by land through Najran.
32
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33
 
 
The Canadian Cabinet agreed to contribute to the mission on June 13, 1963.  The 
Canadians provided 23 RCAF fliers and 2 Caribou aircraft based out of El Arish, 
Sinai.
34
  Paul Martin the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs stated during 
the parliamentary approval of the UN observer mission: 
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“It is hoped that this will bring about the termination of a situation in 
that country which has become increasingly acute since the 
establishment of the present republican government in September of 
last year, and will help to avoid the danger of the internal conflict in 
that country developing into more widespread hostilities throughout 
the area.”35 
 
Thomas Clement Douglas, a Canadian Member of Parliament from British Columbia 
added: 
“I wish to congratulate the government on having accepted this 
responsibility, and to say that…we shall always give out support to any 
contribution which Canada may make through serving under the 
United Nations for the maintenance of peace throughout the world and 
supplying part of a world peace force.”36 
 
 From the perspective of Martin, Douglas, and much of the rest of Canadian 
Parliament in June 1963, it seemed that UNYOM had the potential to bring “world 
peace” or at the very least to contain a local conflict.  While it might be tempting to 
dismiss the perceived potential benefit of the UNYOM as another case of misplaced 
Canadian optimism during the 1960s, there was in fact a shared hope among the UN 
and the US that the Saudis and the Egyptians would be willing to adhere to the tenets 
of the April 1963 Bunker agreements.  The war was proving to be a constant drain on 
the Egyptian economy and political apparatus and the Saudis were in the midst of a 
transfer of power between Saud and Faisal.  Canadian optimism, however, quickly 
dissipated before the observer mission even began. 
As if in a prophetic omen of things to come, during an overflight of Yemen on June 
19, 1963, in preparation for the start of the Yemen mission, von Horn’s aircraft 
sustained damage from an unspecified source of ground fire en route from Sa’dah to 
Sana’a.  The immediate reaction expressed alarm over the substantial risk of using 
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low-flying single-engine aircraft, vulnerable to ground fire from sporadic hostilities.
37
 
Von Horn sent Thant a vitriolic letter describing the incident, blaming Thant for the 
lack of air support.  Furthermore, von Horn argued, others should have been doing the 
reconnaissance rather than him as the task was beneath his dignity.
38
 
In the aftermath of this incident, Canadian and UN official suggested that 
reconnaissance flights remain above a certain altitude in order to stay clear of any 
ground fire from belligerents on the ground.  While the safety and wellbeing of 
peacekeeping forces was of utmost concern, there was a perception that the absence of 
low-flying observation would seriously detract from the overall efficacy of the aerial 
observation mission.  Those advocating a riskier, yet more effective flight regulations, 
purportedly believed that royalists and republican forces alike would immediately 
recognize the UN peacekeeping planes and respectfully redirect their fire.  Skeptics 
and opinions on either side of this argument continued to make their cases on issues of 
aviation and ground reconnaissance throughout the interim of the mission. 
The debate over the relative safety of UN peacekeeping pilots was not, however, 
limited to their flight altitude.  Following the incident with von Horn’s aircraft, U Thant 
requested that for the safety of pilots involved no UNYOM missions should operate in 
areas other than those openly observing a ceasefire.
39
  Prior to the start of the mission, 
there was no actual ceasefire between the royalists, republicans and Egyptians.  The 
only “ceasefire” zone was the demilitarized border area between the YAR and Saudi 
Arabia.  The limitation of observation to this area served to further distance UNYOM 
from actual events in Yemen.  
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Following U Thant’s amended guidelines for peacekeeping pilots Canadian officials 
began to recognize the futility of this ill-defined mission.  It was becoming apparent 
that the “aim of the operation is to provide a face-saving cover for this Saudi-UAR 
disengagement which would prevent a direct confrontation from possibly engulfing the 
whole Middle East in war”.  UNYOM was not intended to bring a stop to hostilities 
between Republican and Royalist forces, but was rather a context within which the 
Egyptians and Saudis could respectfully disengage without conceding defeat.
40
 
Within days of first arriving at the UN Headquarters in Sana’a, there were already 
grievances from the personnel.  Canadians complained of a lack of provisions and 
believed that the water had been poisoned by Yemenis who threw their dead bodies into 
wells being utilized by UN officials.  Multiple reports were sent to UN headquarters for 
an immediate airlift of drinking water.  Brian Pridham, an official from the Arabian 
Department of the British Foreign Office, expressed a great deal of skepticism towards 
these tales of water issues: "The story about the water, as well as the water itself, takes 
some swallowing.  The lowest plain around Sana’a is renowned for its wells, and even 
if the Yemeni had been so un-Arab as to pollute their own water, it would have been far 
simpler to tap any local mountain spring  than to fly water in."
41
   
On July 2, a briefing was received from Sana’a, complaining about the inability to 
boil water at a high enough temperature in high elevation to purify water of high 
bacteria content.
42
  While in reality drinking this partially boiled water would likely not 
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have harmed the personnel, the fact that this briefing was one of the first major issues 
from the peacekeeping mission in Yemen is indicative of more serious problems in 
preparing for conditions in Yemen.  It was as if troops arrived from their previous UN 
posts in Congo and Sinai only to discover, much to their surprise, that Sana’a was set 
atop a mountain rather than a plateau.
43
  The purity of water in Sana’a was 
representative of the greater difficulty of transitioning UN personnel to the shoestring 
mission in Yemen, a new model being advocated by U Thant. 
The Mission Continues to Unravel 
On August 20, 1963, General von Horn submitted his urgent resignation, effective 
officially on August 31, in protest of the unsatisfactory administrative arrangements for 
UNYOM.  He remarked in his letter of resignation: "When my duty-bound 
representations so often are boomeranged as "unwarranted remarks" I feel [sic] having 
lost your confidence and therefore I have no other choice but to herewith tender my 
resignation."
44
 
Von Horn highlighted several specific areas where he thought the mission was 
particularly problematic.  The purported goal of UN operations was to observe the 
withdrawal of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, a task the current mission was not capable of 
completing.  Based on the mission’s reconnaissance, the Saudis were no longer aiding 
the Imam’s forces across the Yemen-Saudi border, although this did not preclude tribal 
groups from conducting their own trade.  In a meeting with UK Ambassador Colin 
Crowe, acting Saudi Deputy Foreign Minister Mas'ud explained "that Saudis have 
ceased all aid through official channels, but cannot account for illicit arms trade”.  In 
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addition Mas’ud reiterated that Jizan and Najran have functioned for centuries as a 
market for the local Yemeni economy and as such attract significant movement of non-
military goods.  This created further difficulties for the UN as there was a need to 
distinguish between contraband and legal trade.
45
 
Additional impediments along the Saudi-Yemeni border further limited the 
mission’s ability to observe, as aerial and ground reconnaissance could only be carried 
out during daylight hours for logistical reasons.  Given the intense heat during the 
majority of the year in Yemen, however, much of the travel was conducted at night 
when there would be no UN observers on site.  Although UN peacekeepers solved this 
issue by maintaining a fixed observer position alongside a main road for 40 hour shifts 
at a time, von Horn did not deem this sustainable for a successful mission.  For 
example, a UN ground patrol observed eleven camels and sixteen donkeys loaded with 
sacks and wooden boxes passing through the Saudi Arabian border town of Nahuga.  
When asked, the leader of the convoy explained that all he was carrying was food.  
Believing him, the observers let him through without having him checked or questioned 
further.
46
  
Von Horn complained that he could not verify Nasser’s claim to have withdrawn 
8,300 troops through independent observation.  UNYOM personnel did not have access 
to Egyptian troop transport facilities in Hodeidah or the Egyptian garrisons in Sana’a.  
He believed that the apparent movement of Egyptian soldiers was merely a rotation of 
troops rather than an effectual withdrawal.  In essence, from von Horn’s perspective, 
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Nasser was making a mockery of the mission and his agreed withdrawal.  As if to add 
salt to the wound, Nasser continued unrestrained aerial bombardment and continuous 
encroachment on the “demilitarized zone”.47 According to the eyewitness account of 
American civilian working for Yemen Aid Team in July 1963, at least 600-700 
Egyptian troops were seen disembarking in Hodeidah.  Yugoslav Deputy Commander 
General Branko Pavlovic added: "I wish to point out that while UAR authorities are 
reluctant to give us departing troop information, they resent any inquiries regarding 
incoming forces." Despite the fact that UNYOM observers were required to oversee 
Egyptian troop withdrawals, UAR officials had asked UN observers to leave the 
premises during troop movements on numerous occasions.  Not surprisingly, during 
these instances, reports confirmed the arrival of additional Egyptian soldiers to replace 
those who had been sent home as part of the usual troop rotation.
48
 
 The second major concern noted by von Horn was the difficulty of securing 
financial support for the mission.  In agreeing to fund the UN Mission, the Saudis 
provided money while the UAR promised only the equivalent value in logistical 
support.  Von Horn refused on numerous occasions to use UAR transports or facilities 
as it would have compromised the objectivity of the mission.
49
 This difficulty in 
maintaining a neutral and uninvolved position is best highlighted by the following two 
incidents.  On July 23, 1963, reports were sent to UN headquarters that UAR aircraft 
were following UNYOM Caribou aircraft during flights from Sana’a to Sa’dah.  
Although the UAR may have been weighing the short term risks of possible ground 
attack against UN aircraft, it was widely believed that the long-term impact of close 
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association with one of the two belligerent parties would be detrimental to the 
mission’s neutrality.  In a second incident in July 1963, UN aircraft were seen bringing 
wounded Egyptian soldiers to Sana’a for treatment.  If done extensively, this would call 
UN neutrality into question as well, as they would have been seen as active participants 
in Egyptian military operations.  Canadian Secretary of State Paul Joseph James Martin 
released a directive indicating that the transport of non-UN personnel should be limited 
to situations where lives are in danger and no other aircraft is in the region.  Any 
extensive airlift of Egyptian or Saudi troops on UN aircraft would not only cast doubts 
as to the neutrality of the mission, but might actually put UN personnel in danger.  
Either side might otherwise consider UN aircraft as troop transports for one of the 
belligerent parties.
50
 
Interaction with UAR troops was difficult to avoid given the nature of the Egyptian 
contribution to the UN mission.  While Saudi Arabia pledged $200,000 in cash, Nasser 
promised only to provide logistical assistance equivalent to $200,000.
51
 As a result, UN 
aircraft was competing with the UAR for airspace, particularly around Sana’a where 
the old airport had no control tower and only a single runway that was in essence a 
14,000 foot-long gravel surface.
52
 These circumstances were a deliberate attempt by the 
Egyptian air force to use UN observers as a cover for bombing raids over royalist 
territory in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.  Close encounters with UAR aircraft were 
additionally a consequence of the language barrier between the Canadian pilots and the 
Egyptian control-tower who spoke no English.  The Egyptian air force was, however, 
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able to communicate the need for priority access to the airfield, barring UN aircraft 
from the field during Egyptian maneuvers.
53
 
In November 1963, Saudi Prince Muhammad ibn Nayef and corporal Saher ben Abd 
al Amer reported seeing two aircraft passing over the Jizan checkpoint before hearing 
explosions in al-Kuba, a Saudi border town.  The attack occurred on Thursday 
November 21, a traditional regional market day during which 4,000 people gathered on 
the banks of the local wadi.  When two airplanes approached from the west, people ran 
for cover.  After the planes circled once, they left towards the north, clearly displaying 
their white color and UN emblem.  When two more planes approached from the 
southeast 10 minutes later, the locals did not run, assuming that these were UN aircraft 
as well, and then the bombing began.  The main targets were five trucks parked in the 
middle of the market.  The attack lasted thirty-five minutes that included bombs and 
gun fire.  Among the dead were children, women, and men from Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen.  UN Sargent Paulsen recounted having visited al-Kuba numerous times and not 
seeing any suspicious Saudi military activity.
54
 
 A third element to von Horn’s grievances was on a more personal level.  Von Horn’s 
requests for airlift of material from Rafah were rejected because of expense.  Much to 
his ire, material would be sent via sea.  Von Horn perceived this rejection as a personal 
affront by Indian General Indar Jit Rikhye, who had been serving as military advisor to 
U Thant.  General Rikhye also rejected Von Horn’s request for extra leave for his 
personnel as compensation for the difficulty of operating in Yemen.  This was part of a 
larger debate that included the level of personnel salaries, sufficient supply, and 
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hygienic accommodations which von Horn and other deemed insufficient.
55
 Sargent 
McLellan, a member of the UNYOM personnel, sent a formal request to UN 
headquarters taking up the same issue of compensation, requesting increase in salary 
given the risk entailed in the UN mission in Yemen.  McLellan insisted that he was not 
being greedy in asking for more money, he was only advocating for fairness.
56
   
Yugoslav Deputy Commander General Branko Pavlovic took over from von Horn as 
interim commander of the UNYOM.  He had previously served in this capacity during 
von Horn’s two week absence in July.  Pavlovic faced additional difficulties, however, 
because of linguistic barriers (he spoke little English) and was replaced by Indian 
Lieutenant General P.S. Gyani before the end of the September 1963.
57
   
During this leadership transition in November 1964, Yugoslavia announced the 
withdrawal of its ground forces from Yemen, following the end of the four month 
original proposal made by U Thant.  Without a presence on the ground, the entire 
observation mission became reliant on aerial reconnaissance.   Furthermore, the 
declining effectiveness of the four single engine Otters in the hot and mountainous 
Yemeni climate forced the RCAF to rely on the larger Caribous, which fly at a higher 
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altitude, providing even less “observation”, although at a safer distance and with greater 
reliability in the Arabian climate.
 58
 
59
 
 
In an attempt to find a solution to the absence of a Yugoslavian military presence, 
Gyani planned for Saudi military representatives to be stationed at checkpoints along 
with UN observers.  Saudi patrols were not, however, to accompany UN observers into 
Yemen territory.  The Saudi soldiers were responsible for checking the contents of the 
convoy with "a thorough scrutiny" while the patrol commander merely observed and 
made notes for his report.  UN observers could only ask Saudis to stop vehicles and 
requisition contraband or ammunition, but were instructed not to inspect convoys 
themselves and certainly not without Saudi officials present. The observers handwritten 
reports, covered in a layer of sand even while stored in their archival folders, detailed 
the movement of troops in the demilitarized zone, convoys between Saudi Arabia and 
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Yemen, air activity, hostile military activity, personnel and equipment redeployment, 
and any indication of UAR withdrawal.
60
 
After intense insistence by U Thant, the Canadians agreed to continue supplying 
members of the RCAF for a primarily aerial observer mission.  Pier P. Spinelli, the 
acting Undersecretary and Director of the European Office of the UN, was brought on 
to serve as the civilian Special Representative to the Secretary General and Head of the 
Mission in Yemen.  Although no effectual Egyptian withdrawal was noted, it seemed 
that the very presence of the UN in Yemen, even in a limited capacity, was a deterrent 
to full-scale UAR assaults on the royalists or on Saudi Arabian territory.  With this in 
mind, Thant managed to secure five additional two month renewals, carrying the 
mission until September 4, 1964.  According to Thant’s reports to the Security Council 
in 1964, while fighting continued in Yemen, air attacks on Saudi border villages had 
subsided, with few exceptions.
61
 
Although direct confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Egypt may have subsided, 
munitions transports across the border were growing more brazen.  Heavy transports 
were seen traveling through the Saudi border towns of al-Jara’a and al-Kuba, but 
vehicles were not checked by observers, "owing to the hostile attitude shown by the 
drivers and vehicle guards.”  The trucks were, however, observed to be carrying “war 
materials and soldiers."
62
 The town of Jizan, as well, was being used as a transport 
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location for munitions to royalist forces in the north and as a destination for Yemeni 
tribal refugees.
63
 
Prior to the end of the UNYOM, General Rikhye observed that rather than reducing 
troops, Nasser seemed to have been preparing to make a large-scale assault on royalists 
just as the UN mission was due to expire on September 4.
64
 UN observers gathered 
information indicating substantial Egyptian and republican troop deployments in the 
planning of further large scale assaults on royalist positions.
65
 The Saudis, however, did 
not need this report to realize that Egyptian troops were not withdrawing from Yemen 
and were reluctant to continue funding UNYOM for an additional two months, bringing 
an official end to the belligerent-funded mission.
66
 
UNYOM – More than Meets the Eye 
 The UN mission in Yemen has been criticized not only for its failure to end 
hostilities in the region, but on the conditions of the UN staff, its restrictions on making 
contact with royalists, and the fact that it had no functional purpose other than to 
observe, and even that was done poorly and inefficiently.
67
  Recently available UN 
archives have shed light on multiple aspects of the mission that counter these three 
purported deficiencies of the mission.   
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Von Horn and other critics of the UN mission have highlighted the meager rations 
and paltry conditions of UN officials in bases and outposts in the demilitarized zone 
between Saudi Arabia and the YAR.  Von Horn blamed what he referred to as the 
“paucity of transport planes” leading to the “near starvation” of UN personnel.68  
During a visit with Canadian pilots in December 1963, Flight Lieutenant Peter Kelly, a 
medical officer for the Canadian Air Transport Command claimed that the supplies and 
conditions were so poor that “We in the RCAF have reached the peak of our endurance 
in the filthy living environment of Yemen.”69 Kelly’s comments came at a time of 
heightened UN tensions as the Yugoslav ground forces were withdrawn leaving the 
bulk of the mission’s responsibility in the hands of the RCAF, much to the indignation 
of the Canadian public that had been losing patience with their continued affinity for 
global peacekeeping. 
Rumors of conditions in Yemen were greatly exaggerated leading UN officials and 
critics to believe the situation in Yemen was far worse than it actually was.  RCAF 
Flight Lieutenant George E. Mayer, a 22 year old pilot serving in Yemen, recalled 
hearing rumors about working conditions in Yemen prior to his arrival.  The flying was 
dangerous, the food was terrible, and the “Yemen Gut” travel diarrhea and vomiting 
was even worse.  He had been told that “the outposts made the TV program MASH 
locations look like the Chateau Laurier.”70 Upon arrival in Sana’a, another Canadian 
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pilot remarked that the accommodations, located in an old palace that had been home to 
Imam Yahya’s harem, were primitive, but certainly acceptable for UN standards.71 
While there is no doubt that operating in temperatures that top 125 degrees 
Fahrenheit during the daytime can hardly be considered comfortable, the UN staff was 
not lacking, especially when considering the dire poverty experienced by most 
Yemenis.   The base in Najran, for example, received weekly North Star air deliveries 
of mail, fresh fruits and vegetables and other supplies from the UNEF base in El 
Arish.
72
  A close analysis of the shipment orders in the UN archives reveals a picture 
far different from the depraved conditions of UN staff.  
The main complaint in many of the telegraphs from Najran, Hodeidah, and Sana’a 
was of the staff’s boredom rather than its lack of resources.  In response to several 
request for reading material and entertainment, headquarters granted six copies each of 
weekly newspapers including Life, The NY Times, Time, Herald Tribune, Newsweek, 
Daily Telegraph (London), charged to the UNYOM expense account.  Along with the 
newspapers, UN headquarters also sent eight films including Bye Bye Birdie, In the 
Piazza, Big Red, Come Fly with Me, and Ambush in Cameron Pass.
73
  A later request 
procured a new movie projector, loud speakers, cinemascope lens, spare parts, and 
transformer.
74
 The projector came along with an additional collection of movies 
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including The Running Man, Wives and Lovers, The Mouse on the Moon, Come Blow 
Your Horn, Murder at the Gallop, among other hit movies from 1963.
75
 
In addition to being entertained with daily newspapers and current movies, UN staff 
also developed a penchant for heavy drinking and smoking.  Telegrams from the 
various UN outposts in Yemen were sent, at least once a week, for shipments of beer 
and alcohol to either be charged to UNYOM’s cash account or to their individual 
expense accounts.  On several occasions UN headquarters responded: "Forwarding two 
Tuborgs [beer] ASAP"
76
  One telegram to headquarters, perhaps in preparation for a 
heavy night of drinking, asked: "Please increase whisky request to four bottles for each 
of us." Some orders did not specify brand name, sufficing with a general request for 
beer, whisky, vodka, or “any other alcohol”.77 Other orders, however, were made by 
UN officials with a more epicurean taste.  For example, Majors Paulson and Woskett 
requested an emergency airlift to Jizan of two bottles of Rémy Martin, a particularly 
expensive brand of cognac.  Paulson and Woskett deemed this airlift, which was to 
include gin, vodka, and pipe tobacco as well, as an appropriate restitution from UN 
headquarters for not agreeing to ship the UNYOM station in Jizan a Christmas tree in 
December 1963.
78
  Requests for beer and spirits were surpassed only by orders for 
cigarettes, specifically Phillip Morris brand.
79
 Aside from a special meal order for 
Christmas dinner in December 1963, the content of these telegrams did not convey a 
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desperate need for food or any other staples.  UN personnel in Yemen seemed to have a 
lot of leisure and downtime on their hands to drink and smoke heavily, watch movies, 
and read regularly, hardly the symptoms of a demoralized and depraved crew.  Even 
General von Horn himself was often accompanied by two things that “never strayed far 
from his side: a beautiful blond Swedish secretary and bottle of his favourite malt 
beverage.”80 
Upon arriving in Sana’a, George Mayer was treated to four cold Amstel beers to 
make him feel at ease.  He recounted a comical anecdote that demonstrated the 
centrality and importance of beer for UN personnel during his later stationing in 
Najran: 
“The focal point of Najran was the 450lb. kerosene fired double door 
fridge strategically located in the shady party area.  On the left side was 
the Danish beer Tuborg and on the right side, my favourite Dutch 
Amstel beer.  You were obliged to bow or salute whenever you passed it 
by!  It was the junior man on the outpost that was charged with keeping 
it stocked and worth his hide if he didn’t!”81 
 
Any demoralization was mainly as a result of the Montreal Canadiens’ playoff loss 
in April 1964.  The Canadian pilots staffing UNYOM in 1964 spent a great deal of their 
leisure and work time receiving updates as to the scores and standings of the Montreal 
Canadiens and Toronto Maple Leafs during the course of the National Hockey League 
(NHL) playoffs.  Over fifty telegrams were sent to UN bases in Yemen detailing the 
outcome of the most recent playoff game, the performance of the Detroit Red Wings 
hockey great Gordie Howe, and the eventual Stanley Cup victory of the Toronto Maple 
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Leafs.
82
 Despite the complaining, it seems that at least Canadian hockey fans had their 
priorities straight… 
UNYOM was also accused of ignoring Yemeni royalists, thereby hampering the 
mission’s ability to mediate a peaceful agreement taking all sides into account.83  In 
reality, there were multiple visits to royalist bases, with the intention of explaining the 
UN mission and making Yemeni tribesmen familiar with the blue helmets and white 
planes of UN personnel.  In August 1963, Saudi Prince Turki ibn Abdulaziz al Saud, 
the governor of Riyadh Province at the time, was asked by UN headquarters to make 
contact with royalists in Jizan on behalf of UNYOM.   The announced purpose of the 
meeting was to explore royalist reactions to UN personnel and whether they would 
offer them protection. 
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The meeting took place on August 21 in the Sa’dah area where UN Major Larry 
David, an American fluent in Arabic with long experience in the Middle East, met with 
royalist Hassan ibn Hussein.  Together they crossed the Yemeni border at al-Kuba, 
needing to transfer from a jeep to a royalist Dodge Power Wagon, as the UN jeeps 
could not handle the terrain.  Good hospitality was shown to Major David and royalist 
officials assured him that al-Badr would order the tribes not to harm UN officials and 
not to fire upon white planes.  Royalist soldiers offered their own assessment of the 
power of Egyptian air supremacy in the Yemeni conflicts: "if the UAR aircraft were 
withdrawn from the Yemen, the royalists would solve the problem of the withdrawal of 
Egyptian troops,  implying that Egyptian air support was the republic’s only tactical 
advantage over royalist forces.
85
 
                                                          
84
 www.unmultimedia.org, UNYOM, June-July 1963. 
85
 UN Archives, S-0657-0012, Folder 5, August 24, 1963, Major L.P. David to Deputy 
Commander UNYOM. 
Fig. 5.3 Prince Turki meeting with UNYOM observers in Jizan, July 1963. 
201 
 
 
 In October 1963, Major Nicholas Doughty, a member of the UNYOM personnel, 
traveled from Najran to the Yemeni district of al-Hashwa for a three day meeting with 
Prince Ali, the twenty-two year old first cousin of al-Badr who spoke English after 
studying economics for one year in the American University of Beirut.  Ali described 
an apparent UAR military build-up northeast of Sa’dah and offered to escort UN 
observers to the outskirts of the Egyptian military site.  In addition, given that UN 
officials were already arbitrating between Egyptians and royalists on prisoner exchange 
matters, Ali expressed a willingness to have UNYOM observers stationed on a semi-
permanent basis in royalist areas.  He explained that royalists held one hundred 
Egyptian prisoners and would be willing to submit to International Red Cross and UN 
inspections.  Royalists were hoping to use these prisoners as bargaining chips to gain 
information on the Imam's family being held in Cairo and Sana’a.  Ali claimed to have 
been provided with arms and intelligence from republican commanders and that the 
republican intention was to kill Egyptians, not Yemenis.  Ali pledged to circulate the 
word to tribesmen not to fire on white UN aircraft, although he admitted that "it was 
often difficult to ensure disciplined acts by the tribesmen."
86
 
 André Rochat, the head of the delegation from the ICRC in Yemen, would later 
follow the UNYOM initiative in establishing a royalist-republican dialogue regarding 
prisoner exchange.  Known by UN and ICRC insiders as the “bridge builder”, Rochat 
secured freedom of movement for the ICRC between royalist and republican territories 
from 1964 through the end of the war.  In 1967, Rochat’s ICRC “bridge” managed to 
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secure the exchange of all remaining prisoners of war, including Egyptian soldiers who 
had been held by northern tribes for upwards of four years.
87
 
In his assessment of the meeting, Doughty suggested continuing talks with royalists 
as they occupied a central geographic position with access to the specific areas which 
appear to be the focus of the UN mission's attention.  He suggested maintaining contact 
with Prince Ali and other royalists, while still retaining an unofficial status, in 
accordance with U Thant’s insistence in avoiding internal politics of the Yemeni 
conflict.  In addition Doughty felt there was a need to increase "at least an awareness of 
what UN people look like, particularly among the tribesmen.”  Furthermore, Doughty 
surmised that "if UAR were notified of UN presence in Hashwa area, the regular 
bombing might cease."  Nonetheless, he admitted that there were some difficulties in 
maintaining regular contact with the royalist camp. The rough terrain of the al-Hashwa 
region would require the purchase of new vehicles for UN personnel and there was 
always a danger of UAR bombing despite UN presence.  Doughty’s visit was 
highlighted by hours of dancing with the hill tribesmen.  He showed off the blue UN 
helmets to three hundred chanting tribesmen who were "in line abreast coming down 
the wadi, each line led by a group of dagger waving dancers."
88
   
Aside from David and Doughty’s accounts, several additional visits were made with 
royalist representatives.  Pier P. Spinelli met with Imam al-Badr’s foreign minister in 
April 1964
89
 and UN and Red Cross representatives visited with al-Badr in August 
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1964 to negotiate a prisoner exchange that was to take place in September.
90
 According 
to Brian Pridham, from the perspective of the UN “the Imam’s side does not exist.”91 
Pridham observed an additional lack of understanding in that "the curt reference to 
"armed Royalist" is nonsense.  All Yemenis in that area are by nature armed and 
royalist!”92 The detailed documentation of UN contact with Yemeni royalists 
challenges the perception that the UN mission ignored them entirely.   
The “observer” designation of the UNYOM has also been targeted as the reason for 
the mission’s failure as there was no Egyptian withdrawal to observe.  While this might 
have been true for that component of the Bunker agreements, the UN mission was 
called upon to observe much more than just the planned withdrawals of Egyptian troops 
and Saudi support.  An addendum to responsibilities of UNYOM included the 
investigation of regional incidents “where appropriate and possible”.  The complaints 
that warranted UN investigation included two categories: UAR offensive actions 
against royalist positions in Yemen and on Saudi Arabian territory and accusations of 
Saudi aid being delivered to royalists in Yemen.
93
 
The presence of UNYOM acted as a safety valve for Saudi Arabia and the UAR to 
let off steam without engaging each other.  According to the UN observer log, both 
countries submitted dozens of complaints to local UN observer personnel.  Most of 
these grievances sounded more like familial bickering, with half of Saudi 
communications naming a camel as the primary victim of a UAR bombing run.
94
  To 
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ease regional tensions, UN observers or Yugoslavian military representatives would be 
sent to “investigate” at least half of the submitted allegation, a process that amounted to 
writing a few notes on an incident log.
95
 Despite the lack of actionable responses to any 
of these incidents, the complaints continued to arrive at UN bases, a sign that even 
meager international attention was sought after and desired by the parties involved.  
Beyond the role of sanctioning diplomatic finger pointing, the UN observers were able 
to foster a working relationship with local officials with whom they consulted during 
their investigations. 
June 1963, while the mission was only in a preliminary and understaffed stage, was 
nonetheless a particularly busy month for UN military observers.  UN observers 
responded to UAR accusations of Saudi weapons transfers by documenting 
ammunition and gasoline dumps near towns along the Saudi-Yemeni border.  UN 
observers responded to reports of UAR bombings in the Saudi border villages of 
Tamniah, Abha, and al-Hadira, where UNYOM representative Major B. Schaathun was 
accompanied by Saudi Lieutenant Colonel Katlan and Prince Abdullah al-Madi for 
thorough investigations.  The team examined bomb fragments and interviewed 
survivors putting together a detailed report with photographs of property destruction 
and injury to civilians.
96
 
On August 27, 1963, the village sheikh of al-Atam wrote to Saudi officials reporting 
that their cattle had been subject to artillery fire.  Saudi officials passed on the 
information in the form of a former complaint.   UN Major David arrived onsite where 
he was shown shell fragments from the artillery fire.  Nearby, other UN observers 
toured the evacuated village of Halfa to investigate reports of an earlier bombing.  
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While they were onsite Egyptian artillery started shooting in their vicinity and 
UNYOM officers had to lie on the ground and crawl towards Ta’ashar valley where 
they withdrew.
97
 In another investigation on November 21, UN observers recorded the 
testimony of locals that UAR planes raided the Harah market, south of Jizan.  Bombs 
and machine guns targeted the market causing injuries and damage to property.  
Onlookers claimed that the UAR planes followed a UN over flight by 5 minutes and 
flew back over UN headquarters in Najran "at a low altitude as if challenging the 
observers."
98
 
These examples represent only a small number of the total complaints investigated 
by UN observers who served additional roles beyond observing the withdrawals of 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia.  UN archival material counters the image of a dysfunctional 
mission. UNYOM did in fact play a significant role in mediating the Saudi-Egyptian 
conflict, managed to incorporate all sides involved and provided adequately for its 
personnel. 
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Understanding UNYOM in Context 
 The discrepancies between the reality of the mission’s activities and living 
conditions and the description offered by critics of UNYOM are at the core of 
understanding U Thant and the role the mission played in the conflict.  Debate in the 
Security Council during the 1960s focused to a great extent on the cost-benefit analysis 
of Hammarskjöld-style peacekeeping and the transition to more cost effective and 
focused UN missions into combat zones. 
The stark differences between von Horn’s description of the starvation-like 
conditions of the UN outposts versus the college dorm-like environment of drinking, 
movie and sports watching, and smoking away leisure time portrayed in the archives, 
was as Canadian pilot Doug Poole explained, a matter of psychological perspective.  
Poole claimed that Canadian airmen were spoiled as “they have always been 
accustomed to going about the business of war, well lodged, well-fed, well-clothed and 
clean shaven.  This mission would tax their mettle to the limit.  The environment and 
the hygiene conditions found in this inhospitable climate would not be their only 
problem.  It would be harder, and take them longer to cope with the mental 
challenges.” 100  The sign welcoming new recruits to the mission’s base in Sana’a, 
referred to the impressive three story structure as “The Twilight Zone,” despite the fact 
that the building was staffed with a personal chef, water purifier (albeit somewhat late 
in coming), electricity, and an acceptable latrine, amenities that the great majority of 
which the local population could only dream.
101
 
 The negative outlook of UN personnel was more likely the result of disgruntled 
reactions to abusive UN leadership and general despondency with the UN mission.  
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Although he declared himself an advocate of UN staff and resigned from his post in 
protest over their conditions, General Carl von Horn was noted to have been in a 
perpetual foul mood and was often verbally abusive to UN personnel.  During a pre-
flight inspection of his Caribou in Sana’a, Doug Poole noticed a fresh bullet hole that 
caused him some concern.  When von Horn arrived to ascertain as to the delay in 
takeoff, the following demonstrative episode occurred: 
“The Wing Commander took him around to the back of the Caribou and 
showed him the bullet hole.  The General had got out of the wrong side 
of the bed and wasn’t in a very good mood.  He seldom was.  He asked 
if the aircraft was alright to fly.  The Wing Commander assured him it 
was.  He told the General, the bullet had gone in on side of the aircraft 
and out the other, “without hitting anything important”…The General 
frowned and replied: “Then get in the God damned thing and fly it, what 
the hell do you think you’re being paid for?”102 
 
Beyond the confines of their headquarters, UN personnel reported being shocked by 
the disdain Egyptians harbored towards Yemenis.  The thought that the UN mission 
was aiding the Egyptian cause, even indirectly, cast a negative light on UNYOM in the 
eyes of its personnel and critics.  Doug Poole reported driving by two Egyptian guards 
on the way to the Sana’a airport and noticed them pointing to a decapitated Yemeni 
head mounted on a plank, laughing at a cigarette that they had placed dangling from the 
severed head’s mouth.103  Ian Umbach, who served as George Mayer’s commanding 
officer in Yemen noted “the appearance each morning of a freshly severed head over 
the main gate to the city,” a sign, according to Umbach, that Yemen was still in the 
Middle Ages.
104
  On a different occasion, a group of four Canadian pilots was shocked 
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by the abuse that Mustafa, a senior Egyptian administrator in Sana’a, inflicted upon his 
Yemeni barber.  Mustafa reprimanded him for being late, then slapped him and kicked 
him multiple times a demonstration of what Poole noted was an imposed hierarchy of 
Egyptians and Yemenis.
105
 
Many UN officials and personnel felt that the General Assembly and the US 
 stumbled into premature recognition of Sallal's republic,” and was now in political 
bind supporting the perceptibly weaker side of an internationalized civil war.
106
  
Although they may have felt uneasy about the organization’s political stance, U Thant’s 
political options towards the royalist campus was limited.  Following the US 
recognition of the YAR on December 16, 1962, the UN had been given the green-light 
to recognize the Yemeni republic as well.  On December 20, the General Assembly 
voted 74 to 4 with 23 abstentions to approve the Credential Committee’s 
recommendation to seat the YAR delegates as the official representatives of Yemen.  
Given the official UN decision recognizing the republicans, Thant and UNYOM could 
not openly incorporate royalist officials and opinions into the specifics of the mission 
without violating the General Assembly’s decision.  Lieutenant General P.S. Gyani 
needed to be reminded of this fact by Ralph Bunche when assuming the head position 
of UNYOM in September 1963: “Limit contact with royalists out of concern that the 
UN might be legitimizing other government than YAR.”107 
US Secretary of State Dean Rusk justified UNYOM for reasons that had to do with 
Saudi royal stability.  According to Rusk, the UN mission gave the Saudi regime the 
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time it needed to stabilize the monarchy in transition. Saud had served as King of Saudi 
Arabia since November of 1953 and was being pressured to give way to his brother 
Faisal.  Although the actual transition of power did not occur until 1964, the relative 
calm fostered by the presence of the UN mission in Yemen allowed Faisal to assume 
many of the royal responsibilities from his brother Saud without worrying about 
unrestrained Egyptian incursions into Saudi territory.
108
 
In a window into the thinking of Thant’s inner circle, Gyani noted that UAR military 
action has made the republic even more unpopular to the extent that the YAR cannot 
even collect taxes to pay full salary to its employees.  He suggested that the UN could 
serve as an advisory role to the YAR in the place of Egypt, seeing this as an alternative 
to the UNYOM mission in its present form.
109
 It is evident from Gyani’s suggestion of 
stationing a permanent UN financial consultant in Yemen that he understood the true 
purpose of UNYOM, simply having a presence in Yemen.   
Gyani was replaced in November 1963, after two months as interim head of the 
mission, by Spinelli, the first civilian UN official to lead a military mission.  U Thant’s 
logic in Spinelli’s appointment further explained his grand vision for UNYOM: “It was 
desirable that the mission of military observation with its limited mandate should be 
complemented by a United Nations political presence, which, by exploratory 
conversations with the parties concerned, might be able to play a more positive role in 
encouraging the implementation of the disengagement agreement and peace and 
security in the region.”110 In appointing a civilian, U Thant was also thinking beyond 
the UNYOM to perhaps maintaining a permanent UN aid mission in Yemen dedicated 
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to the establishment of health and education facilities.  Sallal and Baydani would later 
reject this offer, fearing that a UN presence would undermine Egyptian support of the 
republic.
111
 
 In the early months of the mission, Thant indicated to the Security Council that he 
had envisioned the mission as an "intermediary and endorser of good faith on behalf of 
the parties concerned."
112
  In hindsight, despite the increase in the number of Egyptian 
troops in Yemen, the withdrawal of UNYOM was followed by a series of direct 
diplomatic negotiations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia and royalist and republican 
camps as well.  Mediation efforts that included Bunche, Bunker, von Horn, Spinelli and 
other UN officials acted to reduce inter-Arab tensions and keep open the possibility of a 
diplomatic solution. 
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Chapter 6: Nasser’s Cage 
 The first two years of the Yemeni civil war (September 1962 - September 1964) 
were characterized by international attempts to encourage the withdrawal of Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia from the domestic Yemeni conflict.  Egyptian President Gamal Abdel 
Nasser appealed for diplomacy after each successful offensive, hoping that 
international pressure would help the United Arab Republic (UAR) and the Yemen 
Arab Republic (YAR) hold on to their territorial gains by establishing a ceasefire.  At 
each diplomatic juncture, royalist tribal supporters of the deposed Imam al-Badr came 
back down from their mountainous refuge and pushed the Egyptian frontline positions 
back to the general confines of the “strategic triangle” of Sana’a, Ta’iz, and Hodeidah.  
Rather than face negotiating from a position of relative weakness inflicted by the 
royalist counteroffensive, Nasser repeatedly renewed his offensive, reneging on 
international commitments for a ceasefire and troop withdrawal. 
 The economic costs of the continued occupation in Yemen and the political criticism 
of Egyptian General ‘Abd al-Hakim Amer for high casualties and military failure 
weighed down on Nasser’s regime.1  At the second Arab Summit in September 1964, 
Nasser and Saudi King Faisal once again declared their desire for mutual withdrawal.  
Rather than renew the Egyptian offensive when the royalists attacked in October 1964, 
Nasser chose to hold on to defensive positions and organize additional meetings that 
included representatives from both the republican and royalist camps.  The peace 
conferences, highlighted by the Saudi-Egyptian Jeddah Pact in August 1965 and the 
Yemeni National Conference in Haradh in November 1965, created expectations for 
reconciliation. 
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 By the end of 1965, however, Nasser’s policy in Yemen took a reverse course, 
renewing the Egyptian occupation in what was called the “long-breath strategy”.  UAR 
troops garrisoned the “strategic-triangle” and interconnecting road network, relying on 
an intensive aerial bombing campaign that would feature the indiscriminate use of 
chemical weapons to subdue royalist tribal supporters.  The reversal of the Egyptian 
withdrawal from Yemen has been described as a reaction to British colonial policy, 
Saudi-Iran relations, and renewed royalist attacks against Egyptian troops.  This chapter 
argues, instead, that both the US and the USSR encouraged Nasser to remain in Yemen 
in an effort to confine Egyptian military power.  Even amidst Cold War tensions, 
President Johnson and Secretary Brezhnev found themselves following similar policies 
towards Nasser in Yemen, in an effort to forestall a superpower nuclear conflict over an 
Egyptian-Israeli war. 
Haradh Conference and Political Turmoil in Yemen 
The Montaza Palace in Alexandria, Egypt served as the venue for the second Arab 
Summit in September 1964, a demonstration of Arab unity and reconciliation.  After 
reopening diplomatic relations in the months following the first Arab Summit in Cairo 
in January 1964, Nasser and Faisal declared their willingness to bring the Yemeni 
conflict to a resolution.
2
  According to a Soviet account of the September 1964 
Summit, although the topic of normalizing Saudi-YAR relations was discussed, Saudi 
Prince Faisal did not give a definitive answer.  There was, however, universal 
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agreement on the Arab anti-imperialist stance and the overt support for anti-British 
nationalist forces in Aden, Cyprus, and Oman.
3
   
The Arab Summit followed the success of the Egyptian Haradh Offensive and the 
capture of the royalist base of Qarah in August 1964.  Nasser was intent on establishing 
a ceasefire to secure the territorial gains north and east of the “strategic triangle”.  From 
October 30 through November 4, Nasser and Faisal met in the summer hilltop resort in 
Erkowit, Sudan to negotiate the mutual withdrawal of Egyptian and Saudi support from 
Yemen according to similar parameters of the original Ellsworth Bunker agreements of 
1963.  The royalists were represented by Ahmad Muhammad al-Shami and the 
republicans by Muhammad Mahmud al-Zubayri, one of the founders of the original 
Free Yemeni movement.  All parties agreed on a ceasefire to take effect on November 
6, 1964 with a Yemeni National Council planned for November 23.  There was an 
understanding among the attendees that both Sallal and al-Badr would be forced to step 
down during the course of forming the new Yemeni government. 
As had been the pattern in the previous two years, royalist forces that had previously 
retreated to the northern highlands came back down from the mountains to reclaim 
territory lost during the Egyptian Haradh Offensive.  The description of these battles in 
Western media was analogous to a heroic Maccabean effort of the few royalists against 
the many Egyptians. For example, during the battle with Egyptians on the northeastern 
mountain of Jabal Razih, royalist forces numbered only 1,600 tribesmen facing three 
times that number of Egyptian soldiers and armor.  The royalist assault was able to 
recruit 7,000 additional Hajuri mountaineer militiamen in five hours by “ordering the 
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Hajuri tribal war drum mobilization message to be circulated,” and capturing the last 
two northern Egyptian strongholds at the top of Jabal Razih on December 31, 1964.
4
 
This battle epitomized the futility of the Haradh Offensive, originally intended to 
capture or kill Imam al-Badr by any means necessary.  Although the summer of 1964 
had been Imam al-Badr’s “blackest days” during which he developed a nagging 
neurosis and a raging carbuncle, he emerged triumphantly in December 1964 to declare 
yet again that “Yemen will be Nasser’s graveyard.”5  
 Nasser’s setbacks were not limited to the battlefield, as segments of Yemeni 
republicans referred to as “moderates,” were growing increasingly frustrated with the 
ongoing civil war and the continued presence of Egyptian troops in Yemen.  Several 
leaders formed opposition parties to Sallal’s regime, constituting the movement that 
became known as the “third-force”.  Sayyid Ibrahim Ali al-Wazir, of the historic rival 
clan to the Hamid al-Din family for the position of Imam, was the first to form an 
opposition to Sallal in the form of the Union of Popular Forces, an ill-structured and 
short-lived political party.
6
   
Al-Zubayri, who had served as a minister on Sallal’s cabinet, subsequently formed 
the Party of Allah and left Sana’a to recruit tribal supporters in the northern and 
northeastern Yemeni highlands.  The stated goal of Zubayri’s party was to rid Yemen 
of the Egyptian military occupation and oust Sallal and his government.  Zubayri and 
his “third-force” supporters envisioned retaining the structure of a republic equally 
divided between royalist and republican supporters.  Although groups within the “third-
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force” suggested reviving the concept of a constitutional monarchy, most agreed that 
the Hamid al-Din family should not remain in power.
7
 Qadi ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Iryani, 
who would later serve as the head of state for the YAR from 1967-1974 and oversee the 
Yemeni reconciliation, was considered, along with Ahmad Muhammad Nu’man and 
Zubayri as one of the founding fathers of the concept of a Yemeni republic and a leader 
of the “third force”.  His formal title of “Qadi”, or religious judge, underscored his role 
as the bridge between the traditional imamate and the modern Yemeni state.
8
 
Several secret meetings between royalist and republican representatives took place 
between November 1964 and March 1965.  Egyptian authorities reportedly became 
alarmed at the content of these meeting and arranged the assassination of Zubayri on 
April 1, 1965
9, in the hopes that it would bring the “third-force” movement to a 
premature end.  Other accounts of Zubayri’s assassination blame Prince Hassan who 
may have been alarmed by Zubayri’s popularity amongst the royalist tribes.10 
Popular protest and Hashid and Bakil tribal federations’ threats of marching on 
Sana’a in the aftermath of Zubayri’s assassination pressured Sallal to appoint Nu’man 
as Prime Minister of the YAR, in the hopes that it would appease the opposition.  As 
prime minister, Nu’man wrested much of Sallal’s presidential power and organized a 
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National Peace Conference in Khamir, a hilltop village thirty miles north of Sana’a in 
May 1965.
11
 YAR Prime Minister Mohsin al-‘Ayni expressed a great deal of optimism 
for Nu’man’s government and the success of the national conference, as he believed an 
Egyptian withdrawal would follow.
12
 This belief was based upon a letter received from 
Nasser around the time of the Khamir conference.  In the text of the letter, Nasser 
makes it unequivocally clear that he intends to withdraw Egyptian forces as early as 
July 1965.  He blamed the burdens of continued support of the revolution and 
international criticism of Egypt as a colonial power in Yemen.
13
 
The conference featured more the five thousand tribal notables and produced the 
first modern constitution intended for the whole Yemeni state.  Yemen would become 
an Islamic Republic, with a strong assembly that could overrule the president, and 
would raise an eleven-thousand member People’s Army to replace the Egyptian forces 
upon which the current YAR was dependent.  Iryani, the chairman of the conference, 
planned to seek Saudi recognition and support, supplanting Egyptian forces, Sallal’s 
regime, and al-Badr’s source of financial and logistical support.  Rather than acquiesce 
to Nu’man’s political demands, Sallal rejected the power-sharing measures, a clear sign 
that he was reluctant to compromise with the “third-force”.  In protest of Sallal’s 
alleged violation of the Yemeni constitution, Nu’man resigned on July 1, 1965 and flew 
to Cairo with forty supporters, including Iryani, to protest.  In response, Nu’man and 
his group were barred from returning to Yemen, allowing Sallal sufficient time to form 
a new government, naming himself the interim prime minister and president. 
                                                          
11
 Manfred W. Wenner, “The Civil War in Yemen, 1962-70,” in Stopping the Killing, ed. Roy 
Licklider (New York : New York University Press, 1993), 105. 
12
 FRUS, 1964–1968 Vol XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Doc 369, April 30, 1965, 
Telegram From the Embassy in Yemen to the Department of State. 
13
 Mohsin A. Alaini, Fifty Years in Shifting Sands: Personal Experience in the Building of a 
Modern State in Yemen (Beirut, Lebanon: Dar An-Nahar, 2004), 104. 
218 
 
 
 
 Nasser’s assassination of Zubayri and confinement of Nu’man and the “third-force” 
leaders to Cairo was intended to remove the major political opposition to the Sallal 
regime.  This brash political move was not, however, accompanied by immediate plans 
for an Egyptian offensive to regain lost territory north and east of the “strategic 
triangle”.  The royalist offensive continued unabated from March through August 1965 
driving Egyptian away from Jawf and Mishriq and leaving them with only two 
surrounded outposts in Sa’dah and Hajjah.14 Rather than immediately reinforcing his 
troops in Yemen, Nasser began the gradual withdrawal of his army and traveled to 
Jeddah for yet another meeting with Faisal.  Before setting out to Saudi Arabia, Nasser 
gathered Nu’man and his supporters for a frank conversation about the future of the 
Egyptian presence in Yemen.  At the end of the meeting even Nu’man, who surely held 
some disdain for his forced exile in Cairo, sincerely believed that Nasser intended to 
bring the war in Yemen to a close and withdraw his troops.
15
 
 The Jeddah Pact, signed on August 23, 1965 between Nasser and Saudi King Faisal, 
seemed to be Nasser’s appeal for a respite from the war.16 The Egyptian military was 
hemorrhaging funds, munitions, and soldiers and had little tangible success to show.  
According to the agreement, Egyptian forces would withdraw by September 1966 and 
Faisal would deny Saudi territory and resources to royalist armies.  Plans were put in 
place for a second Yemeni tribal meeting in Haradh in November 1965, with a Yemeni 
plebiscite scheduled for November 1966.  Al-Badr reportedly ordered his troops to 
maintain an offensive ceasefire without ceding any of the gained territory, until after 
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the outcome of the second Haradh conference.  Sallal responded in kind by freeing 
political prisoners, although was soon forced to leave for medical care in Cairo after 
being shot by an “irate Yarimi tribesmen while staging a bogus ‘save the republic’ rally 
at Dhammar replete with imported ‘applause’ and slogan-shouters.”17 The atmosphere 
at the November 24, 1965 Haradh II Conference was optimistic as Nasser had visibly 
been withdrawing troops and the mutual ceasefire was being upheld by both sides.  
Spirits were not dampened when republican and royalist delegates could not agree on 
the future of the Yemeni Imamate after a month-long meeting, agreeing to reconvene 
after Ramadan on February 20, 1966.  However, the second rounds of talks did not 
occur.
18
  Within weeks of the Haradh II conference, Egyptian reinforcements were sent 
and Nasser offensive began once again in earnest. 
As the Egyptian army was rolled back from its positions north and east of the 
“strategic triangle” Nasser appeared to be withdrawing from Yemen with the intention 
of redeploying his troops in Sinai for a confrontation with Israel.
19
 He wanted to 
prepare for an attack on Israel, but also needed to uphold Egyptian during the 
withdrawal.  Several reasons have been suggested to account for the sudden reversal in 
policy in the end of 1965 and the failure of the Haradh II peace overtures.  Republican 
intransigence and refusal to compromise on the republican nature of the state has often 
been cited as the primary reason.
20
  The declared “ceasefire” itself was officially broken 
by royalist forces, partially as a response to the barring of Hamid al-Din families from 
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the Haradh I and II Conferences.  Nasser’s renewed offensive in 1966 was a response to 
the insulting nature of royalist attacks on a withdrawing army in order to improve their 
postwar position.
21
 The renewed offensive has also been attributed to Marshal ‘Abd al-
Hakim Amer, who purportedly sabotaged the Haradh conference to give his military 
solution to the conflict another chance.
22
 
Other accounts of the war have blamed the Saudi diplomatic overtures with the 
Iranian Shah in December 1965 and the attempts to form an Islamic alliance against 
Arab Nationalism even as King Faisal was negotiating a peace settlement with 
Nasser.
23
 In 1966 Saudi Arabia was the recipient of large and unprecedented military 
contracts from the US and Britain.
24
 The Anglo-American air defense program from 
1966-1967, worth $400 million offered the Saudis a package that included British 
Aircraft Corporation (BAC) Lightning planes, radars and communication equipment, 
150 American Hawk surface-to-air missiles (SAM), and British training and support 
service.  While the defense program was being installed, Faisal also purchased 37 
British Thunderbird I SAMs and fifteen former RAF planes to be flown and serviced 
temporarily by British pilots.  Although the defense system failed to prevent UAR 
aerial bombing of Saudi border territory, the large arms purchase presented a potential 
challenge to Nasser’s military supremacy in the region.25 
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 Saudi Arabia was not the only regional power to recognize Nasser’s weakened 
position, both in Yemen and in the Middle East in general.  Responding to a royalist 
visit to Tehran in 1963, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi sent the first group of Iranians 
to Jabal Ahmar in Yemen on April 30, 1965 to ostensibly observe the circumstances of 
the civil war.
26
 Royalist Prince Mohammed ibn al-Hussein made his own trip to Iran in 
October 1966 to ask the Shah for heavy weaponry, Iranian military trainers, and space 
for royalist training in Iran.  In addition, Prince Mohammed broached the possible use 
of Iranian airlifts and parachuting to resupply besieged royalist troops.  The Shah 
agreed to the requests and pledged to organize three parachute drops and the transport 
of heavier material by land through Saudi Arabian territory.  Royalist tribesmen were 
invited to Tehran to be trained in medical, combat, and sabotage, while Iranian trainers 
were sent to royalist camps in Yemen.
27
 Iranian aid for the royalists was concerning for 
both Nasser and the Saudis, who expressed their willingness to forsake al-Badr and his 
supporters for the sake of Arab unity.
28
  Neil McLean conducted his own trip to Tehran 
with a substantial request for military aid.  A portion of this shipment was received in 
October 1967, during a period where Iran was acting as the sole suppliers of royalist 
forces.
29
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The most repeated explanation for Nasser’s decision to maintain a large contingent 
of troops was the issuing of the British 1966 White Paper on Defence, declaring a 
withdrawal from Aden and the Federation of South Arabia (FSA) by 1968, the logic of 
which will be explained in the next chapter.  Nasser allegedly perceived the British 
decision as a way to salvage an otherwise disastrous military expedition by expanding 
his influence over South Arabia following the British withdrawal.
30
 This theory was 
supported by the reported redeployment of Egyptian forces to the southern border with 
the FSA.
31
 
There is no denying the fact that, as John Badeau described: “Most Arab countries 
seemed content to let President Nasser wrestle with his own difficulties in Yemen and 
watched King Feisal’s increasingly effective opposition to the UAR with quiet 
approbation.”32  Focusing solely on regional actors, however, neglects to consider the 
broader geostrategic interests of the US and the USSR as a major factor in convincing 
Nasser to remain in Yemen.  For the first years of the civil war, Soviets supported the 
Egyptian occupation of Yemen with air munitions, loans, and diplomatic capital for the 
defense of UAR actions in the UN.  In contrast, the official US position under President 
Kennedy advocated withdrawal, containment, and mediation even as Nasser’s 
continued military presence in Arabia was quietly sanctioned.  Rather than 
championing the Haradh conferences and the Jeddah Pact as the culmination of years of 
international diplomacy in the region, the new administrations of Johnson and 
Brezhnev renewed support for Nasser and even encouraged him to maintain a 
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continued presence in a country that acted as a drain on Egypt’s economy and as a cage 
of Nasser’s Arab Nationalist foreign policy.  Even at the height of the Cold War, the 
two superpowers realized the danger of unleashing Nasser’s unbridled military on the 
Sinai Peninsula and the politically charged conflict with Israel. 
Ibrahim al-Wazir, a prominent member of the Yemeni “third-force” was one of the 
few to understand the significance of this policy: “Both East and West are now kindling 
the resumption of the war in Yemen, paying no heed to who kills whom.  The 
Communists are supplying the Egyptians with weapons whereas some Western 
countries are supplying them with wheat and dollars.”33 Al-Wazir further charged 
Nasser with cowardliness by keeping his army in Yemen to avoid a confrontation with 
Israel.
34
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Soviet Relations with the YAR 
Nikita Khrushchev was removed from power in October 1964 and replaced by 
Leonid Brezhnev as first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 
and by Alexei Kosygin as premier.  Khrushchev had been accused by members of the 
Soviet Politburo of indiscriminate support for nationalist governments, such as the 
UAR.  There was considerable concern among Nasser’s administration that military 
and economic aid would be curtailed and that Brezhnev might demand loan repayment.  
During a speech on December 24, 1964 Alexander Shelepin, the former head of the 
KGB, laid these concerns to rest by making it clear that Soviet support for the UAR 
would continue unabated.
35
 
Following the August 1965 Jeddah Agreement with Saudi Arabia, Nasser flew to 
Moscow and obtained a massive military-aid package in which the Soviets offered to 
underwrite Nasser’s continued military presence in Yemen.  Two more shiploads of 
Soviet munitions including 50,000 machine guns and an additional 6,000 Egyptian 
troops arrived in Hodeidah while the Haradh II conference was still in session.  The 
UAR became the first country outside of Eastern Europe to receive MIG-21D jet 
fighters (twenty of them in total).  The USSR wrote off Egyptian debt of $400 million 
for military equipment and concluded a trade agreement that promised Egypt shipments 
of Soviet machines, minerals, oil, wheat, wood, etc.
36
 According to Muhammad Heikal, 
Nasser’s confidant and a prominent Egyptian journalist, the debt forgiveness was 
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granted after Nasser demonstrated to Leonid Brezhnev that the debt was directly related 
to Yemeni civil war arms purchases.
37
 
The Soviets may have been relieved to have Nasser occupied in Yemen as a similar 
stance of aggression against Israel would have involved the USSR in another high-
stakes confrontation with the US.
38
 In a different sense, by 1965, Egypt was no longer 
as asset to Moscow, but rather had become a burden.  Nasser had outlived his 
usefulness after helping the USSR establish a foothold in South Arabia and Africa and 
was deemed expendable.
39
  Moscow could not turn its back entirely on its 
unpredictable Egyptian ally out of concern that Nasser would foster a closer 
relationship with Prime Minister Zhou El-Lai, whom he met in late 1963.
40
  With one 
hand Moscow was pushing Nasser back into Yemen and with the other it was 
developing a closer relationship with Yemenis through direct military and economic 
aid, preparing for the post-Nasser Yemen republic. 
The Soviet foreign office envisioned Yemen as a base and a staging post for further 
Soviet expansion into the Arabian Peninsula and post-colonial Africa at the expense of 
Western interests.
41
 The completion of the Hodeidah port by 1961 and the construction 
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of a modern airport near Sana’a in 1963 were an essential component.42  On March 21, 
1964, a Treaty of Friendship between the USSR and YAR was signed in Moscow as a 
reaffirmation of the original treaties signed in 1928 and 1955.
43
  The direct relationship 
with the Yemeni republic obviated the reliance on an Egyptian intermediary.   
The Soviet naval base in Hodeidah was in line with the doctrine of Sergei Gorshkov, 
the Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union since 1956.  Gorshkov’s The Sea Power of 
the State, had a profound influence on Soviet naval strategy in a similar manner that 
Alfred Mahan’s The Influence of Sea power Upon History had on US naval doctrine in 
the early 20
th
 Century.
44
  Like Mahan, Gorshkov argued that the future of the land 
empire of the USSR was at sea.  Only with a powerful navy could the USSR protect the 
revolution and support liberation movements across the globe.  Naval staff stationed at 
these ports would function as cultural ambassadors, organizing sports and other 
activities for the local population.
45
 He emphasized the peacetime military-political role 
of the Soviet navy in “protecting state interests”, specifically Soviet state economic, 
political and military interests in the Third World.
46
  The Hodeidah port and the Soviet 
presence in South Arabia was part of Gorshkov’s vision of a strong naval presence in 
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the Red Sea region and near the Horn of Africa.  This Indian Ocean region was 
envisioned as the “epicenter of the national liberation movement.”47 
Soviet diplomat Oleg Peresypkin explained that because Soviet ships were going 
from Odessa to the Far East via the Indian Ocean, “we need to have friendly relations 
with the littoral states.  We had, and do have, some economic interests there.  We had, 
or have, trade offices in Hodeida, Jidda, Massawa, Djibouti and Port Sudan – some of 
them were set up as early as the 1920s.”48 As Soviet Admiral, Gorshkov personally 
oversaw the expansion of Soviet naval influence in the region and joint Egyptian-
Soviet strategic interests in the Mediterranean and Red Seas.
49
  The Mediterranean and 
Indian Oceans also became scenes of Cold War tensions as the US deployed nuclear 
submarines there in 1962, the Polaris and the Poseidon, with the capability to target 
Soviet cities.
50
 
Until his presumed death during the coup on September 26, 1962, Moscow was 
cultivating a close relationship with al-Badr the successor to the Imamate, with the 
intention of securing their financial investment in Hodeidah.  The coup and the 
subsequent Egyptian intervention complicated Moscow’s long-term strategy for the 
Red Sea region.  Rather than serve as a facility solely for the Soviet navy, the Hodeidah 
port was backlogged with Egyptian shipping and military transport.  The airport in 
Sana’a was also being used as a base for Egyptian aerial operations in Yemen.  The 
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continued Egyptian presence secured Soviet access, albeit somewhat limited, to both 
Hodeidah and the Sana’a airport in the short-term, but the instability of Sallal’s regime 
created a level of uncertainty in Moscow about the long-term strategy and access to 
Yemeni facilities.  After succumbing to successive political and military crises, the 
Soviet foreign office began to explore other more reliable Soviet allies in the YAR 
administration to replace Sallal. 
It was not long before Soviet officials began to question the continued support for 
the forty-eight year old Sallal.  Sallal had taken part in the failed 1948 revolt and was 
part of the Yemeni Free Officer group since that time.  He was considered a 
revolutionary hero by some Yemenis, a title that was reinforced by his continued 
rhetoric against British imperialism and the deposed Imam.  In the months following 
the revolution, however, Sallal’s popularity was subdued in response to the increasing 
amount of corruption among Yemeni officials, tense tribal relations, and the continued 
presence of Egyptian troops in Yemen.  Russian historian Alexei Vassiliev observed 
that “[Sallal’s] dependence on Egypt was absolute.  He visited Cairo so frequently that 
he became a figure of fun.  In some areas of Yemen Egyptian officers acted as virtual 
governors; Egyptian advisers often engaged in black marketeering, snatching away a 
portion of foreign trade from local merchants.  Moreover, the Egyptians’ 
condescending attitude even riled a good number of republicans.”51 Sallal’s reliance on 
Nasser weakened vicariously weakened the Soviet position in Yemen as their approach 
to the YAR was contingent upon a middleman relationship with Egypt, an 
unpredictable regional ally.   
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In an official assessment of the economic and political situation in Yemen, the 
Soviets observed that Sallal relied mainly on his disorganized army and the aid of the 
UAR, with little or no domestic popular support.   Rather than address those inequities, 
Sallal retained plans for a Yemeni army of 28,000 to create a presidential security state, 
as unlikely as it may have seemed.  Furthermore, his government did not manage to 
exercise a single economic reform, yet repeatedly made statements restricting large 
estates, the construction industry, improvement of living standards for the population, 
and other ambitious projects.  The Yemeni government’s only salvation came from 
foreign financial and economic assistance, primarily from the USSR and UAR.  The 
Soviets concluded that without help from the UAR, “it will be difficult for Sallal’s 
government to strengthen its position and its republican regime in the country.”52 This 
bleak assessment continued even after ‘Abd al-Hakim Amer’s positive report on the 
progress of the Yemeni national economy and tribal control several months later.
53
  
Even Nasser himself, in a conversation with John Badeau admitted the futility of the 
YAR government: “You would not believe what goes on in Sana’a.  Half of the 
Ministers never go to their offices and the other half don’t know what to do when they 
get there.”54 
On March 31, 1964, Nikita Khrushchev and Vasiliy Kuznetsov, the First Deputy 
Foreign Minister, met with Sallal and YAR Foreign Minister Hassan Makki during a 
planned visit to Moscow.  Khrushchev and Sallal exchanged letters of formality 
thanking each other for their respective invitations, travel, and hospitality and 
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reiterating the friendly intentions of this meeting.  Kuznetsov considered this visit as a 
positive sign of Soviet-Yemeni friendship, despite serious misgivings as to the 
sustainability of the Sallal regime.
55
 The emergence of the “third-force” several months 
later forced Sallal to make further compromises to the opposition leaders and granted 
them a political council to form the “The Progressive Yemeni Republic”.  Sallal was 
only able to maintain his political position and control over the army by using coercive 
military force against his own population.
56
  His precarious political situation left the 
USSR with little choice but to consider alternatives to Sallal’s leadership, for fear that 
continued access to strategic assets in Yemen would be endangered. 
In anticipation of the collapse of Sallal’s regime, the Soviets made careful 
calculations into alternative Yemeni leaders.  Soviet intelligence reports targeted five 
members of the YAR government, highlighting in particular their respective stances 
towards the USSR.   The Soviets planned to install a puppet leader so that the YAR 
could be corralled into the Soviet sphere in the aftermath of an eventual Egyptian 
withdrawal.  Until that point the “Soviet-five” could also be counted upon for 
continued Soviet intelligence and support within Sallal’s regime itself. 
Among the “Soviet-five” were two future leaders of the YAR, Abdel Rahman al-
Iryani and Hassan Muhammad Makki.  Al-Iryani, the YAR Minister of Justice and a 
prominent member of the “third-force”, assumed control of the YAR presidency in 
1967 following the ousting of Abdullah Sallal, while Sallal was visiting Moscow.  
Iryani, a judge prior to the coup, had spent fifteen years in prison after being implicated 
in the 1948 coup against Imam Yahya, and was an ardent opponent of the Egyptian 
occupation and interference in internal Yemeni affairs.  In February 1964, he was 
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appointed a member of the Politburo in recognition of his positive attitude towards the 
Soviet Union.
57
  
Hassan Muhammad Makki, the YAR Economic and later Foreign Minister, was in 
contact with Soviet embassy employees in Ta’iz both before and after the coup and had 
been instrumental in strengthening the Soviet-Yemeni relationship.  He was estimated 
to have a warm opinion of the political relationship with the USSR and was initially the 
Soviet Foreign Ministry’s top candidate to replace Sallal.58  Makki was ultimately 
appointed YAR Prime Minister in 1974. 
In addition to Makki and Iryani, Soviet officials continued to cultivate a relationship 
with the three other members of the “Soviet-five”, who were all central figures in the 
Yemeni republic.   Hussein al-Dafa’i, who served as YAR Minister of War, Minister of 
the Interior, and ambassador to the Soviet Union was one of Sallal’s closest and 
greatest confidants in addition to being a pro-Egyptian Arab Nationalist.  During his 
tenure as ambassador to the USSR from 1965-1966, Dafa’i developed a friendly 
relationship with the USSR and openly valued the Soviet military help for the YAR and 
the work of the Soviet military specialists in Yemen. He often spoke of developing a 
closer relationship and alliance with the Soviet Union.
59
 Sallal was alarmed by Dafa’i’s 
relationship with the Soviets and had him arrested under suspicions that Dafa’i was 
subverting Sallal’s regime.  Dafa’i would later be appointed Yemeni Minister of State 
in 1977.   
Abdullah Dobbi, the former Minister of War and a YAR military commander, had 
earned a military degree in Baghdad along with Sallal and others of the Yemeni Free 
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Officers group and was one of the most active and influential revolutionaries.  Dobbi 
had a relatively long history with the Soviet Union dating back to Imam al-Badr’s 1958 
Moscow trip and served as national security director in Hodeidah during the period of 
the Soviet port construction.  In February 1963 he was named the personal presidential 
consular to the Soviet Premier, cultivating a friendly relationship with Soviet officials 
throughout the civil war.
60
 As Sallal’s aid for the arrest of targeted political opponents, 
Dobbi developed his own personal network of security personnel stationed around the 
country.
61
 
Saleh Ali al-Ashwal, the longtime YAR Ambassador to the USSR, was one of the 
first YAR officials to visit Moscow in November 1962, by invitation of the Soviet 
Minister of Defense.  He personally handed Khrushchev a message from YAR 
President Sallal in recognition of the 45
th
 anniversary of the Great October Socialist 
Revolution.  During the time of their stay in the USSR together with the delegation, he 
was taken on tours of Kiev and Leningrad, developing a close relationship with Soviet 
officials.  At the 1962 meeting and throughout his tenure as ambassador, he was 
reported to have divulged confidential and valuable information about the internal 
political situation in Yemen.
62
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Yemeni “Hearts and Minds” 
While the Soviet Foreign Office was planning for a post-Sallal Yemen, they were 
also overseeing a shift to a direct diplomatic and aid relationship with the YAR, rather 
than relying on an Egyptian intermediary.
63
 While the US was cutting aid to Egypt and 
improving the American relationship with Saudi Arabia through official visits and the 
presence of an air squadron for protection, the Soviets were cultivating a very different 
relationship with the Yemeni people.  Rather than focus solely on military and strategic 
aid, the Soviets invested resources in education, infrastructure, and entertainment in an 
attempt to win the “hearts and minds” of local Yemenis.   
In October 1964, for example, the first group of Soviet tourists arrived in Yemen 
and included teachers of the Middle East, journalists, artists, and religious Muslims.  
During their guided tour they became acquainted with the lives and the way of life in 
the country, along with Yemen’s history and culture.64 The next month, a Soviet group 
of artists gave their first concert in Sana’a.  The concert was a great success with an 
audience of 2,000 that filled the hall to its entrance.  The attendants included YAR Vice 
President Hassan al-‘Amri and other important ministers.65  This effort to win Yemeni 
“hearts and minds” was deemed a success, at least according to one barometer.  The 
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Yemenis observed that the Soviets called themselves tovarishch, or comrade.  In turn, 
the Soviets working in Yemen noticed that the Yemenis began to call themselves 
“sadik”, a rough Arabic equivalent of comrade, or friend.  This was taken as a sign of 
positive Soviet influence on the Yemeni public and the foundation of closer Soviet-
Yemeni relations.
66
 
The port city of Hodeidah, long envisioned as the base for Soviet operations in the 
Red Sea and the Middle East in general, continued to undergo major infrastructure and 
civil projects that went well beyond the confines of the port facilities.  The majority of 
these efforts were focused on the area of the city known as “New Hodeidah”, a newly 
constructed urban area built over parts of the original city of Hodeidah destroyed by 
fire in 1961.  Soviets specialists, sent to the YAR for two month rotations, included 
architects, quantity surveyor engineers, geological engineers, construction engineers, 
and doctors.
67
 The main projects included hospitals, schools, roads, telephone lines, and 
an electrical grid were built within and between the cities of Sana’a, Hodeidah, and 
Ta’iz.  These projects were seen as a rival to the American $500,000 investment into 
the reconstruction of the Ta’iz water supply system, which was called “The Kennedy 
American Water System”.68 
The stated goal of the Soviet education program in Yemen was “that the Yemenis 
should leave the darkness of the Middle Ages and take the road towards progress and 
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civilization.”69  Prior to the revolution in 1962, there were only nineteen elementary 
schools and a reported illiteracy rate of 98%.  By October 1964, more than 900 
elementary schools (Grades 1-6) and four secondary schools (Grades 7-9) were open 
for enrollment.   The subjects taught included Arabic language and literature, religious 
education, history and society, math, drawing, painting, sciences (physics, biology, 
chemistry, and nature), labor education, and music.  There were over thirty hours of 
school per week, starting in first grade during a school year extended from October 1 
through the end of July.  In Hodeidah specifically, the schools dedicated six hours a 
week to Russian language beginning in third grade in a plan of study approved by YAR 
Ministry of Education.
70
 As a testament to the popularity of the Russian language 
classes, the program advisor placed an urgent request to the Soviet Ministry of 
Education for an airmail of an additional sixty copies of Arab-Russian textbooks for the 
upcoming school year as many more students had enrolled than initially expected.
71
  In 
addition to investing in local education, 5,500 Yemeni students were given scholarships 
to study in the USSR in December 1965.
72
 
The Soviet Foreign Office understood that increasing the military aid and debt 
ceiling for Nasser would encourage him to maintain a military presence in Yemen, 
thereby securing Soviet access to Yemeni port and air facilities and redirecting 
Egyptian foreign policy away from a high-stakes confrontation with Israel.  Relying on 
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Nasser’s independently-minded machinations was not a sustainable long-term solution 
for the broader Soviet aim of securing a stable naval and airbase in South Arabia.  In 
other words, both the USSR and Nasser hoped to take advantage of the collapse of 
British sea power in the region through plans that inherently opposed one another. Over 
the course of the civil war, the USSR invested economic, military, educational, and 
technical resources into the “Soviet-five” and domestic infrastructure as part of a Soviet 
effort to win the “hearts and minds” of the Yemeni people themselves, irrespective of 
state leaders and foreign interventionists. 
The Soviets contributed politically and economically to the Egyptian mission in 
North Yemen, but preferred small-scale relations with the Yemeni people.  The paradox 
is that the Egyptians received the brunt of Yemeni hostility as a reaction to their 
military occupation and forced model of a socialist state, while Moscow was spared 
from similar criticism, leaving Soviets in a position to benefit from the new Yemeni 
state once the Egyptians withdrew.
73
 The irony of Soviet imperialism and simultaneous 
anti-colonialist rhetoric and the Sino-Soviet competition over dominance of the Third 
World did not go unnoticed.
74
 It was not, however, until June 1967, when this irony 
developed into popular protests and riots in front of the Soviet consulate in Hodeidah.
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No Wheat for You 
Congressional disapproval of the US aid program to Egypt grew exponentially as 
Egyptian rearmament continued even during the UN observer mission.  Alaskan 
Senator Ernest Gruening led the Senate opposition to Kennedy’s third world military 
and economic aid policy which had already racked up a bill of upwards of $1.8 billion 
by the end of 1963.  David Bell, Kennedy’s former budget director and new 
administrator of US Agency for International Development (USAID) received the brunt 
of congressional disapproval, primarily from Democratic liberals such as Frank Church, 
who had defected from Kennedy’s leadership in the party.  Church noted that by 1963, 
all but eight noncommunist countries were receiving some form of US foreign aid, 
demonstrating that the US tried to “do too much for too many indiscriminately”.  
Senator Halpern of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee claimed that the PL-480 
shipments to Egypt were causing “Yemen mass murders subsidized by our economic 
assistance”.76  When the Senate passed the Gruening amendment in October 1963, one 
month before Kennedy’s assassination  it was clearly seen as a criticism of his policy 
with Nasser.  The amendment terminated all forms of US aid to any nation “engaging 
in or preparing for aggressive military efforts” against the US or its allies.77  This 
included Kennedy’s economic aid to the UAR through the PL-480 wheat sales.  
Although the Gruening amendment was only the first step in a series of political 
maneuvers to increase Congressional control over foreign aid, it significantly hampered 
Kennedy’s ability to repair his coveted relationship with Nasser.78 
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A combination of Nasser’s intransigence and US Congressional dissent forced 
Kennedy to reconsider his relationship with Nasser and Arab Nationalism and 
compelled Egypt to look eastward in order to secure economic and military aid from 
the Soviet Union.
79
  In 1962, Kennedy had been under the assumption that Nasser was 
the predominant ideological force in the Middle East.  By 1963, however two Ba’thist 
coups in Iraq and Syria presented a challenge to Nasser’s monopoly of the Arab 
revolution and weakened Nasser’s position in the eyes of the Kennedy administration.80   
When Lyndon B. Johnson took office on November 22, 1963, he retained few of 
Kennedy’s affinities for Nasser and did not hesitate to portray the Yemeni Civil War as 
it was: a cage for Nasser and Arab Nationalism.  As he wrote to King Faisal less than a 
month after taking office: 
“On its present course, the UAR is gaining little, losing much in Yemen. 
UAR problems are many. Yemen's drain on UAR resources is great. 
UAR is not winning popular support among the people. Yemen can well 
prove to be a trap for those who would seek to dominate it.”81 
 
Two foreign policy crises in Egypt further soured Johnson’s opinion of Nasser.  On 
Thanksgiving Day in 1964, Congolese protestors in Cairo stormed the newly dedicated 
JFK Library in Cairo in protest of US policies in Congo, burning the building to the 
ground.  Egyptian police who knew of the riots in advance did not inform the US 
Embassy.   Weeks later, on December 18, 1964, oil man John Mecom’s plane was shot 
down near Egyptian airspace.  Although Egyptian officials claimed it was an accident, 
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Mecom was a friend of LBJ and one of his biggest financial supporters, further 
tarnishing Nasser’s image in Johnson’s eyes.  US Ambassador to Egypt Lucius Battle 
warned Nasser that he would not receive aid from Johnson, “because first you burn his 
libraries, then you kill his friends.”82   The efforts of Bushrod Howard, an American 
lobbyist for the royalist cause continuously criticized the economic aid to Nasser, 
further pressuring the Johnson administration to reconsider any form of economic aid 
to Egypt.
83
 Johnson was not amused by Nasser’s lack of gratitude for US economic aid, 
which culminated with a particularly anti-American Port Sa’id speech in December 
1964: “The American Ambassador says our behavior is not acceptable.  Well, let us tell 
them that those who do not accept our behavior can go and drink from the sea.  If the 
Mediterranean is not enough to slake their thirsts, [the Americans] can carry on with 
the Red Sea.”84  Nasser’s appeal to the Egyptian people to throw US aid into the Red 
Sea was countered with further Congressional limitations on aid to Egypt.
85
  
Robert Komer, the administration’s Yemen civil war guru, feeling unrestrained by 
Kennedy’s courting of Nasser, explained to McGeorge Bundy that Yemen had become 
a perpetual military disaster for the Egyptian army.  As long as the US did not force 
Egyptian disengagement and continued to dangle PL-480 wheat sales to the “bellies of 
the fellahin”, it was safe to assume that Nasser would not threaten US and UK bases in 
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Aden and Libya and would not succumb to complete Soviet domination.
86
  Komer 
explained to LBJ: “At this point it may serve our interests better if Nasser has to keep a 
third of his army tied up there, since this will enforce restraint vis-à-vis Israel.”87  The 
US was “just as happy to have 50,000 UAR troops in Yemen rather than deployed 
against Israel”.  All that remained to be done was to periodically reassure Faisal’s 
security in order to protect the billion dollar oil investment and encourage Faisal to 
purchase US aircraft over the British and French options.
88
 Parker Hart admitted to 
British counterparts the US mistake in recognizing the YAR  but “compared Nasser’s 
position in the Yemen to that of a fly stuck on fly paper for Nasser was caught in the 
Yemen and could not escape from it and would slowly die there like the fly on the 
flypaper.”89 
The realization in 1965 that Nasser might actually be pulling his troops out of 
Yemen led Johnson and others in the State Department to argue that it was in the US 
national interest to send economic aid to Egypt, if only to keep Nasser in Yemen.  On 
June 22, 1965 Washington resumed wheat sales to Egypt and allowed non-
governmental organizations and charities to gift an additional $11.6 million worth of 
agricultural equipment.  Johnson was able to circumvent the limitations of the Gruening 
amendment by issuing a direct presidential order for the resumption of aid.  On January 
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3, 1966 the US sold Egypt an additional $55.7 million of agricultural surplus in an 
effort to alleviate the economic strain of sustaining an army of significant size in 
Yemen.
90
 
In Saudi King Faisal’s June 15, 1964 letter to LBJ he expressed “supposed alarm 
and revulsions” at Soviet intentions and Nasser’s violation of Saudi airspace.91 Later 
that year, Faisal continued to drop buzz-words about global communism and expressed 
concern about “the dangers of anarchy and Communist activity in Yemen.”  He said 
that “today, virtually every facet of international communism, including the Russians, 
Chinese, Poles, and Czechs, are at work in Yemen.”92 Faisal’s Soviet alarmism was 
nothing more than a game to gain the goodwill and support of Johnson.  Johnson 
visibly appreciated Faisal’s anti-communist rhetoric and continued to perceive Saudi 
Arabia as the cornerstone of American policy and oil interests in the Middle East.  This 
perception was evident in the great deal of preparation and care invested in King 
Faisal’s Washington visit in June 1966.93 
Despite calling him a communist and urging Nasser’s immediate departure from 
Yemen, Faisal secretly rejoiced at the sight of Nasser expending huge sums of money 
on a futile war.  A combination of covert British operations, Saudi support for royalists, 
and the popularity of Zubayri’s Party of God made it increasingly clear that by 1965 
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Nasser was simply trapped in Yemen and was unable to establish a republican regime 
loyal to the UAR.
94
 
In a June 1966 meeting with Faisal, Secretary of State Dean Rusk clarified the 
relatively lax attitude towards Nasser’s troop presence in Yemen.  The return of over 
40,000 troops to Egypt would threaten the stability of the entire region: 
“With more troops in Egypt, the possibility existed for the U.A.R. to 
move toward the east, which would result in a full scale war; to the west, 
where we had our important base in Libya; or to the south, which would 
create a large problem with the Sudan and would not be welcome by the 
Africans.”95 
 
According to CIA intelligence estimates in May 1966, Nasser was not prepared to 
suffer a humiliating withdrawal from Yemen and was forced to accept the realities of 
the intractable stalemate.  His failed five year economic plan combined with the strain 
of financing a large army abroad led to a plethora of economic problems in Egypt.  
Domestic economic woes and self-inflicted foreign affairs blunders encouraged popular 
opposition to the cost and casualties of the war in Yemen.
96
  In essence, there was no 
longer a need for an expedited Egyptian withdrawal from Yemen, as the continued 
occupation was destroying Nasser’s regime from within. 
In a speech to Palestinian (PLO) delegates in 1965, Nasser explained the logic of his 
inaction against Israel: “Is it conceivable that I should attack Israel while there are 
50,000 Egyptian troops in Yemen?” After the 1956 Sinai War, the UN negotiated a 
ceasefire and positioned a peacekeeping force in Sinai.  According to Michael Oren, the 
absence of a realistic military option against Israel while the Egyptian army was 
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bogged down in Yemen ameliorated Nasser’s stance against the presence of UN 
peacekeeping troops on Egyptian territory.
 97
  Although only a temporary respite from 
Egyptian and Israeli hostilities, Nasser’s commitment in Yemen carried with it an 
inherent inability to pursue military expeditions elsewhere.  In fact, the Egyptian efforts 
in Yemen became “so futile and fierce that the imminent Vietnam War could have 
easily been dubbed America’s Yemen”, just as Yemen was “Nasser’s Vietnam”.98  
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Long-Breath Strategy and Chemical Warfare 
 The Egyptian “long-breath strategy”, a defense of the “strategic-triangle” and road 
network, was sustained by an increased presence of the air force.  Rather than march 
long columns of armored cars north and east of the Sana’a region, frequent aerial 
bombardments acted to hinder royalist troop and supply movement and demoralize the 
local Yemeni population.  In addition to un-guided, precision, incendiary and delayed 
explosion bombs, the Egyptian air force began to employ poison gas bombs in large 
numbers from 1966-67.  The use of chemical weapons was part of the Egyptian effort 
to depopulate the countryside through a “scorched-earth policy designed to eliminate 
support for the royalist guerillas.
99
 
100
Fig. 6.1 
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 The first reported poison gas bombing occurred in the Yemeni village of al-
Kawma’ah July 6-8, 1963, with victims complaining of “choking feeling, burning in 
the stomach, spitting up black blood, partial blindness, black burns on the body, and 
skin fell off leaving scars.  The milk of mothers and cows also dried up.  Lingering 
severe cough for many others.”101   
The gas bombs in 1963 were deemed amateurish and test models made in a 
rudimentary Egyptian military facilities.  The Egyptian chemical weapons program 
began shortly after the 1956 Suez War out of a sense of strategic inferiority and 
vulnerability.  In 1962, the first such facility was established in Abu Za’abal, an area 
near Cairo.  The plant, operated by the Egyptian Ministry of Defense concealed the 
presence of chemical weapons by manufacturing pesticides for commercial use 
alongside mustard and phosgene asphyxiants.  Egyptian technicians were trained at the 
Red Army’s Academy of Chemical Defense in Moscow and were supported by the 
continued presence of Soviet specialists.  The chemical weapons inventory was 
procured from three main sources.  In 1964, reports were issued by British intelligence 
indicating that the Soviets were shipping mustard gas-filled KHAB-200 R5 aerial 
bombs, phosgene-filled AOKh-25 aerial bombs.  Other mustard-filled artillery shells 
were found abandoned by WWI British forces in Egypt’s Western Desert.  Lastly, 
when the laboratory began operation, the Egyptians were soon able to produce their 
own gas bombs by converting disposable aerial fuel tanks.
102
  
From December 1966 through January 1967, the UAR bombed the northern Yemeni 
villages of Halbal and Kitaf with loads of fifteen gas bombs on each occasion.  
Although casualty figures were difficult to confirm, most accounts estimate that 
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hundreds of civilians and royalist combatants were killed in each raid.  According to 
Muhammad ‘abd al-Koddos al-Wazir, the royalist minister of state in 1967, 250 Kitaf 
villagers were killed by “asphyxiation”.103  The International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) conducted a full report of gas bomb attacks from 1966, indicating that 
Yemeni victims died 10 to 50 minutes after the initial attack with blood emerging from 
nose and mouth, but without any mark on their skin.  The survivors continued to have 
difficulty breathing, developed chronic coughs, or went blind. Autopsy reports 
confirmed death by hemorrhagic pulmonary edema, likely caused by breathing poison 
gas as there was no evidence of external trauma to the victims.  Following a gas attack 
in northern Yemen on May 10, 1967, ICRC Drs. Raymond Janin and  Willy Brutschin 
described the victims symptoms as: “shortness of breath, coughing, pink foam at the 
mouth, general edema, especially the face; no physical injuries.” An analysis of the 
mucous in the victims’ respiratory track and lungs indicated that the possible gasses in 
these toxins included phosgene, mustard gas, lewisite, chloride or cyanogen bromide, 
or Clark I and II.  British agents on the ground in Yemen added sarin gas to the ICRC 
list and accused the Soviets of supplying the Egyptian air force with chemical weapons 
in order to use Yemen as testing ground for their effectiveness.
104
  
According to British intelligence report, the gas weapons were Soviet ZAB 
incendiary bombs modified by Egyptian scientists with chemical agents.
105
 Other 
reports suggested that  chemical weapons may have originated in China.
106
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As the war progressed in 1967, the number of chemical attacks increased.  In May 
1967, a total of thirteen separate attacks were documented with a large number of 
casualties.  For example, in a gas attack on the northern village of Wadi Hirran, 75 
people were killed immediately with hundreds of others falling stricken with poison gas 
related symptoms.
107
 As Ibrahim Ali Al-Wazir observed in a conversation with British 
officials, “what is going on in Yemen is by far worse and more horrible than what is 
going on in Vietnam.”108 
Saudi complaints to the UN regarding the use of chemical weapons in Yemen were 
ignored by U Thant who insisted that the Security Council deal with the matter. This 
was an unlikely scenario considering that neither the USSR nor the US was interested 
in pursuing a formal investigation.  A formal US critique of the chemical bombing was 
made through the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency rather than the State 
Department, further evidence of Washington’s attempt to limit public criticism of 
Egyptian chemical warfare.
109
  The absence of American criticism was also the topic of 
a letter from US Representative from New York Lester L. Wolff to Arthur J. Goldberg, 
the US representative to the UN.
110
 
Historical accounts of the Yemeni civil war to date have maintained an element of 
uncertainty regarding the Egyptian use of chemical weapons.
111
  Egyptian officials had 
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insisted that the bombs were not poison gas but some form of incendiary bomb, such as 
napalm or phosphorous, and that the gas emanating from the bomb could be attributed 
to faulty ignition.
112
  Even during the 1960s, there was fair certainty among American 
decision makers that Egypt was deploying chemical weapons in Yemen.  For example, 
US Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Helms, confirmed with McGeorge Bundy on 
July 12, 1963 that the UAR had used in Yemen explosives containing a chemical 
warfare agent. According to additional CIA reports, the UAR had been using a toxic 
chemical bomb against the Yemeni royalist forces since as early as May 1963.
113
 
Between 1963 and 1967, the US Department of Defense had repeatedly confirmed with 
confidence the Egyptian use of chemical agents, including nerve gas, in Yemen.  
Undersecretary of Political Affairs Eugene Rostow added further alarm, indicating that 
the varieties of poison gas used by the Egyptians were “extremely lethal” and of 
“Soviet origin and manufacture”. However, the US consciously muted international 
criticism of Nasser’s chemical warfare in an effort to forestall a confrontation over the 
issue.
114
  
In preparation for a confrontation with Egypt in Sinai, and the possibility of 
chemical warfare, the Israelis asked for a relatively small number of 20,000 US army 
M-17 gas masks. The US shipment, however, was made contingent on the secrecy of 
the transaction.
115
 The conditions of this request were indicative of the broader 
American effort to avoid further military and diplomatic commitments to Yemen. 
                                                          
112
 Terrill, “The Chemical Warfare Legacy of the Yemen War,” 111. 
113
 JFK Library, NSF, Countries Series, United Arab Republic, 6/63–8/63. 
114
 NARA, RG 59, Middle East Crisis Files, E. 5190, Box 19, NE Situation, May–June 1967, 
Folder 1. 
115
 FRUS, 1964-1968, vol. XIX, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War 1967, doc. 37, May 22, 1967, 
Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security 
Affairs (Hoopes) to Secretary of Defense McNamara. 
249 
 
 
 
Additionally, in 1966 and 1967, the US was increasing its own use of defoliants and 
bombing in Vietnam and any challenge of Egyptian aerial policy would have invited 
criticism of ongoing US bombing campaigns. 
This continued American effort to keep Nasser caged up in Yemen by indirectly 
supporting the war effort and muting criticism of the use of chemical weapons 
continued until after the 1967 War with Israel.  On July 23, 1967, US Ambassador to 
Saudi Arabia Hermann Eilts took a figurative sigh of relief following Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk’s indication that there was no longer a need to maintain Nasser perpetual 
military stalemate in Yemen: “We might now be somewhat less emphatic and repetitive 
in recording our well-known reservations regarding increased Saudi support for 
Royalists,” as the chances of the conflict crossing into Saudi Arabia or Israel were now 
miniscule.
116
 Eilts was particularly relieved that he no longer had to obscure the facts of 
Egyptian gas attacks in Yemen and proceeded to discretely encourage royalist officials 
to publicize Nasser’s brutal aerial chemical warfare.117 In response, Nasser set up new 
office in Cairo to protect the Egyptian image after gas attacks.
118
 
The same 20,000 gas masks originally allotted to the Israelis were subsequently sent 
to Yemeni royalists, as Nasser’s gas bombing campaign continued even in the weeks 
after his June 1967 defeat.  The US policy of secrecy turned into a forward policy of 
confrontation with Nasser: “Particularly because inhumane gas campaign continuing, 
we believe additional actions needed focus world attention on this problem…In our 
view some such positive action would make significant contribution toward generating 
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atmosphere in world public opinion which would render such outrages less likely in 
future.”119 
In 1968, the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen released a publication, complete 
with gruesome photos of gas bombing victims, condemning the Egyptian “mass-
murders” and demanded international retribution.  By this point, however, Egyptian 
forces had withdrawn and the international community had moved on to other conflicts, 
leaving the first use of chemical warfare in the Arab world to the backrooms of dusty 
and neglected archives. 
Conclusion 
The Haradh conferences, Saudi-Egyptian reconciliation, and Yemeni national 
dialogue created an atmosphere of optimism for an end to the conflict.  Soviet military 
equipment and forgiven loans along with renewed American economic aid served to 
encourage Nasser’s continued occupation in Yemen.  The “long-breath strategy” that 
characterized the remaining months of the war was engineered by Nasser in order to 
maintain the UAR’s “strategic triangle” and influence on the Arabian Peninsula by 
expending the least number of soldiers and economic capital.  The Soviet foreign office 
began cultivating post-Sallal allies in an effort to secure access to the Hodeidah port, 
while the American State Department made a concerted effort to limit criticism of 
Nasser’s use of chemical weapons. Lurking just outside Nasser’s cage in Yemen, were 
the politically high-risk conflicts with the British in Aden and the Israelis across the 
Sinai border, a topic for the next chapter. 
                                                          
119
 FRUS, 1964-1968, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula, doc. 453, July 22, 1967, Telegram 
from the Department of State to the European Office of the United Nations. 
251 
 
Chapter 7: The British and Israeli Clandestine War Against Egypt 
Introduction 
The Americans, Soviets, and Saudis were each secretly pleased to see Nasser rattling 
in his Yemeni cage with great restraints placed upon his plans elsewhere in the region.  
The British, on the other hand, were not merely content with shackling Nasser’s foreign 
policy.  When the first Egyptian troops arrived to Yemen in October 1962, British 
officials perceived a direct threat to Aden.
1
   This was an opportunity to enact revenge 
on an Arab leader who had singlehandedly delivered the greatest blow to the British 
Empire in the Middle East.  There was concern that Nasser would try to undermine 
British control over the Wheelus Air Base in Libya and a pair of bases in newly 
independent Cyprus.  In order to protect these strategically important bases, the official 
British foreign policy objective was to “keep Nasser locked up in Yemen,” without 
confronting him in open war.
2
  The Anglo-Egyptian conflict would eventually 
encompass members of the French Foreign Legion, the Israeli air force, the American 
CIA, and the Iranian savak secret service, among others, turning the Yemeni conflict 
into an internationalized, yet clandestine, arena of anti-Nasser forces.   
The Aden Group and the Secret War with Nasser 
In 1869 British colonial officials in Aden formalized strategic relationships with the 
surrounding tribes, forming the East and West Aden Protectorate.  Aden High 
Commissioner Kennedy Trevaskis turned the West Aden Protectorate of 15 tribes into 
the Federation of South Arabia (FSA) in April 1962 with Aden joining on January 18, 
1963, intending it to serve as a permanent barrier from Arab nationalism even after the 
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British withdrew.
3
The East Aden Protectorate consisting of those tribes that did not join 
the FSA, became the Protectorate of South Arabia.  The British intent was to grant the 
FSA independence in 1968, while continuing to maintain defense facilities in Aden.  To 
this end, the Aden Legislative Council formally approved Aden’s accession to the 
Federation on September 24, 1962, only two days before the outbreak of the civil war.
4
 
The historian William R. Polk described this arrangement as a “shotgun wedding”.5  
Prior to September 1962, it seemed as is if Aden and the Protectorates were sheltered 
from Pan-Arab nationalism by the “dense curtain of the Imam’s Yemen.  As the former 
High Commissioner of Aden, Charles Johnston explained: “The Yemeni revolution 
brought its bugles on to our doorstep.”6 
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7
Fig. 7.1 
 
Upon leaving Aden in 1964, Trevaskis warned his replacement Richard Turnbull 
that defending Aden in the face of Nasser’s presence in Arabia was becoming 
increasingly difficult.  Echoing the conversation between Campbell and Palmerston in 
1839, Trevaskis explained to the Prime Minister’s Office that  the base in Aden is the 
major obstacle to Nasserite pretensions in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf."
8
  
British Defence Minister Peter Thorneycroft and Secretary of State for the Colonies 
Duncan Sandys agreed with Julian Amery that “the loss of Aden would signal the end 
of the British Empire.”9 In a secret decision, Prime Minister Macmillan appointed 
Amery as “minister for Yemen” and entrusted him with the responsibility of supporting 
royalist forces.  Amery’s “private war against Nasser” would receive no public 
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recognition or official government approval as Macmillan’s divided cabinet would 
never have sanctioned open support of the royalists and a confrontation with Nasser.
10
 
Colonel Neil “Billy” McLean used the crisis of the Yemeni Civil War as an 
opportunity to confront Nasser’s imperialism on the Arabian Peninsula, just as Captain 
Haines had orchestrated the political and military logistics to take possession of Aden 
during the 1830s.  Following his visit to Yemen over Christmas break 1962-3, McLean 
explained the necessary measures that were needed against the Egyptian presence in 
Yemen: 
“The objective is to get the Egyptian troops out of the Yemen.  If this 
were not possible then we should at least ensure that the Egyptians in the 
Yemen are so busy defending themselves against the Yemenis that they 
will not be able to intervene in Aden and other parts of the Arabian 
Peninsula.  Therefore I believe the maximum possible support should be 
given to the Imam.”11 
 
Subsequent letters from British ambassadors abroad to the Foreign Office reiterated 
the need to “prevent UAR state from stabilizing in Yemen,” and that British 
intervention should “maintain at least a stalemate if not a royalist victory.”12  For 
example, in a letter to Julian Amery, Michael Webb, a British undercover journalist 
fighting with the royalists, explained the shared sentiments felt by many current and 
former SAS agents: “That maniac in Cairo has a complex against Britain, and no 
amount of diplomacy and tact will ever eliminate it.”13 
Colonel David Smiley, Britain’s military advisor on Yemen, surmised: “If supplies 
continue to be sent at this rate, though enough to keep the Royalists in the field, they 
are NOT enough to enable the Royalists to beat the Egyptians.  For this reason I am 
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beginning to suspect that it may be the Saudi Arabian intention to ‘keep the pot boiling’ 
in the Yemen.  Many countries opposed to Egypt would no doubt be happy to see 
40,000 of Nasser’s troops permanently tied down in the Yemen, suffering casualties 
and costing Nasser a great deal of money.  Only the Royalists and the UK have a 
common interest in the complete expulsion of the Egyptian from Yemen.”14 Jim 
Johnson, a central figure of the Aden Group, echoed McLean’s observations claiming 
that a stalemate that pinned down the Egyptian army “in a war of attrition suited the 
Saudis nicely.”  Johnson also maintained skepticism over royalist interests following a 
failed offensive in 1966.  French mercenaries working with British counterparts 
organized a heavy barrage of artillery to cover a royalist advance on Sana’a only to see 
al-Badr’s forces remain in place, noting the “royalists’ lack of resolve that went beyond 
the front line.”15 
Trevaskis argued that royalists could not defeat UAR forces, but that the royalists 
would drive Nasser out of Yemen, just as guerillas had driven the British out of Cyprus 
and Palestine and the French out of Algeria.
16
 It was Trevaskis’ belief, Nasserite 
supporters would rise up as a fifth column against the British in Aden making the 
colony untenable.
17
 As he explained to Colonial Secretary Sandys: “in my view, we 
should do all in our power to prevent the Yemen Arab Republic from acquiring 
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stability and if possible to rid the Yemen of the UAR and other hostile influences.”18 
From 1963-64, several British cross-border attacks on YAR military positions and 
against rebels from Radfan were condemned by the UN and British press.  One air raid 
on a Yemeni base at Ford Harib in March 1964 received particular attention as it was 
the first time TV news cameras had filmed British counterinsurgency operations in 
South Arabia.
19
 
According to Clive Jones in his book detailing British mercenary operations in 
Yemen, the post-Suez “malaise” dissuaded London from undertaking large-scale efforts 
to oppose Egypt.  Clandestine operations were undertaken as a way to confront Nasser 
without publicly declaring war on the YAR.
20
 According to John Harding, British 
political officer in Aden during the 1960s, “it was this unofficial campaign, rather than 
anything mounted by HQ Middle East Command in Aden, that ultimately frustrated 
Nasser’s Yemeni ambitions.”21  The secrecy of these operations was regarded as a 
useful means to avoid international condemnation of overt military action, particularly 
from Americans who did not want to be seen as supporting “an old-fashioned colonial 
campaign.”22 Tony Geraghty, author and journalist with a focus on British intelligence, 
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goes even further in claiming that the secret war in Yemen also “helped prevent an 
Egyptian or Marxist takeover in Oman and other Gulf States.”23 In the television series 
The Mayfair Set detailing the clandestine war in Yemen, the English filmmaker Adam 
Curtis best described the group as “the first example of the ‘privatization’ of British 
foreign policy as its worldwide role wound down in the mid-1960s.”24 
On the other end of the political spectrum, British Consul in Ta’iz, Christopher 
Gandy, dismissed Julian Amery’s alarmism, claiming that the Aden Group’s lobbying 
for royalist support was “moved by nostalgia for lost causes.” Gandy suggested 
recognizing the YAR on December 28, 1962 in an attempt to placate Nasser and stop 
his attacks on the British position in Aden.  These “Tory imperialists” as Gandy termed 
them “apparently believed that if only all the King’s horses and all the King’s men 
could push hard enough they could put Humpty Dumpty together again and restore the 
Imamate, provided only that they were not held back by that awkward squad of wets 
and pussy-footers in the Foreign Office.”25 
Kennedy Trevaskis agreed theoretically with Gandy, claiming that the project to 
modernize North Yemen would take decades and consume the resources and attention 
of Nasser and Sallal.  Perhaps this may have been an opportunity to show British 
support for the YAR and demonstrate a post-Suez reconciliation with Arab 
nationalism.
26
 Trevaskis was, however, a realist at heart and realized that continued 
British sovereignty in Aden was untenable, especially given the increasing anti-
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colonialism voice and sentiments among local Adenis.  This became particularly 
apparent following a grenade attack on Trevaskis on December 10, 1963 in the 
Khormakhsar airport in Aden.
27
 
Amery and his Conservative allies saw support for policies of withdraw from Aden 
or reconciliation with Sallal as another example of British “appeasement”.28 Not all 
Conservatives were in agreement, as the contentious Tory politician Enoch Powell 
argued for the complete British withdrawal from colonial positions “East of Suez” 
following India’s independence in 1947.29  Gandy would be expelled by Sallal on 
February 17, 1963 in response to the non-recognition of the YAR.
30
 
In October 1963, Macmillan was forced to resign and was replaced by Alec 
Douglas-Home, the previous Foreign Secretary.
31
 Douglas-Home maintained a 
tolerance of the clandestine support for the royalist as he believed that "the whole 
history in the Middle East in recent years shows that Nasser has had a series of setbacks 
in Syria.  He has only gotten bogged down in Yemen.  Let us leave him alone and let 
him stew in his own juice."
32
   
James Fees, a CIA officer in Ta’iz in 1963 organized a network of Arab-born agents 
who managed to infiltrate the inner-offices of the republic and Egyptian administration 
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obtaining detailed maps of military importance.
33
  During a meeting in November 1963 
with the director of MI6, Dick White, and Richard Helms, then serving as Deputy 
Director of CIA, explained that he could not sanction official support for the royalists 
as the White House officially recognized the YAR.  NSA director Robert Komer was 
convinced that London was exaggerating the threat from Nasser to Aden, as Nasser's 
support for terrorism in South Yemen was only a "pinprick" and was of no serious 
concern.
34
  Any help given to the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) in Yemen 
would have to be completely “off the record”.35 The clandestine supply of American 
weapons for the royalists increased American popularity amongst al-Badr’s supporters 
because the tanks and military hardware used by Egyptians and republicans were all 
Russian-made.  The Irish-born journalist Peter Sommerville-Large explained that 
“because the Americans did not openly help the republicans it was assumed among the 
royalists that they secretly supported the Imam, and had only recognized the new 
regime for devious diplomatic motives.”36 
1966 Defence White Paper 
With the looming general elections in England in October 1964, Duncan Sandys 
added a political dimension to the secret war against Nasser, which he thought might 
discredit Harold Wilson, the leader of the Labour opposition.  Sandys argued that 
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“Nasser is probably the most hated man in Britain.  But at bottom his policy and the 
Labour Party’s also towards the Middle East are very closely aligned.  If we could 
identify Wilson with Nasser…we might greatly strengthen our hand.”37  These political 
machinations were cut short when in July 1964, Al Ahram published five letters written 
between British mercenaries and the central command in England, threatening to 
uncover the entire operation.  The ensuing short-lived media frenzy in England and 
Egypt discredited Conservative party members who were seen as complicit with British 
clandestine activities in Yemen.
38
  The Labour Party would win the elections of 1964 
and 1966, giving Harold Wilson the premiership.   
In 1966, Harold Wilson’s Labour government published a Defense White Paper 
which detailed the withdrawal of British forces ‘East of Suez’, thereby canceling any 
earlier plans for the British to maintain a military presence in Aden and calling for a 
complete withdrawal in 1968.
39
  Denis Healey, the Secretary of State for Defence was 
responsible both for the 1965 White Paper affirming British intentions to retain a bade 
in Aden and the 1966 volte face in British colonial policy, calling for a withdrawal 
from Aden.
40
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The 1966 decision to withdraw from Aden was based on a number of factors:  In 
1964 Sudan forbade British over flights, thereby limiting access to Africa from Aden.
41
 
The FSA was considered a failure as the local elite were increasingly unwilling to 
collaborate with colonial authorities.  Egyptian intervention in South Arabia fueled 
anti-British sentiments and violence, influencing domestic public opinion in England 
against maintaining an empire in the Middle East.
42
 Finally, the economic hardships 
and ensuing Sterling crisis in 1966 forced Wilson to reduce defense expenditures on 
overseas bases such as Aden.
43
 
A report from the British Petroleum (BP) refinery in Aden, with a capacity of 
150,000 barrels per day, offered an additional consideration for the Defence Paper of 
1966.  The investment in the Aden refinery had long since been paid off and therefore 
the port was expendable from BP’s point of view.  There was still a danger of Nasser’s 
further plans in the Gulf and the threat to BP interests.
44
  BP officials felt that it was 
unlikely that South Yemen had the technical capability to operate the BP Aden refinery, 
with or without Egyptian help,
45
 and would “have little adverse effect on Western 
interests in the Gulf”.46 The contingency plan in the event that the Aden refinery was 
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closed included new facilities in the French-controlled Djibouti, considered a viable 
option, despite the initial capital costs of construction and lost revenue in the interim.
47
 
Nasser’s Clandestine Response 
Nasser, however, did not sit idly as British mercenaries and American agents aided 
royalist forces against Egyptian troops.  In November 1962, the Egyptians announced 
the formation of a National Liberation Army to free South Yemen.  The group was 
headed by Qahtan al-Sha’bi who had fled to Cairo in 1958.  During a meeting in Sana’a 
in June 1963, Sha’bi oversaw the formation of the National Liberation Front (NLF), an 
anti-British Arab nationalist militant organization, supported by Egyptian smuggled 
weapons across the FSA border.
48
 The formation of this organization attracted 
tribesmen from all over Yemen who joined the Egyptian cause to fight against British 
imperialism.
49
  Egyptian journalist and Nasser confidant Mohammed Heikal justified 
Egyptian support for the NLF as retaliation for British support for royalists.
50
 Mutual 
border incursions by ground troops, air force, and allied tribes marked the extent of the 
direct Anglo-Egyptian confrontation in South Arabia.  Beihan, a transit-point for 
British-royalist aid was a frequent target for Egyptian-YAR bombing raids.
51
 The YAR 
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served as a training base for anti-British force in a similar way that Aden served as a 
base for the anti-Imam Free Yemeni movement prior to 1962.
52
 
By 1965, the Egyptian campaign in North Yemen had reached a stalemate, as the 
military came to realize the futility of mountainous warfare and the difficulty of 
holding territorial position.  During the course of the “long-breath” strategy, Nasser 
could maintain a defensive position in the “strategic triangle” while dedicating 
additional resources and attention to South Yemen.
53
  In January 1966, Nasser 
continued to facilitate attacks on Aden and the FSA,
54
 by attempting to unite anti-
British factions under a single Cairo-controlled Front for the Liberation of Occupied 
South Yemen (FLOSY).
55
 The original members of the NLF rejected this Egyptian-
proposed union and the prospects of Egyptian control over their organization and 
domination over all of South Arabia.
56
  From November 1966 through the end of 1967, 
NLF and FLOSY engaged in a heated campaign for control of the anti-imperialist 
movement. 
Nasser’s attempts at relieving the pressure on the military campaign in North Yemen 
were not limited to guerilla groups in South Yemen.  In January 1967 for example, a 
group of Yemenis were arrested in Saudi Arabia and accused of harboring intentions to 
conduct terrorist activities.  According to their testimony, Egyptian officials arranged 
for their training in Ta’iz and Sana’a before sending them into Saudi territory to 
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sabotage royalist supply sites.
57
 In a further attempt to gain the upper hand in the 
clandestine war in Yemen, Egyptian intelligence officers even offered Jim Johnson 
substantial bribes to fight for Egypt instead of Saudi Arabia.
58
 
British complaints to the UN and other international organizations were dismissed, 
while accusations against British conduct in Aden were readily issued.  For example, 
Amnesty International in a report issued in March 1967 reprimanded colonial officials 
for allegations of prisoner torture by the British.  The British Foreign Office 
complained that Amnesty International was slanted toward nationalist powers, 
conducted biased investigations, insisted on interviewing criminal detainees that were 
not political prisoners, and in their eyes issued baseless allegations while Egyptians 
were committing far greater atrocities in North Yemen.
59
 It seemed to British officials 
in Aden that Egyptian incursions from Yemen into the FSA were condoned by the 
international community, while British retaliation in Yemen was condemned.
60
  
Saudi Arabia took similar opportunities to reconsider support for the Hamid al-Din 
royal family in favor of the “third-force” moderate republicans.  After several instances 
where the Saudis needed to be cajoled into continuing their support of the British 
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mercenary operations, McLean felt it necessary to turn elsewhere for military aid.
61
 
Along with other members of the Aden group, McLean maintained an active 
intelligence and operations channel with Israel, the only country to have a greater 
vendetta against Nasser and Egypt. 
Yemen, Israel, and the Road to 1967 
Egyptian military officers have readily blamed the Yemen war for their ignominious 
defeat in the 1967 War with Israel.  Egyptian Field Marshal al-Gamasy claimed that 
“nearly a third of our land forces, supported by our air force and navy, were engaged in 
an operation approximately 2,000 kilometers away from Egypt, with no prospects for 
either a political or a military settlement.”62 Others claimed that the Sinai forces 
comprised only 60% active forces with 40% reservists.  The more experienced fighters 
were evidently stationed in Yemen.
63
 Lieutenant General Kamel Mourtagi, the 
Commander in Chief of Egyptian Armed Forces in Yemen went as far as claiming that 
Egyptian soldiers grew used to fighting with air superiority against a guerilla force in 
Yemen and were not prepared to face an army with its own air force.
64
 These self-
serving accounts do not accurately portray the impact of the ongoing war in Yemen on 
Egyptian military performance during the Six-Day War. 
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By 1967, however, Nasser’s “long-breath” strategy had consolidated the Egyptian 
position, allowing for the withdrawal of the great majority of troops who once totaled 
upwards of 70,000.  According to most estimates, there were between 20,000-30,000 
Egyptian soldiers in Yemen, hardly the one-third described by Gamsay.
65
 This number 
may in fact be even lower, as it likely did not account for the order to withdraw an 
additional three brigades from Yemen on May 20, 1967. These brigades were destined 
for Sharm al-Sheikh.
66
  The increasing use of aircraft and chemical warfare 
compensated for the declining number of soldiers who were being redeployed to Sinai.  
Rather than an impediment to Egypt’s military performance in 1967, the intervention in 
Yemen and the cycles of troops being deployed acted as a training ground for battle 
experience, much more than sitting idly in military barracks in Sinai.  Even if Nasser 
had withdrawn all the troops form Yemen prior to June 5, 1967, it is unclear how they 
would have made a difference considering the near-total loss of air superiority.  Indeed, 
contemporary accounts of the 1967 War blame the devastating loss on the lack of 
Egyptian military planning and the difficulties of inter-Arab coordination.
67
  
The official Egyptian national narrative blames the defeat on ‘Abd al-Hakim Amer’s 
reckless behavior, conveniently as he was found dead only weeks after the end of the 
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war from an apparent suicide or overdose.
68
 Amer was quoted giving assurances that 
his army was ready and more than capable of confronting Israel, perhaps giving Nasser 
a false sense of confidence.
69
 Even as late as May 19, 1967, Amer told Moscow that 
despite the continued costs of a commitment to Yemen, Egypt was intent on 
demonstrating that support of the YAR would not “be an obstacle to providing strong 
support for Syria.”70  Egyptian generals who were defeated in the field were quick to 
concur with Amer’s culpability, blaming the ill-prepared forces in Sinai on poor 
military and political planning.
71
 
The US, UK, USSR, and Nasser himself may have surmised that with forces 
stationed in Yemen, Egypt could not attack Israel.  This scenario did not, however, 
exclude Israel from attacking Egypt.  Israeli authorities developed an understanding of 
Nasser’s military capabilities and willingness to use chemical weapons on a civilian 
population through high-level contact with British mercenaries, airlifts to royalist 
forces, and intelligence operations in Yemen, all of which were overseen by officials 
high up in the Israeli chain of command.  The reluctance of the US and UN to condemn 
Egyptian chemical warfare was further evidence that the international community 
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might not rise to the defense of Israeli in the instance of poison gas use.  These factors 
combined to foster a sense of alarm among Israeli military authorizes, serving as an 
additional impetus for a preemptive attack against Egyptian forces. 
In his seminal work on the 1967 War, Ami Gluska explains that a “dread of 
annihilation” was at the core of Israel’s security policy and the decision to preemptively 
strike Egypt and Syria.  The participation of German scientists in the Egyptian 
medium-range rocket and chemical weapons programs and the publicized deliveries of 
advanced Soviet weaponry symbolized an existential threat to Israel.  In an address to 
the Israeli Knesset, Foreign Minister Golda Meir expressed alarm at the alliance 
between German scientists and the Egyptian military claiming that “the close 
connection between Cairo and Nazism existed already in Hitler’s time, and it is no 
secret that today Cairo is a haven for the principal Nazis.”72  Israeli military authorities 
feared an Egyptian chemical attack, including the former Chief of Intelligence 
Brigadier-General Yehoshafat Harkavi, who estimated the potential for casualties with 
over 100,000 dead.
73
   
This apocalyptic psychology was exacerbated by the “courtside seats” to the Yemen 
civil war given to Israeli decision makers from 1964-1967.  With each passing month in 
Yemen, the UAR air force gained experience in bombing raids, aerial reconnaissance, 
and ground support.  In 1966 and 1967 in particular, Yemen became a testing ground 
for chemical warfare against civilian populations.  May 1967, the month before the 
outbreak of the Six-Day War, was one of the most intensive bombing and poison gas 
warfare campaigns of the entire conflict. 
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Israeli Airlifts 
When French Djibouti, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia withheld permission to host the air 
support for British mercenaries, Neil McLean, Jim Johnson, and British Royal Air 
Force veteran Tony Boyle sought the help of the Israeli intelligence services and air 
force.  Neil McLean was first introduced to his Israeli counterparts in October 1962 by 
MI6’s former Vice-Chief George Young, who responded to the Israeli intelligence 
agency (Mossad) request for an “Englishman” by finding them a “Scotsman” 
(McLean).  Brigadier Dan Hiram, the Israeli defense attaché in London promised 
McLean weapons, money, instructors who could pass as native Arabs, and the support 
of the Israeli air force.
74
   
Chief of the Mossad Meir Amit met personally with the British group multiple times 
in 1962 and early 1963.  Amit broached the idea of airlifts to Yemen the head of the 
Israel Air Force (IAF) Intelligence branch, Ze’ev Liron, who was among a group of 120 
Holocaust survivors serving combat roles in the IAF.  Shimon Peres, the Deputy 
Defense Minister and Ezer Weizman, the commander of the IAF and one of the main 
architects of Israeli air strategy during the Six-Day War, personally granted Liron 
permission to travel to Yemen and report on the feasibility of airlifting aid to royalist 
positions.
75
  
In approving this mission, Peres and Weizman explained to Liron that supporting 
the royalist forces in Yemen was equivalent to fighting Egyptian forces and diverting 
their attention from the Sinai border.  Furthermore, Imam al-Badr promised de-facto 
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recognition of Israel upon a royalist victory in return for their aid during the civil war.
76
 
During a separate meeting with Yemeni Foreign Minister Ahmad al-Shami, Ya’akov 
Herzog, the director-general of the Israeli Prime Minister’s office, pressured the 
royalists for direct contact with Prince Feisal in the faint hopes that the Saudis would 
commit to recognizing Israel as well.
77
 
After completing an abbreviated course in espionage, Liron was given a false Polish 
passport complete with an elaborate cover story.  He was posing as an anti-communist 
Polish pilot named Buzhinsky, who obtained refugee status in England after 
communists killed his father.  Liron flew to Aden, via Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and was 
smuggled across the Yemen border along with several British agents.  For the next 
month he traveled through royalist camps and along Egyptian military bases, using 
English to communicate with the select number of Mutawakkilite Princes who spoke 
the language. 
Liron communicated back to the IAF, that several obstacles that would need to be 
overcome to successfully airlift weapons and supplies to royalist forces in the north 
Yemeni highlands.  The first difficulty was passing near the Egyptian airfield of 
Hurghada, located along the Egyptian Red Sea coast just south of Sharm al-Sheikh.  
Any plane traveling from Israel into the Red Sea area would surely warrant the 
attention of the four stationed MiG-17 nighttime reconnaissance-equipped planes.  The 
IAF would have to follow a flight pattern over Saudi territory to avoid Egyptian notice, 
but would still have a difficult time finding the drop sites in the dark and unremarkable 
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mountainous landscape.  Liron spent time training locals in the use of flare markers to 
communicate with the pilots flying overhead.  Liron made it clear that British 
mercenaries would have to communicate directly with the flight crew to ensure the 
success of the drop.  Royalist commanders brought up an additional issue of the 
anonymity of the supplies and munitions.  Liron explained that Israel could not obtain 
foreign munitions but would ensure the removal of any identifying marks that could 
link these supplies with Israel.  It was understood that leaked information about Israel’s 
role in the Yemeni conflict could have grave repercussions for the royalist position.
78
  
Immediately upon his return from Yemen, Liron met with Amit and Weizman, 
exchanging information on the Egyptian position in Yemen and confirming that the 
airlift was possible.  With utmost secrecy, Liron approached Aryeh ‘Oz, a trusted 
fellow Holocaust survivor and seasoned IAF pilot, and asked him to coordinate and fly 
the airlifts to Yemen.  Knowledge of this mission was limited to Liron, ‘Oz, senior IAF 
navigator Mashe Bartov, and Mordechai (Mottie) Hod, who would assume command of 
the IAF less than a year before the Six-Day War.  The mission reported directly to Ezer 
Weizman, IDF Chief of Staff Yithak Rabin and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol,
79
 a further 
testament to the sensitivity of the mission and the direct channel through which reports 
from Yemen were relayed to Israeli policymakers. 
The airlifts began on March 31, 1964 and continued until May 4, 1966 during which 
the Israelis conducted 14 successful missions airlifting military and medical supplies to 
royalists in the battlefield.
80
  The two sets of missions were codenamed “Rotev” 
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(“gravy”) and “Dorban” (“porcupine”).  On two occasions Israeli airlifts reached 
royalist commander Abdullah ibn al-Hassan in an isolated and remote mountainous 
region saving him from certain defeat.
81
  
Tony Boyle was responsible for accompanying each flight in order to coordinate 
with his British colleagues on the ground.  Each Stratocruiser transport plane, an 
adapted version of the US Air Force bomber,
82
 carried 12,500 pounds of supplies and 
was forced to fly without lights or unnecessary electronic navigational equipment to 
avoid detection.  The packages needed to be pushed out of the plane in a hurry as soon 
as the aircraft turned its nose skywards, as the drop-sites were small and the packages 
all needed to fall in the same vicinity.
83
  In order to compensate for the lack of lighting 
equipment, the flights were planned only for nights with a full moon and clear skies.  
Each member was dressed in civilian clothes without any Israeli identification, carried 
false passports and gold coins in the event of an emergency landing in Yemen.
84
  After 
seeing the success of the first drop, Imam al-Badr asked for the next drop to be made on 
a specific mountaintop a few dozen square meters wide with steep slopes on each side - 
no easy delivery task.  Al-Badr invited prominent sheikhs and other loyal tribal leaders 
to watch the spectacle on May 26, 1964.  After the packages landed on the mountaintop 
successfully, the tribal leaders cheered and called out, according to British observers: 
“We are so strong that we will be able to conquer Aden in addition to Sana’a!”85 While 
this was hardly an encouraging reaction for British mercenaries aiding the royalists, it 
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was nevertheless a demonstration of the psychological impact of the airlifts, regardless 
of their origin. 
 
Fig. 7.2 Israeli Stratocruiser dropping aid to Yemeni royalist camp.
86
 
 
During one of the flights, nearby antiaircraft fire forced the plane to change course 
and fly north of Sana’a where the Egyptian airfield was clearly visible along with rows 
of unguarded MiGs.  Upon landing Tony Boyle broached the possibility of loading 
barrel bombs onto an Israeli Stratocruiser and destroying the Sana’a airfield and many 
of the Egyptian planes.  Weizman initially approved the plan and began preparations, 
but was later overruled by Prime Minister Eshkol who argued that a bombing raid 
would have turned Israel into one of the belligerents in the Yemeni conflict.
87
 
Furthermore, the Israel Defense Forces were intent on avoiding a crisis either in Yemen 
or with Syria that might have been used as a diplomatic cover for Egypt’s withdrawal 
from Yemen.
88
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In exchange for its airlifts, Israeli officials asked the British mercenaries for detailed 
reports on Egyptian military capabilities and troop movements.  For example, following 
the first reported use of Egyptian poison gas on June 8, 1963 in the Yemeni village of 
al-Kawma, McLean delivered shell casings to his Israeli counterparts for analysis.
89
 In 
a meeting with British counterparts, Golda Meir received reports on Egyptian military 
performance in Yemen.  She expressed concern for the Egyptian missile stockpile and 
the significant battlefield experience being afforded to Nasser’s rotating troops.90 In a 
second meeting with British Prime Minister Alec Douglas-Home, Meir expressed 
additional concern over the Egyptian acquisition of medium-range rockets and the 
willingness of the USSR to replace the purported 80 million tons of military material 
lost.
91
 
Israeli Head of Military Intelligence Aharon Yariv estimated that well-trained and 
combat-ready Egyptian troops and poison gas bombs could conceivably be transported 
to Sinai within forty-eight hours leaving the IDF limited warning if Egypt was to 
undertake an offensive.  According to Yariv’s May 1967 intelligence appraisal, the 
Egyptian air and ground forces were highly effective and had the potential to increase 
the UAR offensive capabilities in Sinai, especially after the arrival of updated Soviet 
aircraft, electronic, and navigation systems.
92
 Member of Knesset Ya’akov Hazan 
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described the situation in May 1967 as “a storm which had been brewing in Yemen 
until then and was now moving towards Israel”.93 
Intelligence Operations 
MI6 director Dick White and future CIA director Richard Helms worked with 
Mossad director Meir Amit and members of the Aden Group on two additional 
intelligence operations in Yemen.
94
  The three parties put together teams of Yemenite 
Jews living in Israel and Mossad Arab-specialists to gather intelligence and aid the 
royalist war effort.   
From 1948 to1950 approximately 50,000 Jews were airlifted from Yemen to the 
newly founded state of Israel in an operation known as “Magic Carpet”.  This group of 
Jews resembled native Yemenis, spoke their dialect, and, for all intents and purposes, 
was indistinguishable from the local population.  The CIA helped the Mossad train a 
group of Yemeni Jews in guerilla warfare and the use of modern weapons before 
facilitating their infiltration into Yemeni territory.
95
  During a meeting with a group of 
foreign diplomats, ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Baydani accused Israel in November 1962 of 
sending upwards of 1,000 Yemeni Jews through Aden to Yemen, with the intention of 
undermining the republic.  Baydani’s accusation was not only grossly exaggerated, but 
was also made most-likely before the Israeli intelligence actually dispatched agents to 
Yemen.
96
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In a letter to Julian Amery in 1967, Ya’akov Herzog encouraged the continued use 
of Yemenite Jews who had migrated to Israel explaining that they “speak Yemeni 
Arabic and are often indistinguishable physically from Arab Yemenis and would make 
liaison, technical missions, etc. very difficult for enemy propaganda to penetrate.”97 In 
this same letter to Amery, Herzog suggested turning to the Jewish community that 
remained in Yemen as discrete liaisons to aid the royalist war effort.  When civil war 
broke out, there were upwards of 3,000 Jews in Yemen.  According to Bruce Conde, 
they were “all staunch loyalists, supporting the Imam, serving in his armies, or if in 
YAR area, imprisoned”.98 Herzog envisioned Yemenite Jews both local and those 
settled in Israel serving in the royalist ranks and forming Israel’s “best prospects of 
beginning the long, slow task of building Arab-Israeli eventual friendship and 
cooperation.” He claims that after a battle victory in Khawlan, Yemeni outposts were 
shouting the following remark: “We hope our brothers in Israel (i.e. Yemenite Jews 
living in Israel and serving in the IDF) will give you as good a beating in the North as 
we are giving you here in the South.”99 Although Herzog’s plans seem somewhat 
ludicrous in hindsight, they underscore the extent of the contact between Israel and the 
Aden Group.  
In addition to this group of Yemenite Jews, the Mossad dispatched to Yemen an 
Egyptian-born senior intelligence agent, Baruch Zaki Mizrahi, to ostensibly report on 
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the Egyptian army and on traffic in and out of the Red Sea.
100
 He entered the country 
with a Moroccan passport under the name Ahmad al-Sabbagh and established an 
espionage ring of Yemenis.
101
  Mizrahi remained in Yemen until his capture by Yemeni 
authorities in May 1972, masquerading as a Moroccan businessman and documenting 
Palestinian terrorists who were using Hodeidah as a base to launch attack against Israeli 
shipping.
102
  In 1972, Israeli officials appealed to President Nixon to intercede on 
behalf of Mizrahi, who was still interned in Yemen, as part of a prisoner exchange 
between Israel and Egypt.
103
  When the US refused to intervene, fearing damage to US-
Yemeni relations, the Israelis turned to West Germany and Iran who appealed directly 
to Yemeni Interior Minister Sayf Ali Khawlani, for a delay in Mizrahi’s execution and 
for an official prisoner transfer to Cairo.
104
 Negotiations continued after the Yom 
Kipper War, in October 1973,
105
 and Mizrahi was finally released in March 1974 in 
exchange for Egyptian prisoners of war held by Israel.
106
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Fig. 7.3 Baruch Mizrahi in cell number 6 in Cairo (Al Ahram c. 1974) 
 
 In addition to Mizrahi, the Mossad sent veteran agent David Karon to meet with 
royalists in Yemen.
107
  Little information is available on the actual intelligence 
delivered by the operations led by Yemenite Jews, Karon, or Mizrahi.  The very 
existence of these operations in conjunction with the IAF airlifts are evidence of the 
attention Israel devoted to the Egyptian military activity in Yemen.  Reports on Israeli 
activities and on Egyptian military and chemical abilities made their way directly to the 
desks of the most influential political authorities in Israel, factoring into the decision to 
preemptively strike Egypt in June 1967.  Military officials, such as Yithak Rabin and 
Motti Hod, received direct reports from operations in Yemen and pressured Prime 
Minister Eshkol to launch an attack against Egypt.
108
  On June 5, 1967, Israel became 
the only country to turn the clandestine war against Nasser into an open conflict. 
Conclusion 
In May 1967, Neil McLean claims to have sent a vital piece of intelligence to his 
Israeli counterparts through unspecified channels, reiterating that there is “no feasible 
way that Nasser could fight a war with Israel” with so many of his forces holed up in 
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Yemen for the foreseeable months.
109
  By this point, the British had moved up their 
date of departure to November 1967, leaving the Israelis only a few more months to 
exploit Nasser’s apparent strategic disadvantage.  Although this coincidental narrative 
is compelling, there is no written confirmation that the memo was received by anyone, 
let alone the Israelis.  Furthermore, it is doubtful that the Israelis based their decisions 
in 1967 on a few lines of intelligence from a nostalgic British MP-turned Yemeni 
emissary.  Israeli military officials already possessed sufficient intelligence on the 
Egyptian position in Yemen to make this strategic decision on their own accord.  The 
most revealing aspect of this memo, however, is not the impact that it had on events in 
Sinai, if any, but in the psyche of British imperialists, even as late at 1967.  There was a 
sense, at least among the members of the Aden Group, that it was still within the power 
of the British Empire to influence regional events in the Middle East.  
As it happened, events in Sinai in May and June of 1967 turned out much as 
McLean had predicted.  The cost of the Yemeni war economically and politically had 
taken a toll on Egypt’s domestic prosperity and on Nasser’s Arab Nationalist prestige 
abroad.  The decision to reoccupy the Sinai Peninsula on May 14, 1967 and provoke 
the Israelis into a war was likely made at the behest of Nasser’s strategic vision.  As 
Jesse Ferris explains, war with Israel would both restore Nasser’s stature in the Arab 
world and provide him with a justifiable military withdrawal from Yemen.
110
  Events, 
however, did not proceed as Nasser had envisioned.  Egypt was forced to withdraw 
from Yemen, but in the ignobility of defeat rather than the triumphant march to war 
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against Israel.  The decisive Israeli victory in the Six-Day War brought Nasser’s 
imperial expeditions in Yemen to a premature close.  By December 1967, only weeks 
after the British evacuated Aden, Nasser withdrew the last Egyptian soldier from 
Yemen marking the end of 140 years of British and Egyptian competition on the 
Arabian Peninsula.  The war in Yemen, however, was far from over.  McLean and 
other British mercenaries would remain in Yemen during the ensuing royalist siege of 
Sana’a, harboring unrealistic hopes, that the Imam would be victorious, leaving British 
interests with at least one ally in South Arabia. 
281 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
The Siege of Sana’a  
On August 29, 1967 at the Arab Summit meeting in Khartoum, Sudan, Nasser and 
Faysal agreed on a “Yemen Peace Plan”.  Egypt committed to withdraw its troops and in 
return Saudi Arabia pledged that it would discontinue aid to the Yemeni royalists. In 
return, the oil monarchies agreed to compensate Nasser for Egypt’s economic loss as a 
result of the closure of the Suez Canal.
1
 A military intervention that had originally been 
envisioned by Egyptian Field Marshal ‘Abd al-Hakim ‘Amer to take no more than a few 
weeks, had become a costly five year war against an underestimated royalist opposition.
2
 
Efforts at international diplomacy had come full circle.  The original withdrawal 
agreements first proposed by US diplomat Ellsworth Bunker in 1963 continued to serve as 
the basis for peace negotiation throughout the conflict and were finally implemented in 
December 1967. 
On November 5, 1967, Abdullah Sallal boarded a plane bound for Moscow, ostensibly 
to attend the 50
th
 Anniversary celebrations of the Russian Revolution.  Sallal’s plane never 
made it to Moscow as he was diverted to Baghdad where he would spend the next 14 years 
in exile.
3
 According to his unpublished memoirs, this exile was self-imposed as he 
understood what was awaiting him following Egypt’s withdrawal.4  Sallal had long fallen 
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out of favor with fellow Yemeni republicans and would have been deposed earlier were it 
not for continued Egyptian intervention and support.  In Sallal’s absence, Qadi ‘Abd al-
Rahman al-Iryani, a prominent member of the “third-force” and one of the “Soviet-Five” 
launched a coup taking over the YAR.  Iryani was joined by fellow members of the “third-
force”, Ahmad Nu’man and Muhammad ‘Ali Uthman, to form a triumvirate ruling 
coalition.  Hassan al-‘Amri was named Prime Minister and Hassan Makki was named 
Foreign Minister giving Soviet-friendly Yemenis influential positions in the new republic. 
Egyptian aerial and artillery superiority for five years of the conflict had prevented a 
full-scale royalist advance on the capital city.  Nasser’s withdrawal which would be 
completed by November 29, 1967 was already in its advanced stages, leaving republican 
defensive positions and the entire “strategic-triangle” vulnerable to attack.  With the 
republican defenses weakened, Imam al-Badr’s counterattack on Sana’a, long-expected 
after the September 1962 coup, finally materialized in December 1967.
5
 The siege lasted 
for seventy days and became a defining moment in Yemeni national history.  After the 
Egyptian and British withdrawals from Yemen, the Saudi-royalist threat was met with the 
collective efforts of multiple segments of Yemeni society.  NLF and FLOSY fighters 
arrived in Sana’a to protect the revolution and the war against al-Badr’s forces became a 
popular revolt as previously anti-Egyptian republican tribes joined on the side of the 
republic.
6
  Both Iryani and Makki left the city for purportedly unrelated reasons leaving 
Hassan al-‘Amri, who had only recently been released from political detention in Cairo, in 
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command.
7
  ‘Amri’s heroic performance at maintaining the city’s morale and civil order 
during the siege and eventually breaking through royalist lines earned him the historic 
name of “The General of Yemen”.8 
With the onset of the siege in December 1967, Iryani turned directly to Moscow with an 
urgent request for aid.  In protest against what the Arab world deemed as the American 
collusion in the 1967 War, the YAR recalled its ambassador and curtailed diplomatic 
relations with the US.  Since there were no longer diplomatic relations between the two 
countries, the US foreign office was at liberty to pursue a more open and noncommittal 
stance towards both sides in the continuing civil conflict.  US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia 
Hermann Eilts explained the current status of US-YAR relations: 
“I assume that with YAR withdrawal of recognition from USG our political 
commitments in Yemen have been wiped clean. We ought now try to 
establish contact with as wide spectrum of Yemeni political contacts as 
possible. We should seek develop at least some influence with all 
groupings, but at this time commit ourselves to none. By doing so, 
hopefully, we may at some future time be able to exert constructive 
influence for a broadly based Yemeni Government.”9 
 
In the absence of US intervention, the Soviets responded to Iryani with emergency 
airlifts of medical supplies, food, and ammunition for the besieged city.
10
 A total of 10,000 
tons of supplies were delivered to Sana’a along with a Soviet squadron of MiG-19s, pilots 
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and ground crew intended to provide air cover for republican positions.
11
  The royalists 
claimed to have shot down a “red-haired MiG-17 fighter pilot” who was wearing a Russian 
wristwatch and held Soviet documentation.
12
  Bruce Condé explained how the royalists felt 
towards the Soviet intervention: “The Yemen war was simply a communist geopolitical 
move with Nasser as the agent.”   Sheikh Abdullah al-Ahmar of the Hashid tribal alliance 
threatened royalists with Soviet-orchestrated poison-gas bombings if they continued the 
siege of Sana’a.13 Hassan al-’Amri made similar public threats on Radio Sana’a claiming 
that “he will summon Soviet warplanes to destroy with poison gas, napalm, rockets, and 
bombs ‘every living thing’ in the Royalist two-thirds of Yemen.”  In response, 
Condé commissioned new royalists stamps called “freedom fighter” that portrayed 
tribesmen with small arms fighting against Soviets, rather than Egyptians to reflect the 
shifting enemies.
14
   
On March 21, 1968, the YAR declared that it had signed a new Soviet-Yemeni 
Friendship Treaty acting to solidify their alliance and continued cooperation.  To 
emphasize the sincerity of their commitment, and in response to renewed hostilities in 
August 1968, Moscow organized 75-100 roundtrip flights to Yemen carrying munitions 
and supplies to the last battlefields of the Yemen civil war.
15
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In March 1969, Prince Muhammad ibn al-Husayn resigned as the Imam’s deputy and 
royalist general.  At that point Imam al-Badr realized that continuing the royalist military 
efforts would only result in more Yemeni bloodshed.  According to his own recollections, 
al-Badr agreed to sever the allegiance between the royalist tribesmen and the Hamid al-Din 
family, allowing political flexibility to negotiate with Iryani and the YAR.  Official 
negotiations took place during the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Jeddah 
from March 23-26, 1969.  Both sides agreed to form a unified government with republican 
and royalist representation, albeit excluding the Hamid al-Din family.  Several weeks later, 
Saudi Arabia recognized the YAR, officially ending that era of international intervention in 
Yemen.
16
  The YAR Minister of Economics Muhammad Sa’id al-Attar argued that the 
northern opposition was driven by the presence of a foreign power in Yemen that might 
infringe upon their tribal independence in the highlands.  Once the Egyptians and Soviets 
had withdrawn from Yemen, the temporary alliance with al-Badr was no longer a 
necessary measure.
17
 
While the royalist and republicans were fighting their final battles in the north, the 
British-created Federation of South Arabia was quickly collapsing.  On November 30, 
1967, the day after the British withdrew from Yemen, the NLF declared an independent 
state of the People’s Republic of South Yemen (PRSY).  The NLF was able to take 
advantage of the power vacuum created by the simultaneous withdrawal of Britain and 
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Egypt.
18
  The NLF sent a delegation to Moscow and obtained political recognition from the 
Kremlin.  By early 1968 a group of Soviet military advisers arrived in Aden.  Political 
tensions continued in South Yemen as a radical Marxist branch of the NLF gained power 
and reorganized their party as the Yemeni Socialist Party.  On December 1, 1970, South 
Yemen became the first and only Arab communist state, the People’s Democratic Republic 
of Yemen (PDRY). 
As the PDRY became a center for Soviet military affairs in the region with a large naval 
and air presence, Moscow subsequently allowed their strategic relationship with Sana’a to 
deteriorate.
19
 The USSR decided to abandon Sana’a for a number of reasons.  Multiple 
coup attempts by left-wing Yemeni groups against YAR General Hassan al-‘Amri failed, 
pushing the republic further to the conservative right and into an alliance with Saudi 
Arabia and Western powers.  This political stance was demonstrated by the YAR decision 
in July 1969 to resume diplomatic relations with West Germany in exchange for an aid 
package worth 1.5 million pounds.  Saudi Arabia continued to improve its relations with 
the YAR, offering their recognition in July 1970
20
 along with a renewable aid package 
worth $20 million.  Individual “stipends” or bribes were given to Yemeni tribal sheikhs to 
maintain their allegiance.
21
  Saudi Arabia came to view the YAR as a buffer between the 
Marxist PDRY and the Saudi border.  Furthermore, despite the precarious royalist position 
and the relative strength of the republican army equipped with Soviet weaponry, the last 
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battle of the civil war was hardly a measure of success.  Depleted royalist forces captured 
the city of Sa’dah from republican forces in February 1970, placing them in a relative 
position of strength in advance of the conference for national reconciliation.
22
   
Legacy of the Yemen civil war 
 The Yemen civil war was a pivotal moment in the history of the Middle East.  The 
decline of Arab nationalism and Nasser’s expansionist foreign policy was brought about by 
the Egyptian intervention in Yemen.
23
 It would be incorrect to assume that Nasser’s 
presence in Yemen was a complete failure.  For one, the Yemeni republic remained intact 
despite eight years of war with the royalists.  As part of the Saudi-Egyptian Khartoum 
agreement, Egypt was given a share of Saudi oil wealth and employment opportunity for 
hundreds of thousands of Egyptian workers in the Saudi oil industry during the 1970s and 
1980s.  Finally, Nasser succeeded in securing the Red Sea approach to the Suez Canal by 
uprooting the threatening British military presence in Aden.  Egyptian presence in North 
Yemen and its support for the NLF and later FLOSY were instrumental in forcing an early 
British withdrawal from Aden and a collapse of the FSA.
24
 Rather than a harbinger of 
defeat, the war in Yemen gave Nasser an opportunity to further his personal security, 
economic, and ideological agenda in the region in a relatively low-stakes conflict 2,000 
miles away from Egypt. 
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 The real victors in the Yemeni civil war were Saudi Arabia and the USSR.  Without 
expending their own troops, the Saudis managed to secure a stable ally south of the border.  
The emergent YAR in 1970 represented perhaps the most ideal state the Saudis could have 
envisioned.  The Shi’i monarch in Yemen had been exiled, the state was weak and 
decentralized and dependent upon continued Saudi funds.  The most populous region on 
the Arabian Peninsula was split between North and South, allowing Saudi Arabia to 
maintain its regional hegemony and patronage of the YAR.
25
 
The USSR similarly saw its vision of an ideal South Arabian state emerge in the PDRY.  
As early as June 1968, 18 Soviet ships visited Aden, a number that would increase 
exponentially over the subsequent years.
26
  The Marxist country in South Arabia became a 
Soviet naval and military base for the interim of the Cold War and served as a strategic 
base for missions to post-colonial Africa; Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Somalia in 
particular.  The increased naval presence in the Indian Ocean region occurred as the British 
withdrew from “East of Suez” in the late 1960s and early 1970s and ushered in renewed 
era of Soviet interest in its “internationalist duty” in the Third World.27 
The Iraqi political scientist Adeed Dawisha best explains the aftermath of the Yemen 
civil war:  “Inevitably, the conservative instincts and social customs of the Yemenis, as 
well as their religious affiliations, meant that sooner rather than later Sana would replace 
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Moscow protection by that of Riyadh.”  By the 1970s, it had become obvious that the 
survival of the YAR depended “not so much on the Russian tank as on the Saudi riyal.”28 
As international interest began to wane in 1968, Pavel Demchenko, the senior Middle 
East correspondent for Pravda, observed that September 1962 was not a revolution, but 
rather “a centuries-old method of Yemeni regime change.”29 When al-Badr’s palace was 
first shelled on September 26, 1962, the conflict could still be considered a localized civil 
war.  Any significant delay in Egyptian intervention may have signified the failure of the 
republic and the return of the Yemeni Imamate, albeit perhaps somewhat reformed.  In 
1962, the republican model was not a universally accepted concept among local Yemenis.  
Neil McLean recounted a demonstrative and comical story circulated among the Yemenis 
during his travels: 
“It is told that that when the great meeting of chiefs was called on the 
Foundation of the Republic they were informed that ‘The Republic will 
bring you roads, schools, and other benefits which will make the Yemen 
into a modern country.” The chiefs shouted ‘Hooray, Long live the 
Republic,” but at the end of the meeting they asked “This is all very fine, 
but who is going to be the Imam?”30 
 
The local “regime change” was overrun by events and conflicts well beyond its border.  
The civil war was prolonged and the sufferings of Yemenis deepened as a result largely of 
players and forces much larger than themselves.  With each additional international 
intervention, it was easy to lose sight of the fact that this conflict, at its core, was a clash 
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between Yemen’s history and its future.  The state that emerged in 1970 was starkly 
different from the isolationist regime of Imams Yahya and Ahmad.  The previous 
generation of autocratic monarchs made every effort to forestall Yemen’s entry into the 
international community.  Instead, the civil war brought the international community to 
Yemen’s doorstep and transformed the former kingdom into a modern nation-state.  Rather 
than demonize the individuals who brought destruction, death, and a prolonged 
international conflict to Yemen, the country continues to celebrate even Abdullah Sallal 
and ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Baydani as national heroes.31 Yemen’s state-issued history and 
memory focuses on the 1960s as a period of revolution, nationalism and modernization 
rather than a trying decade of civil strife and political uncertainty.   Even the most culpable 
collaborators and inept leaders have been granted the status of a national revolutionary 
hero. 
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